

MOSAIC'98, July 20th - 23rd, 1998

University of Konstanz, Germany

PROGRAM

Monday, July 20th

7 - 8 p.m. Begin of the meeting: Wine in the "Rosengarten" on the Flower Island of Mainau.

The Rosengarten is right next to the island's castle. The island is accessible by bus #4 and car from the town.

8 p.m. Opening banquet on the Island of Mainau, in the "Mälarstube" (covered by the conference fee).

([Guide to the locations](#))

Sessions in the University of Konstanz, Room "D 434" (Last minute changes!)

Tuesday, July 21st

9 - 10 a.m. Morality as it is apprehended and as it is manifested in behavior
(Mordecai Nisan, Jerusalem, Israel)

10 - 11 Where is the competence in moral judgment competence? The long way from theory
to measurement to practice
(Georg Lind, Konstanz, F.R.G.)

11 - 11.30 (Break)

11.30 - 12.30 Is there anything like innate morality
(Zsuzsanna Vajda, Szeged, Hungary)

1 p.m. LUNCH

3 - 4 p.m. Multiple conception about moral education. Competing paradigms in a Mexican higher
education setting
(Christina Moreno, Monterrey, Mexico)

4 - 5 p.m. Proper functioning constitutive of a priori concepts: Another way of understanding
common values?
(Richard Davies, Oxford, UK)

Evening ---

Wednesday, July 23rd

(OVER)

- 9 - 10 a.m. Moral and epistemological influences on participation in Christian churches
(Dawn E. Shrader, Ithaca NY, U.S.A.) - **cancelled** -
The uses and abuses of literature for moral education. Multi-cultural education as
moral education
(Tom Wren, Chicago, USA)
- 10 - 11. Are morality and religiousness distinct domains?
(Anna Laura Comunian & Nicola Purgato, Padua, Italy)
- 11 - 11.30 Break
- 11.30 a.m. - 1 p.m. MOSAIC Business meeting
- 1 p.m. LUNCH
- 3 - 4 p.m. Discourses on citizenship
(Helen Haste, Bath, UK)
- 4 - 5 p.m. Children's peer relations and reasoning about social rules
(Gavin Nobes, London, UK)
- 8 p.m. Social hour at Georg's house: Schottenstr. 65

Thursday, July 23rd

- 9 - 10 p.m. Can we achieve a multi-cultural democracy in jail?
(Daan Brugman, Utrecht, The Netherlands)
- 10 - 11 p.m. On the universalistic and culture-specific nature of some 'universal values'
(Ibolya Vari-Szilagyi, Budapest, Hungary)
- 11.30 - 12 Break (coffee)
- 12 p.m. LUNCH / End of the conference

Last change: July 20th, 1998

Author: Georg Lind

MOSAIC'98

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Where is the competence in moral judgment competence?
The long way from theory to measurement to practice

Georg Lind
Konstanz, F.R.G.

- Draft -

Socrates: „Now you have just said that virtue consists in a wish for good things plus the power to acquire them. [78 b] [...] So if one man is better than another, it must evidently be in respect of the power, and virtue, according to your account, is the power of acquiring good things.“ [Plato, Menon, § 78 c].

„Every action is virtue which exhibits a part of virtue, as if you had already told me what the whole is, so that I should recognize it even if you chop it up into bits.“ [79 c]¹

Socrates' two statements about virtue apply also to what we call today *moral competence*, and are both still highly significant. In my present reading, I believe that they mark off both a major achievement of modern psychology and a big problem that blocked (and still blocks) major progress in research and practice in the domain of moral development and education. In this paper, I will reinforce Socrates' first statement: Morality has a cognitive or competence aspect, and the discovery of this aspect by scholars like Levy-Suhl (1912), Piaget (1964/1932) and Kohlberg (1958; 1964), is one of the greatest achievements of modern psychology.

Yet, I want to challenge Socrates' second statement. Moral cognition or competence (I use both terms as synonyms here) can be validly recognized only by observing or measuring *pattern* of behavior and their *relationships* rather than isolated bits of it.

Before discuss this in more detail let me first look more closely at the two aspects of moral behavior.

Two aspects of moral behavior and development

It is notable that Socrates defines virtue in terms of two aspects, namely of morally good intentions (or moral attitudes) on the one side, and „the power of acquiring good things“ (or, as we would say today, moral competencies), and called this „power“ the most decisive aspect of virtue. This power come from the knowledge of the Good.

The notion of moral competence is the hallmark of modern cognitive-developmental psychology. While in former times it was believed that the possession of a moral attitude is a sufficient condition for behaving morally (Burton & Kunc, 1995; Hartshorne et al., 1928-1930; Lickona, 1996), cognitive-developmental theorists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg maintain, that moral attitudes or ideals are related to moral behavior in a complex way, and that this complex way can best be described in terms of cognitive structures or competencies, which the individual is to develop during the course of his or her development. Cognitive-developmental theorists hypothesize that, in order to enact their moral attitudes or principles in every-day life, humans must acquire a high level of *moral judgment competence*.

Why would we need such a competence in the moral domain? Doesn't it suffice to be strongly attached to moral ideals? The hypothesis of moral competence seems plausible for two reasons. First, for an ideal to be called a moral principle, it must be universally valid and, hence, general and abstract. So it always needs to be „translated“ into concrete decision making when applied to every-day life. For example, „justice“ is a universally valid moral principle highly esteemed by many people. Yet, in specific situations different people may view different courses of action as being „just.“ Different level of moral competence may account for a considerable amount of variation.

Second, there are more than one more principle and it is very likely that in a particular situation the moral principles involved suggest mutually exclusive courses of action. Such a situation is called a „moral dilemma.“ Obviously, to solve such a dilemma we need cognitive competencies. It would not help to increase the strength of our moral principles. On the contrary, this would only make the dilemma harder to solve.

Third, moral principles are but one determinant of our behavior and this source is acquired only late in a person's development. Basic biological needs (e.g., hunger, fatigue, anxiety), social needs (family bonds, friendship, subordination to authority) and needs of self-respect (opinion agreement), may conflict with moral principles, and will have to be brought into some balance with them. The need for opinion agreement is one of the best documented counter-players to moral principles (Keasey, 1973). If people have a strong

¹ Plato. *Protagoras and Meno*. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. Harmondsworth, England Penguin.

opinion about certain dilemmas, this tends to restrict their moral deliberation and discourse about a just solution. Moral reasons are rarely used, and if so, they are very selectively used to *defend* their opinion rather than to *evaluate* it. Only when a mature moral judgment competence is developed, people use moral principles to test their own opinions and decisions, and, if necessary, to revise them.

Accordingly, Kohlberg defines moral competence as "the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments" (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425). Moral competence then is the bridge between one's moral ideals on the one hand, and one's moral behavior on the other. "What we conceptualize as moral reasoning," Kohlberg (1984) writes, "is a cognitive competence" (p. 400).

So scholars from Socrates to Kohlberg agree that, to be complete, the description of moral behavior must include two different aspects, namely a) the attitudes or principles on which people base their behavior (= *affective aspect*), and b) the formal properties of the structural relationship between their moral attitudes or principles on the one hand, and their behaviors or decisions on the other (= *cognitive or competence aspect*).

I have tried to summarize this statement in my *Dual-Aspect* model of moral behavior (Figure 1; see Lind, 1978; 1985; 1995; 1998). Basically this model implies the following postulates:

- Affective and cognitive aspects of moral behavior must be clearly distinguished from one another, though they describe only different properties of human behavior and not different classes or sets of behavior, as some 'component models' imply. As Piaget (1976) writes, "affective and cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, although distinct: the former depend on energy, and the latter depend on structure" (Piaget, 1976, p. 71). While affective aspects (like moral attitudes or values) describe the aims and pretenses of our behavior, the cognitive aspects describe some important formal properties like the degree of its *integration* (consistency) and *differentiation* (situational adequacy).
- Moral judgment competence, that is, the ability to make integrated and differentiated judgments based on one's own moral principles, is the key aspect for understanding moral *development* and *differences* in moral behavior. Moral principles or values are indispensable for moral behavior. Without them there would be no moral behavior. Yet, preferences for certain moral ideals seem to be developed so early and in so many people that they differ little in most people regardless of age, level of education, socio-economic or cultural

background (see Levy-Suhl, 1912; Kohlberg, 1958; Turiel, 1983; Rest, 1979; Lind, 1998).

