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How Moral is Helping Behavior?

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Psycholgy of Morality &
Democracy and Education

How Moral is Helping Behavior?

Simple intuition tells us that there ought to be a close, if not perfect, fit between helping behavior and morality, and that one way to promote morality is to teach adolescents to help and care about others. As one book title says, only "Some Do Care" (Colby & Damon, 1992). All other people need to develop a sense of caring and moral obligation in order to lay grounds for moral behavior. Because of its simplicity and its long tradition this intuition is very appealing. It is firmly rooted in our history of thought.[1] But is it right? Can we built an effective program for moral educational on the basis of this simple intuition?

In my paper, I will report about a study in which we addressed this question. Before I get to this, let us look at some examples from the classroom before we look at research.

First example: Bill, a student with learning disabilities, is about to fail the class. He also has no friends who would help him. So the teacher tells Bill's classmates that it is their duty to help Bill. Would they help? Some students disagree. Some for reason of laziness. Others think that helping someone who is not your friend is weird because helping is a sign of friendship. Others reckon if they would help someone else, then their own grades might be negatively affected (see Thorkildsen, 1997). Would there be anyone in the class to help Bill?

Second example: Nancy who is about to flunk class, studies hard for her final math test. When she realizes that she still isn't able to solve certain types of math problems, she asked her best friend for help. Her friend should let her copy the answers during the test. How many of the students, do you think, would help in such an instance?

You might interrupt me and say this is not 'helping' but 'cheating,' not moral but immoral behavior. Yes, from your point of view you are right. Yet the students from their point of view, have good reason, too. Obviously, there

are different intuitions about the morality of helping depending on the perspective one takes.

<u>Third example</u>: Recently, a high school ethics teacher told me that she uses in her teaching <u>moral exemplars</u>. She asks her students to do research on people who made it into the news because they exhibited an unusual degree of altruistic helping behavior, like <u>Mother Theresa</u>, who has founded a hospital for the poor in India, or <u>Oscar Schindler</u>, who saved many Jews from the Holocaust, or a young <u>Bosnian nurse</u> who fled from her war-torn country but returned to help wounded and sick people, risking her own life.

The students' responses to them, she observed, are, at best, apathy and indifference. Often they respond with laughter and sarcasm. At some point of time she started to believe that her students lacked any sense of care and altruism. However, when observing these students in other situations, she had to conclude that these students are quite normal. Many of them were actively helping others or were involved in public service projects.

Intuition and Critical Thinking

How can we resolve the contradictions that become visible in these examples? The moral philosopher R. H. Hare (1981, p. 26) concludes that as long as we deal with these problem merely on the basis of our <u>intuitions</u> we cannot find a rational, non-obtrusive solution. All one can say is that one intuition is as good as the other. To impose a certain understanding of helping on their students, teachers would have to resort to their power status. The students then have merely the choice either to subordinate their thinking to the teacher´s or to protest by the way of apathy, sarcasm, or open rebellion. In either case, all we can achieve by this would be to replace one intuition about helping through another one, and it might not even be the intuition which we favor but one that the child picks up somewhere else.

A rational, non-obtrusive, democratic way to teach morality can only be reached, Hare insists, if we move from the level of intuitive thinking to the level of <u>critical thinking</u>. This is thinking that follows the rules of symbolic logic and reason.

Habermas (1983) and Kohlberg (1984) take this argument one step further. They argue that critical thinking can become productive only if it is embedded in a moral discourse among equals. Thus, it is not sufficient that teachers develop critical thinking but they must also develop a "discourse perspective" (Oser, 1986). They have to involve students in a moral discourse rather than making single-handed decisions.

It follows from this that an important step for advancing our educational methods of moral education is to take the students' points of view seriously. This means, first and above all, to learn about them and, if necessary, to correct false preconceptions. Most teachers believe that they take students' perspective into account when planning their classes. Yet by this many mean that they base their teaching on a general percept of students or a stereotype of students rather than on information gathered from real students through open dialogue.