- *Integration* of moral behavior is defined as a subject's *consistency* of judgment *in regard to his or her moral principles*. This means that someone can only be considered morally competent if he or she bases his or her judgment consistently on the same set of moral principles, regardless, for example, of the mood of the people involved, or of any other circumstance that cannot be regarded as a legitimate reason. So consistency per se is not a criterion for moral competence, nor is consistency a sufficient ground for ascribing someone moral competence. First, it is always consistency *in regard to moral principles*, or the *moral point of view*, that defines moral competence (Kohlberg, 1984).
- Second, it is consistency within some limits that characterizes a morally competent person, and not limitless moral rigidity (see Mordecai Nisan's contribution to this conference, 1998). Therefore, *differentiation* is the other necessary ingredient for defining moral judgment competence. If, as is often the case, one moral principle suggests another course of action than another principle, the individual has to limit the range of application of at least one of these principles.

From this it should become clear that moral judgment competence *cannot* by any means be observed or measured by looking merely at *one* act in isolation or at many acts of the same type. Rather we can make fair judgment of a person's moral dispositions only when we observe a whole *pattern* of reactions to a variety of situations. In his Heinz-Werner-Memorial lectures, Kohlberg (1984/1981) writes that the 'structure,' that is, cognitive aspect of moral judgment, "is warranted only on the grounds of 'intelligible' ordering of the manifest items. One might say that the hypothetical structure is the principle of organization of the responses" (p. 408). Here Kohlberg clearly contradicts Socrates whom he otherwise admires. It would make no sense to say of a single act that it is "ordered" or "organized."




Abbildung 1 The Dual-Aspect Theory of Moral Behavior

Preferably, these situations should be of a particular kind, namely *moral tasks*. Competencies or abilities are named after the sort of tasks to which they are applied. For example, mathematical abilities are applied to mathematical tasks. Analogously, moral judgment competence is named that way because we need this competence to solve moral tasks.

Moral tasks

They question then is: what are moral tasks and which tasks are suitable for challenging people's moral competencies. Obviously, some tasks are ruled out

for moral reasons. We must not seduce subjects to harm others in order to see whether they have a strong moral conscience. Some researchers even feel that it is morally wrong to deceive subjects in order to study their moral competencies.

Other situations resemble a moral task but may do so only in the eyes of the researcher and not in the eyes of the subjects. For example, cheating in class is considered an immoral behavior – by most teachers, but not by most students. So cheating is not a valid testing situation for students who do not consider cheating a moral offense. If they cheat, this does not tell us anything about their moral competence. Similarly, helping does not unambiguously indicate high moral competence since it may be triggered through many other dispositions as well, and since high moral competence may sometimes imply not to help in the way that the researchers wants it (Lind, 1997).

When I was faced with this problem of selecting a proper moral task for the study of moral judgment competence, I followed several lines of psychological research, especially socio-psychological and cognitive-developmental. Socio-psychological research has shown how cognitive dissonance powerfully determines people's behavior and attitudes (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). Cognitive dissonance theory, however, cannot predict which of the two changes. Usually, it is believed that if people's attitudes are at odds with their behavior, they try to resolve this conflict usually by changing their behavior. However, often people change their attitudes rather than their behavior. Experimental research shows no consistent pattern.

Cognitive-developmental theory lets us make a more precise prediction. We can hypothesize that the way a person resolves a dissonance between his or her opinion about a moral dilemma on the one side and his or her moral principles, depends on the level of this person's moral development. Indeed, Keasey (1973) has demonstrated this experimentally. Children of low age and with little education typically resolve this dissonance by accepting or rejecting moral arguments according to their opinion on the moral dilemma. Only when they become morally mature, they rate moral arguments according to their moral quality rather than their opinion agreement.

How can we measure 'structure' or can't we?

Socrates' second statement points at a lasting controversy among psychometric theorists and even among cognitive-developmental psychologists. Socrates claims that we can observe or measure the virtue of people by merely observing one act. Most, if not all, modern psychometric theories basically agree with that. They maintain that is possible or even

inevitable to study an individual act in isolation and to neglect relationships among these acts and their formal properties. For example, classical test theory (see, e.g., Gulliksen, 1950) is based on the notion that a certain disposition like a particular ability can be measured by observing *one* behavior (like solving a particular mathematical task). Though, this approach mandates to make multiple observations, these multiple observations are merely used for reducing the amount of measurement error (that is, for increasing the so-called *reliability* of the observation) but not for assessing subjects' *structure* of behavior.

Other psychometric approaches like Guttman-scaling and Rasch-scaling are based on the same notion. Repeated observations or measurements are merely used to describe the quality of the observation process (measurement error, difficulty of test item, item-characteristic curves) rather than to describe the quality of an individual's pattern of behavior. Thus structural differences between persons are totally neglected or are believed to be totally determined by the characteristics of the measurement instrument.

Many researchers have rest content with this state of the methodological art of psychology either because they believe that moral competencies are not an important object of study (and education), or because they believe that they are very difficult or even impossible to observe and measure. Herrenstein and Murray (1994) exemplify the first kind of believe: "We start with the supposition that almost everyone is capable of being a morally autonomous human being of the time and given suitable circumstances. [...] Human beings in general are capable of deciding between right and wrong" (p. 543).

Nick Emler and his associates (1983) even believe that they have experimentally demonstrated that moral cognitions or competencies can actually be seen as just another kind of moral attitudes, having no real existence of their own. Even those who believe that their ultimate goal is the study of moral competencies believe that they are of little importance for every-day life and, hence, for the process of education.

Others believe that *cognitive structure* is a non-observable and non-measurable fiction. Jane Loevinger (1976) clearly explicates this position when she writes that "testing the distribution of scores within a protocol as if it represented a characteristic profile for that person's ego structure appears to be erroneous [...] Probably variability is more a function of the instrument than of the person" (pp. 239-240).

Even Kohlberg and his colleagues sometimes express this point of view when they write that "the structures themselves can never be observed" (p. 242). So when defining the scores for the *Moral Judgment Interview*, Kohlberg and his colleagues "have required each item in the manual to clearly

reflect the structure of the stage to which it is keyed" (p. 403). "Each item must have face validity in representing the stage as defined by the theory" (p. 410). Consequently, it seems, most moral researchers rest content with using classical test theory as a basis for measuring moral development (see, for example, Colby et al., 1987; Gibbs et al., 1992; Rest, 1979).

How can we bridge this gap between theory and research methodology? Is the notion of moral competence, as plausible as it may be, only a scientific fiction or hypothetical construct that can be "inferred" from human behavior but never be directly observed? Or is it a real aspect of human behavior that can be directly measured and shown to be powerful and influenced by education?

Competence versus Performance?

"Because our goal is to explain moral judgment in everyday life, our focus is on performance, not competence. We take as a starting point Kohlberg's acknowledgment that people do not always perform at their level of competence indeed, we suspect people usually fail to perform at their level of competence, and we seek to uncover the 'performance factors' that mediate low-level moral reasoning" (Krebs et al., 1991, p. 143)

Toward Tests of Moral Competencies

"Structural" measurement may mean many different things. Some use this term as to mean a hypothetical, non-real entity that cannot not be directly observed or measured, but needs to be "inferred." This inference then is based either on the researcher's intuition grand, or on murky statistical computations. Ingenious intuitions have played an important role in the conception of cognitive-developmental theory. Yet they are no proper ground for proving the existence of moral competencies or for settling theoretical controversies. Experimental data serve this purpose much better.

Statistical analyses do not suffice for this purpose either. No statistical analysis can guarantee that the results are a valid basis for inferring moral competencies or for deciding on issues of theory construction. If the quality of the analyzed data is bad, then no sophisticated statistical analysis can make up for this. All attempts to remedy less-than-optimal data through statistical formulas, are - explicitly or implicitly - based on researchers' intuitions about the nature of human conduct. One such unquestioned intuition is, as we have seen, that all variation in repeated observations of subjects' behavior is due to 'measurement error,' and not due to difference in their cognitive structures.

To secure validity, the nature of moral judgment competence and the design of the observation process and the stimuli used to elicit this disposition

need as much our attention as the process of scoring and statistical analysis. Kohlberg (1984): "In order to arrive at the underlying structure of a response, one must construct a test, [. . .], so that the questions and the responses to them allow for an unambiguous inference to be drawn as to underlying structure. [. . .] The test constructor must postulate structure from the start, as opposed to inductively finding structure in content after the test is made. [. . .] If a test is to yield stage structure, a concept of that structure must be built into the initial act of observation, test construction, and scoring" (pp. 401-402).

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MOSAIC'98

July 20 - 23, 1998, University of Konstanz, Germany

IS THERE ANYTHING LIKE INNATE MORALITY?

by
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Why do we follow moral rules? Do we have an innate inclination to behave ethically? For centuries the cause of morally right behavior was a subject for metaphysics. Lately, however it is more and more psychology that is considered to be competent in questions of morality. This process is parallel with growing social role of psychology in the modern, or postmodern world. By the words of J. Meyer: Public attention to psychological conceptions and issues is a notable feature of contemporary society... The intensity and extensity of this public discussion clearly distinguishes modern societies - especially more individualist ones - from others." (1988, 47-48)

In the past two decades innatist approaches of development had a real breakthrough in cognitive psychology. Starting with Chomskys language acquisition theory, more and more cognitive functions are proving to be based upon very special inborn capacities. Since it is indisputable that moral behaviour has a cognitive component, it has to have some biological base too. Indeed, empirical research found a very early occurrence of morally related behaviour: according to Lamb (1993) children show first signs of it already in the second year of life. These signs - feeling of empathy, distress if something hurts adults norms, as a broken toy, or a torn piece of clothing - can be identified already during the second year of life. In my paper which is a first outline of my thoughts, I try to connect the problem of innateness with the problems of absolutistic versus relativistic concept of morality in Piagets and Kohlbergs models. Later I examine, consequences of the assumption of inborn capacity to act in a right way. Certainly, changing concept of morality was in the

centre of debates in the 80ies. After publication of manifold views on concept of moral behaviour and development in the volume edited by Kurtines and Gewirtz, we would think that most important arguments are wellknown now and we cannot go further opposing them again and again. But by my view there are some points that remained out of interest. About the problem itself Kurtines and Gewirtz wrote in the introduction of the volume, edited by them in 1984: "...although there have always been skeptics and relativists, we have argued that the greater part of Western history has been dominated by objectivist epistemological and moral thinking and that objectivistic (indeed: absolutist) conceptions of morality have been historically consistent with the mainstream of Western thought. We have further attempted to show that a number of intellectual developments in the modern world and the rise of modern science in particular, have been the basis for a gradual but radical transformation in the very foundations of Western moral thought. For the first time, we suggest, relativistic moral thinking is consistent with the mainstream of the Western intellectual history."

The same authors previously wrote that Piaget and Kohlbergs theories were influenced by a strong nonrelativist tradition. Some other contributors of the volume, first of all Liebert represent a similar view, claiming that universal progression of moral decision which was a basic tenet of Piaget and Kohlberg, postulate an absolutistic paradigm. Liebert blames Kohlbergs theoretical model as supposing 1. that the most advanced people in every time and place have independently come to the same moral principles and 2, that these principles can be seen arise as the natural end point of the universal progression in moral development that his work has shown. This argument enjoys neither empirical nor logical support." (182) Let us see first wellknown theoretical models of Piaget and Kohlberg. But before further arguments I would like to emphasize that both are about development of moral reasoning that is not identical with moral development. The latter involves action, which needs unequivocal decisions (if we did something, we excluded all other possibilities) since moral reasoning does not. (And, as we know, there is a very sophisticated relationship between moral thinking and moral action)

In the first stage of Piaget children make their judgements under suggestion of adults. By his observations they judge more strictly, when the caused harm was bigger, and intention of actor did not played any role in their judgements. By Piagets assumption which - as Liebert also admitted - was supported by other researches too, a significant change occurs in ages of 6-8 years when intention of actor and other subjective

considerations will have a more significant impact on the child's moral judgement.

Nevertheless there are some, more recent studies, which call in question Piaget's tenet. Liebert in his cited paper refers to studies which demonstrated that young children were more inclined to take into consideration intention of actor, if the stories were repeated for them several times, and when they learn of the actor's intention after they have been told the consequence of the act. (180) Another, more recent research of Zelazo, Helwig and Lau (1996) demonstrated that children under 5 years of age may take into account intention of the person who acts in a certain way. Researchers worked with non-canonical causality" which meant that an act led to an unusual result: for example petting an animal caused harm to it. They concluded that taking into account intentions is almost exclusively a question of cognitive skills. In judging an act we usually weigh two things; the intention of the actor and the outcome. Young children cannot treat two determinants in the same time, thus they choose either intention or the outcome for their judgement. It is only after 5, when children consequently are attentive to the actor's intention.

Zelazo and his collaborator also claim that their results did not support Piaget's hypothesis, since children under 5 also could recognise the actor's intention.

By my view these results did not contradict the main substance of Piaget's theory. His most important claim was that children's moral judgements are not autonomous. It is not the attributes of an action that determine their judgement, but orientation, coming from adults. Beyond everyday experience of anybody who knows small children, several experimental and observational data support that young children, under age of 6-7 are not only inclined to accept suggestions of adults, but even claim for them. Lamb in her already cited paper reports the appearance of morally related behaviour of children in their second year of life, which is registered among others by an innate awareness of a standard of performance, just as a mastery smile, an expression of pride". Data collected about young children's testifying before court as victims or witnesses also proved that they are very sensitive to open or subtle suggestions of adults. If for example children under age of 5-6 are asked several times about a certain event, they may think that something is wrong with what they have answered and therefore can change their mind. (Cole, S. - Cole, M. 1997) These observations suggest that experimental results, referred by Liebert, have to be controlled with the avoidance of

any possibility of adults' suggestion. (By my view the most critical situation from that point of view was when the intention of actor was mentioned after the consequence).

Autonomous moral decision after 6-7 years of age means not only that the child is becoming more independent from adults' judgements but also that his way of moral thinking is less absolutistic. Taking into account the actor's intentions means that we do not apply rules strictly, we treat them as more or less flexible ones, and a certain level of autonomy also leads to more relativeness. It is even doubtful, whether Piaget thought of any kind of moral concept in the sense of absolutism or relativism. He referred clearly the cognitive background of moral judgement, and not values, involved in it. His basic tenet, which is proved in his works several times, is something very relativistic: the rules come from society, they are represented by people, surrounding the child. In fact according to him, children acquire concept of law from the society and in their early years they try to adapt it to their experiences with the world of objects.

Kohlberg's stages are not based upon nonrelativistic tradition either, as it is stated by Liebert and Kurtines. The process of development from absolutistic to a more relativistic way of moral decision is more evident and goes further by him, than by Piaget. First of all, in his model moral development means a change of children's relationship to conventions, not to moral rules, or laws. Conventions, being purely social by origin, are much more relativistic than moral rules, which are related to long-term or eternal values. Kohlberg himself also emphasizes that he would not expect a highly developed person to judge in one certain way; he gave examples for both pro and contra answers at each level. (Accepting Heinz's stealing the drug or not to steal it may have the same moral value)

According to Kohlberg, children's moral judgement develops by the same trend that was stated by Piaget: on the lowest level children accept adults' judgements without thinking of their reason, because they want to be accepted by adults themselves. On the middle level law or rule becomes more important to them. Following the rules is no more a result of constraint, it is rather a decision. (One has to mention that almost all kind of developmental studies supported increased conformism of children between 6-10 years). One would say that it is a level of interiorization of rules, and during this process youngsters may judge things inflexibly. What follows after that? Kohlberg's highest level of moral decision is clearly a relativistic one: those who reached that stage, make their decision dependent on the situation and their own values.

Here we are touching a question that is unreflected in the literature about moral development. What do we mean on an individuals own values? For example Kurtines in his paper of the cited volume (1984) wrote: In a world that frequently places people in situations that require complex and difficult moral decision, we thus conclude that in the end the responsibility for moral choices rests with the individual not systems or principles" (322).

Exactly this is what is suggested by Kohlberg, who at the beginning emphasised that his stages are based on conception of the moral method" of judgements and he has nothing to do with their content. But in his later papers (1981, 1985) argued that stealing the drug for saving someones life was the right decision, and he thrived to connect developed moral judgement with certain acts (like demonstrating for free speech at Berkeley University and leave early from the obedience situation of Milgram). He has to realise that a morally right act cannot be deduced from moral method". In his paper in 1984 he stated: Thus, both Kants principle of justice or respect for personality and Mills principle of utility or the greatest welfare of the greatest number would agree in judging Heinz right to steal". Well, I am not so sure: stating that the right behavior is to steal the drug" is a prescription, not a moral orientation.

In fact if moral choices are proved by neither some kind of community, nor by a principle, we have no argument against someone who tries to make from his particular value or interest a moral rule. I would like to mention that that there was no cruel dictator in the history, who would not be convinced that his particular tasks represent high ideals.

On the other hand if we suppose that individuals can develop in themselves higher ideals than any kind of principles, or communities values, then this capacity must be an inborn one. Thus, the relativistic moral concept leads to an interesting paradox: to a subtle assumption of an objectivistic (natural, biological) origin of morally right behaviour.

Having more and more evidence of innateness of certain cognitive capacities it is very important to make a difference between cognitive and motivational side of moral conduct. Both may have innate origine, but it is only the cognitive side which has a direction.