Taking students into account, requires both a) systematic research on students' moral views and b) immediate discourse with them on a day-to-day basis. Each approach has its specific merits, and neither one can substitute for the other. To get to know students, teachers must always supplement research findings through their continuous, open communication with their students, and they must supplement their anecdotal knowledge about students through findings from systematic studies. Research can provide teachers with knowledge about their students which immediate communication, for various reasons, might not reveal.

Forms of Helping Behavior

To probe more systematically into our intuitions about helping and morality, we will discuss the nature and theory of helping behavior in more detail.

Helping has many meanings. These meanings depend on the particular situation. If we are in deep trouble we are mostly very grateful for help and little interested who and why we receive help. However, from a more distant point of view, we wonder who helped us and for what reasons. Moreover, we may get to the point to think about the value of this help for our overall need to be self-reliant and grow through our own endeavors rather than becoming

dependent on other people and loosing our ability to cope with problems. If we see someone in deep trouble most of us immediately have the desire to help. However, after a little thinking we may conclude that other persons would do a better job in helping (Midlarsky, 1984), or that the troubled person may cope with the situation him- or herself, or that we should carefully limit our help to what we really can do and what other persons can do better. So an observer must first very thoroughly inspect the situation before he or she can infer a helping disposition from overt behavior. Above all, the observer must take the subject´s reasoning into account (Bierhoff, 1984; Krebs, 1982; Lind, 1989).

The meaning of helping depends also on the social perspective one takes. If my best friend asks me to help him during exams by letting him copy my answers, I may view this as helping, i.e., as something morally justified. If, however, I take the point of view of the whole group or society, I will view my "help" as cheating, i.e., as morally wrong. Similarly, if I help my friend to beat up his worst enemy, I feel that I have done something admirable. If, however, I take the point of view of my friend´s enemy, my doings no longer can be called helping behavior.

Helping behavior is a disposition concept. We usually call a person´s behavior helping only if it was intentional but not accidental. If someone saved my life only because he or she believed I was a good friend of him or her, I will be little grateful to that person though I am very glad that I am still alive.

If we feel obliged to help we also have to consider how this help effects other people including ourselves. "Ideal prosocial persons," Dan Solomon and his colleagues (1990) argue, "strive for an optimal self-other balance, attending to their own needs and to those of others simultaneously" (p. 1). "Altruistic behavior," as Krebs (1982) writes, "is not necessarily moral or just behavior. In fact, inasmuch as the idea of altruism means giving more than one´s share, or giving more than one 'should,' it entails a violation of the balance of reciprocity that defines justice" (p. 73).

Because questions of justice and of balancing rights and duties are involved, the decision to help or not to help depends, among other things, on the actor´s perception of other persons' readiness to help. Research frequently shows that people are more likely to help others if they perceive others as willing to help, too (Bierhoff, 1980; Staub, 1996).

Finally, research shows that helping involves not only feelings of obligation but requires the ability to make mature judgments in the face of conflicting moral norms and principles (Krebs, 1982; Kohlberg, 1984). Because of this, helping is subject to developmental change, and may be fostered through education (Power et al., 1989).

To integrate these findings, I proposed a <u>dual-aspect-theory</u> of moral development and helping behavior (Lind, 1985; 1989; 1993). This theory makes a clear distinction between the <u>affective</u> and the <u>cognitive</u> aspects of helping behavior, between a person´s desire to help and his or her ability to help adequately. Research has shown that already in pre-school age, children have a very high sense of obligation to help others but their ability to help in adequate ways is little developed. Adequate helping develops only through the use of reason and dialogue (Lind, 1989; see also Krebs, 1982).[2] The dual-aspect-theory predicts that the development of the cognitive, or ability, aspect is most important criterion for the quality of helping behavior. In contrast to cognitive-developmental theory,[3] this theory predicts that the ability to help adequately, like other moral competencies, can regress. Regression is very likely to occur when two conditions are met, a) when the individual has not developed a "critical level" of moral judgment competence, beyond which moral development becomes self-sustaining, that is, when the individual enters the phase of self-education, and b) when a person has no opportunities to apply his or her moral competencies (Lind, 1996).