Assuming that we have inborn capacities to act in a right way, means that people who do not act in that way, are sick. For the first glance it seems to be a more humanistic approach of social deviance, aggression or cruelty. But in fact that means that immoral people (children) cannot be changed by social methods, like education, conviction, etc. Or with other

worlds: there is no way to change them through their own will. They need medical intervention, therapy or isolation. Indeed we find more and more reports about inborn origins of aggression, antisocial behaviour and maladaptation. Doctors prescribe drugs and children are imprisoned from very early ages, while parents and teachers are recommended not to much intervene into the process of spontaneous formation of values.

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MULTIPLE CONCEPTIONS ABOUT MORAL EDUCATION: COMPETING PARADIGMS IN A MEXICAN HIGHER EDUCATION SETTING

by
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Moral education has been related with a number of different concepts: civic education, religious education, democratic education and so forth. What does moral education mean in a particular setting and how is it translated into particular educational efforts in a higher education setting?

As of 1996 the Universidad de Monterrey is offering an ethics program aimed at: developing in students awareness about their moral responsibilities towards their community, helping them develop strategies to analyze and understand moral problems we face as individuals, professionals and members of a broader society and providing them with "tools" or abilities to act with a moral purpose.

The information for this paper was gathered from two sources: interviews to faculty members from all fields of knowledge at UDEM and the project for an ethics course developed by an interdisciplinary group. Problems and questions faced by this group are discussed.

Introduction

This paper addresses the challenge that we are facing at the Universidad de Monterrey to design and implement an ethics course that

is a part of the general studies requirements for undergraduate students. An interdisciplinary group has been formed in order to develop a course proposal that would serve the needs and interests of the different academic faculties.

In order to make curriculum decisions, we decided to carry out interviews that would help us obtain the impressions of faculty members from all faculties. One of our concerns is related to the support that we can obtain from the faculty as well as the sources of resistance to the course. Shremer (1992) and Joseph (1993) elaborate, from different perspectives, the importance of understanding how faculty members perceive, understand and talk about their role as moral agents. We would also like to analyze faculty responses in the light of what Magendzo (1994) and Schmelkes (1995) have identified as the paradigm that has been used in values education programs in Latin America: Education for Human Rights.

Our report draws on the results of a structured interview with sixteen faculty members from six different faculties at Universidad de Monterrey. Seven female faculty were interviewed. They teach at the schools of Law, Medicine, Architecture, Engineering and Education. Nine male faculty were interviewed. They teach at the schools of Communications, Business, Engineering, Humanities and Architecture.

The Context

Access to college education in Mexico is restricted to 5% of the age cohort (Guevara Niebla, p. 56). Colleges have been in charge of education young men and women and of preparing them with knowledge and skills that the job market is looking for.

General education in Mexico is completed at the high school level. Traditionally, students entering college will go straight to their professional fields (even in the fields of medicine and law (these are offered at the undergraduate level).

Only very recently, have Universities and colleges started to provide general education. This change in focus (from a more vocational to a more general) has been due to the recent search for accreditation by U.S. accreditation agencies.

Changes in undergraduate programs will, in the case of UDEM, respond to this motivation, and the ethics course will be part of graduation

requirements for students entering the university as of 1996 and graduating in year 2000.

The Goals

The Interdisciplinary group has written a course proposal in which the four following goals have been states:

The course should help students:

1. Identify their own values and those of others.
2. To put students in situations which can help them develop
3. more elaborate reasoning patterns to examine moral problems through the use of analytical tools.
4. Arrive at certain agreements about particular values that are adequate to build a sense of community.
5. To develop competencies that will allow them to participate fully in the process of building a democratic community.

The Means to Develop the Course and Main Concerns

The first course proposal was elaborated by three faculty members. This proposal was presented and discussed with the deans of the sic faculties at the university and with the chairs of 20 academic programs.

The main concerns that rose had to do with:

1. Who was going to teach the courses;
2. What academic background these faculty should have;
3. The academic support available for faculty coming from background other than philosophy of psychology;
4. The focus of the course; and
5. The best time for students to take the course

The interdisciplinary group had the task of developing a first proposal but the final versions of the syllabi were to be developed by the faculty members who were going to teach the different sections of the course. We thought at that moment that we needed at least seven different versions of the course:

Ethics for health professions (Medicine and Psychology)
Ethics for Lawyers
Ethics for Educators
Ethics for Communicators and Journalists
Ethics for Architects and Art Professionals
Ethics for Business Professions, and
Ethics for Engineers

We tried with this organizational pattern for two semesters as part of a pilot study. The courses were offered then not as general education requirements but as optional courses. We had requests from students from fields different to those to which the courses were directed to enter various courses. For example, marketing students were interested in joining a section on Ethics for Communicators and Journalists and Law students interested in legal aspects of medicine. The participation and the richness that students from different fields brought into the courses made us change our mind and reorganize the courses, giving students from all fields the opportunity to join the groups they were interested in. Our course offering looks like this at the moment:

Ethics and business
Ethics and mass media
Ethics, life and health
Ethics and community
Ethics and human rights

Results of Interviews

One of our concerns has been related to the ways in which faculty members perceive themselves as moral educators. We consider this a key issue in launching the program. The purpose of our sample selection was to obtain representation of each of the academic faculties at UDEM, we

also tried to get include those faculty members that excerpt certain leadership within particular programs.

Faculty members viewed themselves as values or moral educators in all cases. They think then educate by example. They teach respect and responsibility through their own behaviors in the classroom. A male professor who has taught in the communications programs for more than twenty years, and is actually teaching a public opinion seminar said:

"I would say that, yes, I am and educator of the ethical dimension of my students. Because I consider that respecting students and their point of view allows me to approach these topics (ethical concerns) in the classroom. In fact the type of topics that I teach right now imply a certain ethical assessment. To give you and example, my students develop opinion polls, and they have to learn to be faithful in writing the answer that a person gives the true answer and not to fabricate it on their desks (as we could all do)...We could do it the way somebody wants it to sound, and we would be lying. Trying to do things truthfully, starts with respecting what other people think..."

The answer makes evident the teacher's awareness of his role as a moral educator not only through the content area he teaches but by the indispensable attitude of respect that is necessary to create an atmosphere where students feel free to talk and where they know they will be heard. It is interesting to note that he conceives his role as moral educator as one interwoven with the content area he teaches and not separate from it. As a teacher one teaches values through the areas that one chooses to stress and also through the ones one decides to ignore.

Teaching by example was the category named most often by the interviewed. But there were a few faculty members that perceived moral education as taking place mainly outside the classroom. Some excerpts of this position are the following:

"You teach values when you share experiences with your students on the sports fields, when you attend their presentation in an artistic performance..."

"When you give them personal orientation regarding academic problems, when you pay special attention to them outside the classroom."

These professors understand their role as moral educators as being separate from their academic tasks. In these cases, the role is identified more with the mode of relationship and not with the ethical implications of the discipline.

Moral conflicts

When asked about examples of moral conflicts within the classroom, professors referred mainly to two key issues:

1. Fairness when grading and
2. Handling students' academic dishonesty.

Two foreign professors who had joined the university in recent times expressed a deep concern with academic honesty:

"When I first came to the university, I really had a problem with students, not only undergraduate students but also graduate students. They...just copied drawings and work from other authors and presented them as their own work. So I took a very strong attitude about that, but at the same time, sometimes, the reason for that is that professors make it almost impossible to students to pass...many times I see in from of me professors making very heavy demands, yet, they do not provide the technical basis that would allow the student to make it, and they... in the very end...the students are not to be held accountable."

This professor presents a concern that is underlined by his own experience as a student and professor in the U.S. HE feels obliged to teach his students that they should give credit for what they write and present in papers and projects and at the same time, he perceives the need to make students aware of differentiating their own work from somebody else's work; but at the same time he is able to understand that students exhibit such a behavior because it is motivated by their professors unreasonable demands. He is then caught in this conflict. He describes

his own way of trying to teach their students in spite of the difficulties stated before:

"...the difference is (I am not saying that I am a better teacher, I just hope that I am a better teacher that I used to be years ago) but every semester I try to learn from my own mistakes, but I try to give my students a good idea of what want them to do...what I want them to achieve, so I try to prepare well for class, I sue a lot of pre-class preparation...but yet in the end, if they do not get it, I grade them accordingly."

Grading students fairly is the main source of conflict for the female professors who teach engineering and education.

"With grades, when I see that a student is making an effort, but still, she is not achieving the goal and at the same time one can read in her eyes and her face that she is saying_ "what do you want? (I do not get what are you looking for"...Sometimes I think one cannot act exactly the same way with each one of our students, and if you give them a grade...then I feel afraid to give a high grade to somebody to recognize her effort and then, she might think "O.K., I made it" at then she might not keep making and effort, maybe I am going to cause her harm when what I really want is to help her...To measure that...puts me in the situation of giving my students feedback that do not harm them but that at the same time appears to be always challenging...it is a tough business."

Female professors express much more clearly than their male counterparts this tension between the ethics of justice and the ethics of care. Even for those that state that grades are not or should not be all that important, it seems very clear that grades are perceived as very influential on students' self-esteem, on their desire to strive for excellence and that his is why they are a source of great conflict.

Recommendations

When we asked for recommendations for the course, there where three issues that came up several times:

1. That the course should be part of a broader strategy for developing the ethical dimension of our students, but that it would take much more than a course to achieve this.
2. That we require all faculty to be convinced that this is a worthwhile enterprise and that if we want to achieve results we need more than a handful of professors committed to it.
3. That we need faculty willing to take part in this project and also aware of the effort, time, and work that it will require.

An engineering professor compared this effort with one in the area of developing writing skills. She is worried that the ethics program could be viewed as one in the hands of few:

"There was a big mistake when the Writing Course was launched years ago. Some people thought that this course was going to solve all the verbal reasoning problems of the students. The experience was not successful, precisely because the teachers in other subject areas did not support this effort; they did not stress writing as a learning tool. In the case of ethics, I think we need at least the support of an important group of faculty, we need everybody to be aware that we teach ethics through our own behavior. That is a lesson we could have learned from the Writing Course. It was not the course that failed, we failed to support the course, that was the problem."

Making a few changes in the academic programs might not bring about very surprising results, if we do not conceive the course as one necessary initial effort maybe followed y or accompanied by the revision of our administrative practices as with a review of the ways in which decisions are made and codes of behavior are not only written but observed.

Professors also expressed their concern about how the results of the course were going to be evaluated both in the short and in the long run.

As in Joseph's study, we did not include the religious issue in the questionnaire but it came upon several occasions. Religion might be a point of concern and tension. We found opposing views about the role of religion in ethics education. Addressing the question of what we should avoid, professors said in various occasions that we ought to be very careful not to mix or confuse both. They made clear that they themselves are practicing Catholics but that, given the outlook of our students and the aims of the course, approaching ethics from a religious perspective could be a mistake. On the other hand, others think that ethics and morality cannot be separated from religion, so their recommendation was that we should not only include it, but also underline this aspect. The following excerpt is an example of the latter group's concern:

"...I think that if the Catholic church is expert in this issues (and I think they are), we should ask them for advice. They have gone a long way, they have much more experience than we do...because through all their apostolic activities, they try to shape well rounded men...they have had that goal and they have taught people of all ages...they have a lot to teach."

Faculty were also asked to tell us what they considered we should avoid while teaching this course. Their answers could be grouped as follows:

1. To confuse teaching ethics with teaching religion
2. To limit the courses to moralizing
3. To look for "truths" somewhere else (e.g. in the U.S.)
4. That the courses are dogmatic, imposed, and authoritarian

We can observe the differences in professors' views about the religious issue. It is interesting to note the preoccupation (especially of foreigners) with the search of answers that are compatible with our own

cultural background. They were the ones to stress that we should be very careful with "importing foreign truths".

The Human Rights Approach

With the interview we wanted to learn about the professors' perceptions of their roles as moral educators, about general preoccupation they may have regarding the ethics courses, and about possible sources of tension. In a former paper, the author had anticipated some particular areas of concern in the process of decision making of the interdisciplinary group (Moreno, 1994). I will examine briefly in this section some of the strategies designed by our group, and although these tensions were not directly approached by the interview questions, I will exemplify some of the emergent themes that relate to some of those questions:

Critical Rationality vs. instrumental rationality and conservation vs. change

This is one of the hottest issues that have emerged in the decision making process so far. As stated previously in this paper, instrumental rationality has been the dominant perspective that has influenced most of the curricular design in the last decade. Mexican society has not precisely been a good example of a society with an easy flow of communication and freedom of speech, and universities have not been an exception.

In the early seventies, Mexican universities received a good number of academics from South America who had flown from military regimes. Those academics joined the ones that has supported the critical role of universities.

The role played by the Catholic Church in our countries has not been one unique. The Church is a plural institution with various fractions. When some of the colleagues talk about asking the Church for advice, we would have to ask, to whom particularly in the church?

If we approach the teaching of ethics from the human rights approach, it means taking a critical view of our institutions, our government, and so forth. This is a touchy issue at universities at this point of time, and it is a very delicate issue for private universities which survive mainly from tuition and private donations from entrepreneurs.

Some excerpts from interviews reflect this preoccupation for the transformative role that ethics education should have:

"...I think the future of Mexico lies in the hands of these young people, in the hands of this university and I think we might have an opportunity to be part of a change for the better."

Problematizing education vs. consensus-oriented education

Should our course be directed toward the creation of fundamental agreements or should we promote plurality? Should the ethics course be one to shake students' beliefs or confirm the ones that they already have?

We do think that there are certain fundamental values that we will try to promote, independent from the students' major or religious background, these values are respect and responsibility. But at the same time we believe that a problematizing approach may help students to understand, review, or modify their commitments. For example one faculty member who teaches history says:

"I try to help them (my students) build a personal point of view. That they view and live their lives with a certain awareness...not because of tradition, not because their parents or families act in certain ways, but because the way they live is the result of conscious choices, because they are convinced of what they want. They are studying what they want and not what others want them to study. I try to develop a critical and constructive awareness..."

Separate subject vs. integration into the curriculum

As the interviews show, ethical issues are discussed and included in many subject areas. A separate ethics course might be an opportunity to teach moral issues more profoundly.

Two possibilities have been discussed. The first one was a one-size-fits-all approach. (One course with the same program for all students). We found this an easier way to deliver the course but with shortcomings in terms of individual relevance.

We have decided that the course would be offered as a separate subject, but this does not exclude encouraging faculty involved in other content areas to bring up moral issues related to their particular subjects.

At the present time we have ____ courses opened to students from all fields, these are:

- Ethics and community
- Ethics, life and health issues
- Ethics and mass media
- Ethics and human rights
- Ethics and business

Extensive vs. Intensive Treatment

We have discussed the mode of the course (modular, seminar, etc.) and, if it should be taught early when students start their college experience or near the end, when they are entering their professional fields either by the community service experience (which is a graduation requirement for all undergraduates students in Mexico) or by the work performed as internships which in our university is a requirement also in all fields.

We decided that a semester long ethics course would be offered. The course would draw on both theoretical and applied ethics, using moral dilemma discussion (Lind)

Dilemma discussion vs. action models

At the present time we are using the moral dilemma discussion, but we would like to combine the discussion of dilemmas with the experience that students acquire during their community service.

Since the 1930's there has been a community service requirement for graduation at college level in Mexico. This service has been carried out in several ways, with varying degrees of supervision.

Students at UDEM engage in 500-hour projects with people living in marginal (economic, social or health) condition. Some academic departments design their own project which require the students to apply their professional expertise to help a particular community.

This community service has been carried out without linking it to any process of reflection promoted by the university. The ethics course might provide adequate conditions to bring real situation and not only simulated ones into the classroom.

Short vs. Long term projects

There are experiences that report an increase in gains from relating classroom experience to community service work such as the ones reported on the works of Rose (1992) and Boss (1994).

The ethics course experience is limited to a period of 16 weeks. Nevertheless, if we take into account that students are going to relate this course to their community service and internship experiences (that occur either before, during or after the course) we are talking about a medium length experience. We have done a pilot study with the Origin test developed by Lind, in order to track how these experiences that require both role taking and capable tutoring are combined. The moral judgment test is used to assess the impact of this factors on moral competence.

Commitment versus Neutrality

There is a somewhat tacit understanding of faculty members working in this area that we cannot teach without a particular perspective. Moral objectivity is not possible or even desirable. We are committed as faculty to develop moral competency in our students and this implies that we also develop rational capabilities. We are taking a stand in favor of creating skills for the construction of a democratic society, what do we require in order to achieve this?

Finding "a" way for ethics education vs. exploring "new" ways of promoting moral competency: Closing remarks

Usually there is an underlying temptation of finding the unique and only answer for moral education. Educational institutions often look for magical answer to fulfill their purposes and satisfy their preoccupation. The ones who have been engaged in teaching know that we need to continuously fine tune our strategies to different groups, that every term we discover together with our students, new problems, we explore new tensions.