The dual-aspect-theory lets us predict that normal adolescents and adults will have a strong desire to help other people but that their decision to help and how to help will be based strongly on their perception of the situational context. This perception in turn, will be more rational and more mature the higher the subjects' moral judgment competence. More specifically, we predict that highly competent subjects will base their willingness to help (and actual helping behavior) both a) on a feeling of personal responsibility, and b) on a rational assessment of the situation, rather than on external "triggers" like authority and role models.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

In this paper, I will test some hypotheses that follow from the two contrasting views on helping behavior. Because the results of these tests seem to have strong bearing on the way in which we teach, or should teach, moral behavior, this hypothesis testing involves secondary school students as subjects.

1. Do students really have such a low desire to help others, as simple intuitions assert? Or do most of the students have a desire to help other who heed help?

   2. Does, as our intuition would suggest, peoples' 'chronic' desire to help determine their willingness to help others in a concrete situation? Or does helping in concrete situations depend more on an authority´s intervention (the teacher said I should help), role models (others would help) or a sense of personal responsibility (I would feel responsible if someone got into trouble because of me)?

   3. Does level of moral judgment competence, as simple intuition implies, directly determine a person´s willingness to help, or does it, as our dual-aspect-theory implies, rather determine the way in which he or she decides what to do?

Methods and Subjects

My answers to these questions rest on an empirical study that Leonore Link and I conducted in 1987 (Link & Lind, 1988). This study was designed, among other things, to test the hypotheses mentioned above concerning the relationship between helping behavior, situational conditions and individual´s moral development.[4] Although, the survey was done some years ago, the findings are still relevant for our questions. None of the findings reported here have been published before. All analyses were done especially for this presentation.

   The sample of this study comprises 219 secondary school students (40 percent were males, 60 percent females). The subjects attended several school-types: German low-track "Hauptschule" (main school), vocational school ("Berufsschule"), science-oriented "Realschule," and the high-track university-

bound high school ("Gymnasium"). The age of the subjects ranges from 13 to 22 years of age. In the analysis, the N's vary because of missing data on some items.

Research Instrument

The research instrument comprised two parts, a "narrative questionnaire" on helping behavior and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) by Lind (1993; 1995; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).

The part of the narrative questionnaire, that is relevant for our research questions, describes contains the following situation:

"Sometimes, there are class-mates who have no close friends and who are disliked by the class. Bill is such an disliked class-mate. He has no friends in your class. His achievements are low, especially in one subject that you are particularly good in. Bill is likely to flunk the final exams and fail the class. Everybody else does well. The teacher asks you to help Bill studying so he would also pass the exams."

After this description of the situation, the subjects are asked four questions. To assess subjects feeling of obligation to help we asked: <u>Do you think you should help Bill in this situation?</u>

To assess the subjects' willingness to help, we asked: <u>Would you help him in this situation?</u> As most other studies, we did not observe factual helping behavior. Like these, we felt that the subjects' willingness to help was information enough to at least partly answer our research questions. We had to balance the advantages of direct observation of helping behavior, which can only be done in laboratory settings, against the restrictions that a laboratory experiment would have imposed on our research questions. Nevertheless, such experiments need to be done and have been successfully done.

To learn about subjects' perceptions of social facts that might be relevant for his or her decision to help, we asked two questions, first: <u>Imagine that you did not help and Bill flunked his class: How much would you feel responsible for this?</u> Second, <u>How many of your class-mates would help Bill in this</u>

situation? (The complete questions and answers are printed in the Appendix, p. 28).

Moral judgment competence was measured by the Moral Judgment Test, MJT by Lind (1993; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985). In the MJT, the subjects have to rate moral arguments that oppose their own opinion on the particular solution of a moral dilemma. This task has shown to be a very efficient test of subjects' level of moral judgment competence which is indexed through the MJT´s C-score. Many children and adults find it very difficult to appreciate the moral quality of an argument when it opposes their opinion on some issue. They indistinguishably reject opposing arguments even when this argument agrees with their moral principles and ideals, and accept all arguments when they support their stances on a conflict even when these arguments reflect a moral orientation that they would normally reject. In a series of laboratory experiments, it has been shown that the ability to rate arguments solely on the basis of their moral quality rather than on the basis of their opinion-agreement, cannot be faked upward (Lind, 1993; 1996; Wasel, 1997).

This operational definition of moral judgment competence regardless they should regardless of their moral Kohlberg (1964) once defined as the ability to judge in accordance with one´s own moral principles and to act upon them. Accordingly, subjects get a high C-score when their judgment behavior shows that they are highly able to distinguish arguments in regard to their moral quality, and to base their rating on this distinction. If a subject is merely consistent in regard to arguments' agreement or disagreement with his or her opinion, then he or she gets a low C-score.

The C-index is designed as a continuous measure ranging from zero (reflecting zero ability) to 100 (reflecting a person´s perfect ability to apply his or her moral values to a conflict situation). This index is a pure measure of the cognitive aspect of moral judgment behavior. That is, that it is logically independent of the moral ideals or affects a subject has. Hypothetically, a subject could have extremely low moral ideals and still get a high C-score. However, in reality, we consistently find that high moral judgment competence, as reflected in the C-score, on the one side, and preference for high end moral principles are strongly correlated (Lind, 1993 This finding supports Paget´s hypothesis of an affective-cognitive parallelism and also

explains why some tests of moral attitudes produce similar findings as pure tests of moral judgment competence (Lind, 1995).

The theoretical validity of both instruments, the questionnaire and the test, has been established through a series of studies. As already noted, the MJT´s C-index has shown to be not fakeable experimental settings in which other tests could be faked upward (Lind, 1995; Wasel, 1997). Furthermore, subjects usually get lower scores on the MJT than on other tests of moral development like Kohlberg´s Moral Judgment Interview or Rest´s Defining Issues Test (Lind, 1995). Nevertheless, the C-score is sensitive to educationally induced change (Lind, 1993).

The questionnaire on helping behavior seems to be valid. None of the subjects had problems with understanding the questions. There no missing data. Other evidence comes from the teachers who administered the questionnaire. They reported that the students filled in the questionnaire with great interest. One teacher even reported that, after responding to these questions, the students demanded to discuss these topics with the teacher in an extra session.[5]

The questionnaire and test was applied during classes. All subjects were allowed as much time as they needed to answer in the questions.[6]

Findings

What are the findings from this study? 1. The first finding is that, contrary to simple intuitions, very many adolescents (122 out of 207) would help Bill, even though he is nobody´s friend. Only 9 out of 207 students said they were not willing to help (Fig. 1).

This findings is supported by the students' answers to another questions. When being asked how important it is that students help each other even when they are not friends (see Appendix, p. 28), 84.5 percent of the adolescents answered that it is important or very important. So in this respect our simple intuition about students' willingness to help is clearly false. It is interesting to note that more students said that should help (because the teacher told them so) than said that they would help (169 versus 122, out of 207). Hence the teacher´s request did not motivate all students to help.

According to hypothesis two, external "motivators" may enhance students' willingness to help their peer: the role model of other students (if most other students help I will do so, too), and the authority of the teacher who requests helping another student.

Both external motivators seem to be important for many secondary school students. The correlation between the students' perception of others' willingness to help and their own willingness to help ($\underline{r}$ = .44; Fig. 2) is higher than any other correlation that we found. Note that more than 50 percent (105 out of 219) of the subjects believe that nobody or only a few of their peers would help Bill learning. Only 16 out of 219 students think that many others would help Bill (Fig. 3). Note how this figures contrast with the 60 percent of the students who said they would help Bill. The social psychologist Floyd Allport (1924) called this gap "pluralistic ignorance." A high degree of pluralistic ignorance in regard to helping behavior, has also been found in other studies of secondary school students , e.g., by Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989).
The second external motivator, teacher´s request to help, seems to have only little less impact on students' willingness to help. This correlation is $\underline{r}$ = .37.

Yet, internal motivation, students' feeling of personal responsibility is also highly correlated with their willingness to help ($\underline{r}$ = .38).

These kinds of motivation seem to be more important for a person´s willingness to help than their 'chronic' disposition to help ("It is important for me that students help one another") and moral development scores with students' willingness to help. The respective correlations are only $\underline{r}$ = .11 and $\underline{r}$ = .08 see Fig. 2). These differential correlations were predicted by the dual-aspect theory but not by our simple intuitions about helping behavior. The latter had let us to believe that chronic helping disposition and moral development correlate highly with people´s willingness to help.