Our proposal for moral education at our university should allow for a variety of possibilities within the curricular academic offer to other kinds of extra curricular and co-curricular activities. We must search for a common framework that could promote conversation and teamwork at

these early stages of the project, human rights seems to provide a wonderful opportunity to examine everyday moral issues across our country and to move to the very heart of our institution, examining our practices, habits and policies. While aiming to change the world around us, we might be changing from within.

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PROPER FUNCTIONING CONSTITUTIVE A PRIORI CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO COMMON VALUES?

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Outline of argument

Introduction

- (a) The recent SCAA list of common values:
 - (i) lacks a grounding in reason;
 - (ii) captures a need for legitimate common values to be taught in schools.
- (b) The list of values does not look so helpful when one considers the practical curriculums that might develop.
- (c) Alternatives to a list of values seem *prima facie* more educationally valid.
- (d) Is it possible to develop a framework for common values which is grounded in reason?

An alternative view

- (e) The values on the SCAA list can be seen as moral values, and can be grounded in a framework of virtues.
- (f) MacIntyre's account of virtues depends upon:
 - (i) that we all make sense of the social world by gathering actions together into social practices;
 - (ii) the virtues that ought to be displayed by all are dependent on the social practice in which one is engaged.
- (g) If we all make sense of the social world using the same mental framework then are the social practices different groups generate the same?

- (h) The social practices are common if we have a common part of our social life e.g. we are part of the same country.

Conclusion

- (i) Hence if (g) is correct, then there are common social practices, and if (f)(ii) is correct then these social practices entail a list of common virtues. This provides a reasoned and necessary list of values for people who operate in Britain.

Introduction

The common school is presumed to have some sort of common aim, and in Britain has a basic common curriculum. The Education Reform Act of 1988 brought in a National Curriculum which has framed the classroom activity of teachers. The act placed upon schools not only responsibility for the intellectual development of students, but also their cultural, moral and spiritual development. The difficulty is I hope obvious, whereas it is reasonably clear what physics ought to be taught, the teaching of morality is fraught with difficulty. The problem is pluralism - it seems empirically true that different people hold to different moral, religious, political values, and what is more this difference is clearly visible to teachers, pupils and parents. Consider the comparison with physics. Few teachers are worried by pluralism in physics, for example Peat's (1995) articulation of the scientific investigations of the Blackfoot Indians has not undermined parental confidence in Western Science. Scientific pluralism is less obvious, and less problematic. Further there is a deep seated belief in society that scientific disagreement can be solved rationally, whereas values disagreement are irresolvable. Pluralism slips into relativism. There has been a long standing desire within education to develop some guidance as to the kinds of values that could be taught in schools, particularly in response to what was seen as a lack of moral education in the home. The moral 'deficiency' of the young needs to be counteracted by the State, and the school is an ideal vehicle. There was a call to a public debate not about the nature of values education in school per se, but about the common values that teachers could feel confident to teach. The result was essentially a democratic approach - a select group of people were gathered together to see which values they all held in common. Thus consensus politics combined with a desire for some direction in a difficult area.

The positive result of such a move is a list of values which teachers can use as a basis for values education without fear of being harangued by all, the negative result is that there seems no reason why they shouldn't be. In fact the list of values provides no reason at all for us to accept them as legitimate values that ought to be taught in schools. The list is the product of naive naturalism - just because it was the case that slavery was legal and accepted in the past does not imply that we think that teachers in that era ought to have taught that it was right. The only possible exceptions are either total belief in perfection either divine law or human society. This paper is a response to the lack of reason which underpins a particular government sponsored initiative to develop an account of common values. I shall shortly describe the way in which this list of common values was generated, before moving on to look at the specific problems I have with such an approach.

The core of my response is to look at an alternative account of moral values which has some claim to being common. The alternative view is broadly based in meta-ethical naturalism, and deals with the need for legitimate reasons for holding particular values. This view is developed in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre (see MacIntyre, 1985). The work of MacIntyre requires a commitment to (i) a form of realism with regard to social phenomena; and (ii) a common mechanism for making sense of social phenomena. MacIntyre himself does not make any sociological or psychological claims, but in the context of an interdisciplinary conference, I hope to stimulate a debate of the common nature of the brains interpretation of the social world. As part of this paper I draw on some thoughts from evolutionary psychology.

SCAA initiative

In late 1995 the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) initiated a 'public debate' about the values that ought to be taught in schools. The motivation appears to have come from three areas. The first was a sense of moral unease with a recent spate of murders by children of other children; the second was the christian conservatism of the head of SCAA; and the third was a general climate in which teachers were believed to be in need of guidance about what ought to be taught. There

are, no doubt, other motivations at work, but it needs to be recognised that (i) there were mixed agendas; and (ii) that values were perceived as closely connected to 'moral values'.

The first stage of this public debate was an attempt to develop a list of values which could be defended as being held in common by all reasonable people. The list was to be a set of statements on which all agreed, and if only one person disagreed then, in principle, it could not be included. The reasonable people who came together numbered 150, representatives of different organisations, and specialists (teachers, academics etc.) chosen by SCAA. The organisations invited to send representatives was selective - the British National Front, or Traveller communities, for example, were not asked to send representatives. The forum of 150 people met together (mostly in groups) on a number of occasions (for most groups this was three times), to develop a list of values. These lists were then collated into the final document by SCAA officials.

The resulting list contained a number of general values collected together in four groups - values relating to: society; relationships; the self; and the environment. For example in relation to 'the self' - 'We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic worth, with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development and change' (SCAA 1996).

If the list was really intended to provoke a public debate then it seems to have failed. It has led to a number of academic responses pointing out its defects (see Carr, 1998). In public terms the failure of Glenn Hoddle to pick Paul Gascoigne for the England World Cup Squad has raised more debate. As Carr points out the SCAA document is not the harbinger of public debate, but a legitimisation of a particular form of values socialisation. For an 'insider reflection on the SCAA process see Talbot and Tate (1997)

Details and devils

It has been said that the devil is in the detail, and let us agree with Haste's (1996) short review that consensus on these values was unsurprising. The list of values was never intended to stand alone, but it was recognised that the individual values that a person had reflected their 'form of life'. It was

clear that any reasonable form of life would include these values. A form of life is here seen as the product of an individual's cultural background, and their personal life choices. As I have pointed out the major difficulty I have with the SCAA approach is the lack of reasons that underpin the generation of the list. Democratic means have been held suspect since the days of Plato's republic - there are situations, and issues which are not suited merely to the will of the people. Values, and moral values in particular seem to be one.

However, the list was meant to inform a particular practical issue - values education in schools, does it pass a pragmatic test?

Let us consider what a reasonable teacher might do with this list of values - even given the fact that they 'confidently held them'. The situation in which most teachers teach is normally one of plurality of values. Given a list of values there seems to be two responses that the teacher could make: firstly, that the list provides the basic framework of a curriculum for exploring values in society; or secondly, disguise the different approaches to values and induct pupils into the established list. The second approach seems both less likely to succeed and contrary to what we normally understand by schooling. If it could be justified as acceptable in schools, then the thin nature of the list (that is the highly limited nature of the values included) would seem insufficient to develop a comprehensive set of values for life. I shall return to this later, but first I wish to consider the idea of the list as a basis for a curriculum.

There are a large number of values that could be taught in schools, but these values on the list are the ones that need to be taught - not because they are more important, but because they are legitimate. A brief look at the SCAA list seems to indicate that it is of a manageable length. The teacher teaches them assuming that they are commonly held by the cultural groups to which the pupils are linked (whether or not these are religious). (By definition any group that does not hold these values is 'unreasonable'.) The teacher then takes a plural approach to the justification of these values, why it is that different cultural groups find these things to be valuable, and perhaps pointing out where the disagreements between groups arise.

This seems a reasonable approach to the subject, but it also seems a rather long way around - it is not clear what the 'commonly held' notion adds to

the teaching of values. Surely a better criteria is one of 'most important' or 'ones that are not taught elsewhere'? If one rejects the need for uniformity, there may be a more credible educational argument for teaching those areas of values on which we disagree (Mott-Thornton, 1998).

What if we take seriously restricting the teacher to teaching the values on 'the list', then we are faced with the implications of working within the confines of a thin, groundless account of values. We could teach the basic values, and even that we (teacher and pupils) should embrace these values, but we still fall prey to the question of 'why?'. In addition we develop attitudes towards values in what we do not teach, as well as what we teach. In his essay on Sex Education, Russell (1932) argues that in not mentioning sex young people take this as an implication that sex is 'unmentionable'. This conclusion is also reached by Midgley (1991) in her discussion on religious education. Thus the teacher who teaches the list of values is not simply leaving untouched the values that a young person might learn from their community, but is effectively developing a two tier system of values. Young people learn that there are values one can discuss in public (i.e. the school), and those which one refrains from mentioning. This might not be a problem, but for the fact that the list of values is not substantive enough for an individual to develop a comprehensive set of values. As SCAA themselves recognise the list is to be filled out within particular forms of life, such recognition seems at odds with an educational approach which restricts itself to teaching the list, and only the list.

The discussion so far may seem so much hot air - of course teachers will use the list of values like they do other government information - with professionalism. Teachers will take the basic ideas, and the traditional approaches to education, and synthesise the two.

At the end of the day we want to say that we hold these values in common because we see them as being reasonable. That is not just reasonable for Christians, Liberals, or Muslims etc., but reasonable to everybody who isn't prejudiced. We think that it is right to respect others, to value both truth, and a sustainable environment, it is the result of common sense. As I mentioned above certain groups were excluded from the discussion because they are not like us - we have a sense of commonality which enables us to define others as outsiders. The list of values produced is seen

to have force because it is a collection of values with which only the prejudiced, criminal, insane, or parasitic would disagree.

In the discussion above I hope I expressed the view that what we expect a competent teacher to do is to develop a curriculum in which young people are brought to recognise the values in society, and discuss their merits. The aim of the SCAA initiative, however, seemed to be grander - to develop an account of values which young people ought to embrace. The difficulty is that the approach taken of consensus does not provide the mandate for such a set of values. There is a requirement for a framework to justify such a conclusion. The SCAA list is one of primarily moral values, and I shall now turn to an account of moral virtues, though there is no reason why one could not broaden MacIntyre's account for other values (see Zagzebski, 1997)

Naturalism, values and forms of life

In 1981 Alasdair MacIntyre published the first of a series of books and articles developing a broadly Aristotelian account of the virtues. There might, at first sight, seem to be a mismatch between the values language of SCAA and the virtues language of MacIntyre. SCAA desired a 'neutral' language in which to conduct the public debate - values as opposed to either morals or virtues seems to do the trick, but are they describing different things?

There are two points that ought to be made. The first is that the values that appear on the list are essentially 'moral values'. We might have said that we value the use of toothpaste, or warm clothes, both of which I suspect are commonly valued. The second is the question of why do we value things such as 'human rights'. It is not an intrinsic value, human rights are not thought valuable in themselves, but only in as much as they articulate our basic moral beliefs about how we should act towards others. Again, the family is valued '...as a source of love and support for members..' (SCAA, 1996). Is it not the case that we believe there to be a moral obligation to love and support those closest to us? I am in danger here of mixing moral languages, but I want to show that the values are valuable in so far as they capture moral intuitions. In developing an account of common values of the sort espoused in the SCAA list it is legitimate to

move to the language of morality. Having established a moral framework within which are intuitions can be challenged and reasoned out, it will then be possible to return in the opposite direction and establish from that moral framework a collection of common values.

Virtues are essentially character dispositions which can be described in terms of more generalised form, for example, the virtue courage is a disposition to act neither cowardly or foolhardy - but the act of courage itself will take different forms under different conditions. The values statements are statements about what we think people ought to be like - just, developers of the common good etc. The claim is not that the two are identical, but that values statements of the sort contained in the SCAA can be read as statements about the types of virtues that we find commendable. Since the values statements have no justifying framework there is no alternative to re-interpreting these statements in other ways.

MacIntyre's project is one of articulating the nature of moral language and establishing the kinds of virtues that we need to develop in order to live life well. At the heart of the approach is the belief that there are better and worst ways to live life. This, although it has an ancient heritage, is practically unhelpful - few if any would disagree with such a general comment or know what to do with it.

If it is possible to divide life into a meaningful collection of activities and ascertain what it means for one to perform each of these activities well, then with some additional work on how one personally evaluates which activities one ought to engage in, it would seem possible to develop an account of what it means to live life well. Performing each of these collections of activities well means to display the virtues inherent in those activities. We value these virtues because they enable us to live life well. If I do not play sport then I am unlikely to develop or value the virtues inherent in sport - say courage, though I might develop, and value, through academic work, a virtue of courage.

Consider what I would need to do to develop a list of the virtues needed in the various parts of my social life. I would need to:

- (a) develop a list of all possible collections of activities, that is all available to me in my society;
- (b) develop an understanding of the virtues inherent in each collection of

activities;

(c) develop a means of establishing which collections of activities are most profitable for me to engage in as part of the flourishing life.

The question arises as to whether this collection of virtues would be in any sense common? It is necessarily true that (b) must be common in so far as the virtues are connected to the collection of activity. If (a) is also common then we would have a list of valuable virtues which could be said to be held in common - though of course which activities I engage in, and which ones I find personally valuable will be a matter to be settled by (c). In the following work I shall ignore the question as to how one decides which activities promote the flourishing life. This is not meant to imply that this is less important or ought not to be part of a social education curriculum, but that it is marginal to the main argument. I shall now briefly review MacIntyre's thesis.

MacIntyre holds that we are born into a particular cultural tradition, which determines what sense we make of our social world. The social world presents itself most tangibly in the form of social institutions - schools, government etc., but also through the need to make actions intelligible. If you see me kicking a ball, then it makes sense within the context of football. If you see me kicking another person, then it could be Karate, self-defence, or Grievous Bodily Harm. The reason kicking a ball makes sense within football is because it contributes to the ends of football - to win the match, and to play well. Another example is building a brick wall which might take its purpose and value from being part of the building of a house, that is part of the practice of architecture. Of course if the wall was built by Damien Hurst and exhibited in the Tate Gallery then it would take its meaning and purpose from the practice of Art. The ability to make sense of any particular action requires its location within a particular practice, and as such an understanding of the various social practices is philosophically prior to understanding both one's own, and others, actions. Relating to this to (a) above, The claim is that we see the social world as being composed of social practices which are themselves composed of actions. The actions become meaningful because they contribute to the end goals of the social practice of which they are a part. The collection of social practices that we perceive is determined by the culture into which we were born (i.e. raised). However, it does seem according to MacIntyre

that the fact that we see the social world in terms of social practices is not tied to our cultural heritage. The only way out of this is to claim that there is some inherent predisposition within the brain to see the world in this way. If this were true then the framework for making the social world intelligible would be common to all human persons with proper functioning brains. If this basic framework is correct, then when we talk of distinctions between cultures we are talking their division of actions into different social practices. Before returning to the question of the brain I wish to briefly consider the implications of this possibility.

Different social practices

The idea that different cultural groups perceive their social world in terms of different social practices has two possible forms. The first is that there is no sharing of the social practices between different groups. It is well recorded the difficulties that early anthropologists had in making sense of the various religious, moral, political practices of different tribal groups. The division lines were in different places, and confusion resulted. The second approach is one which sees a particular cultural group as having a common set of social practices with another group, but in addition other social practices. This might be the case in Britain among Moslems. The social practices of liberal democracy, work etc. are the same as other members of the community, but in addition there are social practices concerned with religious practices which are not shared. There are two further caveats that I wish to add to this. The first is that we might want to say that these religious duties also play a prominent role in decisions about what social practices one ought to engage in for a flourishing life, so for example pre-marital co-habitation would not be considered right, but this is not a case of the action being seen as unintelligible. Secondly, a different cultural perspective might enable finer discrimination within a social practice, and enable one group to see distinctions to which another group are blinded - for example between different social practices of the family. Liberals tend to see the family in materialist terms which hides a distinction between different social practices of the family apparent to, say, Christians.

It would seem impossible for different cultural groups to effectively live and work together and be dividing the social world up into completely

different social practices. It therefore seems empirically true that in Britain we are dealing with the second type of difference. Different cultural groups share a number of common social practices, and as such value the virtues which are inherent in these practices.

Is evolutionary psychology helpful?

The argument so far is that if there is a common mental structure for making sense of the social world then if we share a common social reality then there will be a common set of social practices. It might be that you and I share a significant part of our social world, but not all - hence our total set of social practices might be different, but we would still have set of practices in common. One must take care here, and not assume that the same word say 'family' relates to the same social practice. I take the example of the family because that proved to be difficult in the SCAA discussions. A stronger form of the value of the family was included in the appendix, as a means of achieving more general agreement on the weaker form in the body of the document. This has been seen as an indication of the fact that religious groups wanted to imbue the family with more values than others. Here I want to offer an alternative account - that the social practice of the family is different of the different groups, and hence the virtues and values that are necessarily tied to the social practice are different. For example, some Christians would hold that an ontological shift occurs when a man and woman marry, and that the family has significance in a 'spiritual field', actions with regard to the family are made intelligible within the light of this dimension as well as the material dimensions. The secular humanist on the other hand must restrict their attention to the material, and potentially make sense of actions within the family in different ways.