The third hypothesis derived from the dual-aspect theory is most central. It states that a person´s moral judgment competence influences helping behavior indirectly, that is, it qualifies the way in which external events can trigger helping behavior (or other morally relevant behaviors). Specifically, this hypothesis states that the more competent adolescents' judgement is, the more do they follows their moral principles rather than let their decisions depend on external events. If this hypothesis is correct, we expect, for example,

that morally competent students will decide to help because they believe it is the right thing to do and not merely because the teacher said so or because other students would do so.

We test this hypothesis by dividing our sample into two groups, those with high C-scores (above 30) and those with low C-scores (below 30), and looking at the correlations cited above for these two groups separately.

Our findings clearly support this hypothesis. The correlation between willingness to help on the one side and external motivators is much higher for low scorers than for high scorers (Fig. 4). This may indicate that students with a high moral judgment competence let their behavior determine from external triggers like role models and authorities to a lesser extend than students with low moral judgment competence.

In line with this findings, Figure 4 also shows that the role of internal motivators, like students' sense of personal responsibility, is hardly affected by their level of moral judgment competence. For high scorers the correlation is only slightly higher than for low scorers.

Further analysis reveals that adolescents' perception of others' willingness to help is in turn correlated with their level of moral development. There is an interesting, non-linear relationship between both variables (Fig. 5). At the lower end of the C-scale, subjects' perception of their peers' willingness to help is negatively correlated with their C-scores: The more competent, the more skeptical (or ignorant). This negative correlation, however, changes into a positive one when we look at the higher C-score levels. There, students' perceptions of others' helping behavior is the more accurate the higher their moral judgment competence.

It seems that at the low and the high end of the scale, subjects' perception is equally accurate though for different reasons. While at the lower end, the perception that others will help might be based on naive thought, at the high end, this perception is based on a more mature level of interaction with peers.

Discussion

The findings presented here show that the intention to help is much more prevalent among adolescents than many of us seem to believe. Most students

<u>wish</u> to help others who are in need. People who wish to help may often refrain from helping for reasons which they think are justified: they may not help a) because their social environment disapproves of it (as may be signaled through the fact that others to not help), b) because they conclude that the best help is not to intervene but let others do the job more effectively, or c) they may reason that in this particular situation one should not help because such help would undermine the help-seeking person´s willingness and competence to cope with it himself or herself.

This has also be shown in many other studies. Turiel (1983) found that already very young children were able to discern moral principles from mere social conventions. Similarly, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) showed that children at elementary school age could make <u>moral</u> judgments. Children not only distinguish moral from non-moral values and rules, but also show a clear sense of moral obligation. Even juvenile delinquents hold a moral values system (Nucci, 1995). They prefer to deal with moral problems on the level of moral universal principles rather than on the level of group conventions or selfish motives (Lind, 1993). In fact, this finding is so universal that many think it is too trivial to be reported anymore.

The findings of our study shows that many current practices in moral education are not appropriate because they rest on false beliefs. In a study of more than one hundered teachers, Lind (1993) found that most teachers grossly underestimate students´ willingness to help their peers. This may explain why many teachers believe that they ought to instill in students this willingness through the use of moral exemplars, or other more direct techniques like moral indoctrination (for a critical overview on indoctrination approaches to character education, see Kohn, 1997).

This may also explain why students do not feel motivated through such teaching methods, or may even feel offended by them. Students may sense that people who do help, may also do so for non-moral reason, that is, their behavior may be seen as highly altruistic from the outside, but may in fact only be partly motivated by moral motives, if at all. For example, some people who use aid as a means for making others dependent on them, help without having a helping intention. Other people may help other people because this helping behavior is coupled with the sensation of risk. Oscar Schindler´s life seems to exemplify this case. First, he seems to have been motivated to help Jews by

some lust for sensation rather than by moral motives. Only eventually, moral motives seemed have taken the lead over, or even replaced, such non-moral motivations (Wundheiler, 1988).

Little wonder that many students feel insulted by teachers who try to instill moral ideals in them through indoctrination. Not to mention the fact that this method is hardly compatible with the principles of democracy. Such educational efforts may even have harmful effects. If we insist that students' lack of helping behavior is solely due to a lack of moral attitude, ignoring the other factors that are necessary to translate moral ideals into adequate behavioral decisions, we will merely instill in them moralistic attitudes and feeling of guilt. Strong feeling of guilt then might cause people to develop cynicism and depression, and to submit uncritically to any authority. Both cynicism and depression, as James Gilligan (1995) asserts, in turn are the main causes of aggression and violence.

Using moral exemplars for teaching morality is problematic for this and an additional reason. When adolescents are confronted with moral saints, they may develop feelings of moral guilt so strongly that they will shy away from, rather than use, them as role models. Furthermore, they may follow the example of highly publicized moral exemplars for non-moral reasons or may become cynics when they find about the shortcomings of their moral heroes. Even the most highly praised "moral" people may be just plain human being who desire to comply with the particular social expectations of their group. For example, in an excellent study of rescuers of Jews during the Second World War, Michael Gross (1994) "found very few instances of isolated, detached individuals acting on the force of personal convictions or altruism alone" (p. 465; see also Gross, 1995). The main reason for engaging in this "altruistic" behavior seems to have been social rather than moral. Second, the use moral exemplars, may teach the wrong lesson. When looking closer at some of exemplars, the students may find out that these persons were not all-round saints as they are depicted by the media.

The findings of this study also point toward other, more promising ways of moral education, namely the fostering of students' moral judgment competence and the accuracy of their social perception. As we have seen, the development of moral judgment competence makes the individual less dependent on external motivators for helping others, like other students or the teacher´s

command. The higher an adolescent´s moral judgment competence score, the lower was the correlation between his or her intention to help on the one side and, for example, his or her perception of the peer´s willingness to help on the other. While this perception can play an important role in one´s decision to help, it is often inaccurate because it is merely based on hearsay and social stereotypes rather than on adolescents' own observations, and thus can hinder a student to help another student though he or she actually wished to help. Only on a higher stage of moral development, as in McNamee´s (1978) sample, actual helping behavior depends more strongly on a person´s moral ideals than on his or her social perceptions. Hence, there are two ways to increase the likelihood that students help others. One way is to help students to perceive more accurately their peers moral intentions and dispositions. This can be done best through providing sufficient opportunities for unrestricted communication among students about moral issues. The second way is to foster students' moral judgment competence. Through this students will become less dependent on social triggers of helping behavior but be more guided by their own judgment. Both ways are pursued in cognitive-developmental approaches to moral education, for example, Dilemma Discussion (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975), Just Community (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989), Democratic School (Mosher, 1993) and Discourse Pedagogics (Oser, 1986). These methods have shown not only to be highly effective in promoting moral judgment competence in children, but also in increasing the accuracy of students' perception of their peers moral norms (Higgins, 1980). In the intervention project "Democracy and Education in Schools" (DES), which used a combination of both methods, Fritz Oser and I found similar tendencies (Lind, 1993; Lind & Althof, 1992; Oser, 1996). A most recent support for this comes from the carefully designed pre-posttest study by Kuther and Higgins-D'Allessandro (1997). They found that through Just community meetings, students learn to understand the moral dimension of behaviors which, before, they had perceived to be merely a matter of personal preference.

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Endnotes

1. Famous thinkers from August Comte (1830-42), the French founder of modern sociology, and Arthur Schopenhauer (1840), the very influential German moral philosopher, to contemporary psychologists like Martin Hoffman (1988), Ervin Staub (1996) and Nancy Eisenberg (1996), treat morality and helping or altruistic behavior as if they would be one.

2. Our <u>dual-aspect-theory</u> of moral behavior and development is a reformulation of cognitive-developmental theorizing, as advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and his colleagues, on the basis of extensive longitudinal, cross-cultural and experimental research, and intervention studies in schools (Lind, 1993). The dual-aspect-theory agrees with Kohlberg´s theory in that it also emphasizes the competence aspect of all behavior in the so-called "affective domain." However, in contrast with that theory, it assumes that these competencies require educational inputs and regress, if an learning environment ceases to exist before the individual has reached a critical level of development at which he or she can self-educated himself or herself (Lind, 1996). Moreover, the dual-aspect-theory states that to make progress in research about these issues, we have to develop appropriate assessment methods that let us simultaneously assess <u>affective</u> aspects (that is, values, attitudes, intentions, preferences and alike) on the one hand, and <u>cognitive</u> aspects (that is, structural properties of behavior, competencies, abilities and alike) on the other hand. As long as we measure these aspects as if they were separate behaviors, measurement cannot be considered valid in regard to this theory (Lind, 1995; Lind & Wakenhut, 19985).

3. "Kohlberg has hypothesized that the developmental levels that he has described constitute stages in a strict Piagetian sense. First, the stage concept implies that under normal environmental conditions developmental change will always be upward in direction" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984, p. 42).

4. We shared the subjects and some parts of the research instruments. Both her and my study were done in preparation of a research on the effectiveness of moral education programs, which we did in collaboration with Fritz Oser and Wolfgang Althof at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, as well as Sybille Reinhardt, Heinz Schirp, Detlev Garz (see the special issue of <u>The Moral Education Forum, 17,</u> 1992).

5. Other criteria for test evaluation, like the so-called "reliability" does not apply to this research instrument. In the case of the MJT, consistency information is used to describe the cognitive structure of the test-taker, so it cannot be used for describing properties of the test, if it can be used at all to describe the properties of any measure (see Lind, 1995). In the case of the narrative questions about helping, their high face validity makes it unnecessary to check on their reliability. The latter must always be higher or equal to the former. So is provide interesting information only when the validity seems to be low.

6. The survey was directed by Leonore Link, so were the data processing. The instrument was administered by teachers who integrated it into their regular curriculum of social studies or German language. I like to thank them for their cooperation and help at this point.

Appendix: Figures

Fig. 2 Answers to the questions: "Do you think that you <u>should</u> help Bill in this situation?" and "<u>Would</u> you indeed help him in this instance?" Data source: Link & Lind, 1988; analysis by the author.

Fig. 3 Correlation between moral judgment competence (C-score) and various hypothesized factors (N = 212; data source: Link & Lind, 1988; analysis by the author)

Fig. 4 Answers to the question: "How many of your class-mates do you think would help Bill?" Data source: Link & Lind, 1988; analysis by the author.

Fig. 5 The correlation between willingness to help and external and internal triggers for two groups of students, with high (N= 47) and low (N=108) C-scores (MJT). Data source: Link & Lind (1988).

Fig. 6 Perception of helping by others as a function of subjects'
own moral judgment competence (MJT). N = 219. Data source:
Link & Lind, 1988; analysis by the author.

Appendix: Items of the questionnaire used in this study

<u>A.</u> To which degree does this apply to your school:
(002) Students help each other even when they are not close friends.
Answers: Does not apply at all ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Applies completely (check one).

<u>B.</u> How important are these things for you in regard to your school (circle one answer):
(021) That students help each other even when they are not close friends.
Answers: Unimportant ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
very important (check one).

<u>I.</u> "Sometimes, there are class-mates who have no close friends and who are disliked by the class. Think of this situation: Bill[1] is such an disliked class-mate. He has no friends in your class. His achievements are low, especially in one subject that you are particularly good in. Bill is likely to fail the class. Everybody else does well. The teacher asks you to help Bill with studying so he would also pass the exams.
(077) <u>Do you think you should help Bill in this situation? (Check one answer):</u>
　　　　○ Yes　　　　○ No　　　　○ Don't know
(078) <u>Would you help him in this situation?</u>
　　　　○ Yes　　　　○ No　　　　○ Don't know
(079) <u>How many of your class-mates would help Bill in this situation?</u>
　　　　○ Nobody　　　○ Few ○ Some　　　○ Many
(080) <u>Imagine that you did not help and Bill flunked his class: How much would you feel responsible for this?</u>
　　　　○ Not at all　　○ Little　　　○ Partly　　　○ Strongly ○
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Very strongly
(The <u>Moral Judgment Test,</u> MJT, is available from the author on request.)

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[1] In the German version, the protagonist´s name is "Bernd."