I do not want to minimise the difficulties involved in defining our common social practices, and understanding the virtues inherent in them, but is the claim that we have a common means of making sense of the social world sustainable?

An interdisciplinary conference with psychologists, and sociologists is probably not the ideal place to display one's ignorance of evolutionary psychology. However, I shall attempt to point out what has led to the

speculation that such a direction might be fruitful. It is worth pointing out that I am not concerned with rather crude arguments that have been made about the relationship between evolutionary psychology and morality. The evolutionary 'fact' that I am biologically prone to promiscuity does not lead to the view that this is morally justifiable. This is just too naive a form of naturalism.

As I understand evolutionary psychology the development of the brain is directed by the reproductive value that it gives to the organism. The greater the number of offspring the greater the possibility of the functions of this brain becoming more prominent in the population at large. One implication of this is the tendency towards particular activities (promiscuity or family life etc.). The other branch which I am concerned with is the processing of perceptual data. The ability to form correct beliefs about the world, both physical and social, would seem to provide survival value. If I have a poor sense of the physical world I am more likely to fall and injure myself, or fail to see a moving animal about to eat me. In the social world the ability to make sense of the actions of others, and the expectations that they have of me would seem to provide both survival value (am I about to be killed by the person next to me), or direct reproductive value (is successful reproductive activity likely). The way in which I make sense of the world is less important to my argument at this stage than the claim that such a way is subject to the same evolutionary success criteria as any other organ. If the need to make sense of the social world is a necessary and critical part of the evolutionary history of the human species then one would (I think) expect dominant cognitive structures to develop which frame the way this is achieved. Dominant in the sense that it is common to all human persons.

The argument here is not about the substantive aspects of social practices as being hard-wired into the brain, but the processing which ascribes intelligibility to actions by collecting actions together into social practices such that they get their meaning for the overall purpose of the social practice.

Conclusions

In this paper I have attempted to speculate about an alternative approach to common values. The commonality being drawn from the structure of the human mind, and the shared social reality with which those in a particular country engage. There might be an argument for claiming that this approach could include not only those in Britain, but all those in the broadly liberal countries, and perhaps, under the influence of global business, much of the know world. The framework is developed with an eye to offering a reasoned account of what teachers ought to teach in schools. If the framework is correct then teachers ought to have confidence in teaching these values, as well as developing the pupils' ability to choose in which social practices they should engage.

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ARE MORALITY AND RELIGIOUSNESS DISTINCT DOMAINS?

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A major problem regarding religious development concerns moral development and role-taking opportunities. It is one of the purposes of the present research to investigate the usefulness and validity of Oser's Religious Interview in an Italian setting. In addition, the project was designed to test the universality of the stages and their sequence with the help of a cross-sectional study representing different age levels. It was then investigated (a) if religious judgment development is related to age; (b) if moral development stages are related with the religious development stages.

The Italian version of the Religious Interview of Paul's Dilemma shows good levels of reliability and validity, which are comparable with those of the original version.

Highly developed stages of religiousness involve role-taking opportunities and high moral development stages.

What processes operate to encourage the integration of moral and religious development in everyday life? To what extent can religious (and moral) development be improved by role-taking opportunities? These and a series of related questions remain to be further explored.

Introduction

This paper is part of a series of studies on the relationship between moral and religious development.

For the first time in 1980, Power and Kohlberg's paper addressed the problems of moral stages without identify them with morality. The authors examined and empirically document what is specifically religious, and also described the connections between ego development, the social atmosphere in schools, and religious judgment (Power & Kohlberg, 1980; Oser & Reich, 1990). Taking up the question of the relationship of religious thinking to stages of moral judgment, Kohlberg (1984, p.321) notes that their functions are different. He assumes that "the function of moral thinking is to resolve competing claims among individuals on the basis of principle, and that the function of religious reasoning is to affirm life and morality as related to a transcendent or infinite ground or sense of the whole".

Moral reasoning asks: "How to life justly and why?" while religious reasoning focuses on "Why live?". The religious question pertains to the moral domain but is not answerable in terms of moral discourse (Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 322-323).

Kohlberg and Power describe a stage sequence for religious concepts that parallels the model for moral development (Kohlberg, 1984). At stage 1, authority is based on superior physical characteristics, and children's thinking is rooted in a sense of obedience to adults. The deity is viewed as powerful, capable of making everything happen. At stage 2, children base their moral reasoning on a sense of fairness in concrete exchange. They see their relationship to God as based on fair exchange: God may be influenced by personal prayers and religious practices. At stage 3, moral judgment is based to a great degree on a desire to meet the expectations of family, friends, and the community, and mutual trust is recognized as a primary value. God is viewed as a trusted and trusting deity, and his authority is tempered by mercy. At stage 4, a concern for maintaining the social system is seen as primary. The deity is viewed as a "supreme being as a law-giver", who overrides the personalistic view of God of the previous stages. At stage 5, the deity is viewed as one who supports autonomous moral action. Stage 6 is assumed to involve a cosmic, perhaps pantheistic view of the universe. Kohlberg sometimes

identifies a "highest" stage of world view incorporating faith and morality (stage 7). The highest level of faith development is identified as stage 6 or 7. "The characteristics of all these stage 7 solutions is that they involve contemplative experiences of a nondualistic variety" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 345). Stage 7 is a metaphorical notion seeking a solution that is compatible with "rational universal ethics" and essential for understanding human development. He hypothesizes that moral stage development is necessary but not sufficient for a parallel stage of religious development. "Put in slightly different terms, the idea that development of moral principles is necessary, but not sufficient for a metaphysics of morals... represents the idea that one moves from a better known or more certain to the more unknown or speculative" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 337).

Kohlberg sees that the ultimate goal of religious development as coming to terms with the meaning of life and the reason why people should choose to live.

Consonant with Kohlbergian's theory and research, the best known lines of inquiry are James Fowler's and Fritz Oser's research strategies (Fowler, 1981; Oser, 1991a, b).

Fowler bases his theory on extensive interviews and descriptions of faith stages from the intuitive-projective to the mythical stage, followed by synthetic-conventional, individual-reflexive, polar-dialectic and universalizing stages (1981). About the question as to whether faith development is related to moral stages, he felt that, both psychologically and philosophically, moral development proceeds to (and causes) faith development and vice versa.

Oser parallels Kohlberg's theory and researches closely. However, according to Oser, a given stage of moral judgment is not a "necessary, but insufficient condition" for the corresponding stage of religious judgment (as Kohlberg assumes). The basic claim of Oser's theory is that all religious judgment stages are considered basically independent of moral stages, on account of the "religious mother-structure". Oser's theory (Oser & Gmünder, 1991, pp. 48-56) postulates the existence of a religious mother-structure which facilitates "religiously" qualified coping with reality.

Oser's religious reasoning "mother structure"

Oser writes that, in many conversations with Kohlberg, he has repeatedly stressed the conviction that "religious structures" are "soft" while moral structures are "hard". Morality, he maintains, has a generalizable structure, because it plays a role in every society, while religion may comprise and include morality, but it does not belong to the generalizable domain of human experience (Oser & Gmünder, 1991). In analogy with the concept of "mother-structure" introduced by Piaget (1968, pp. 23-28) in the domain of mathematics, Oser relates the concept of mother-structure to the construct of cognitive-religious judgment. The cognitive religious mother-structure is conceptualized as a fundamental structure possessing an irreducible core. This core a) facilitates specific coping with reality, religiously qualified, which goes beyond content; b) proves to be resistant to enlightenment and secularization, examined from an historical perspective.

The religious mother-structures are "experienceable" by everyone. They are identified as specific reasoning patterns located above or below everyday reality as common perceptions, and are universal. In particular, the religious mother-structure contains "a very specific reasoning potential which moves on the very specific level of the questions of meaning" (Sauter, 1980). The religious mother-structure "is not an immediate self-actualization, but the process with which people enter into a relationship with an Ultimate Reality which transcends all empirical determinants" (Rendtorff, 1980, p. 199).

A logic of religious development with various forms of structural level is made possible by the concepts of "totality" and the meaning-making ground. The religious mother-structure represents a unique form of knowing concrete situations with the aid of the seven polar dimensions. These are: freedom *versus* dependence, transcendence *versus* immanence, hope *versus* absurdity, transparency *versus* opacity, trust *versus* fear, eternity *versus* ephemerality, and holy *versus* profane (Oser & Gmünder, 1991).

Equilibrium among the various polar elements is accomplished by the process of making and receiving meaning. The preference or activation of certain dimensions by subjects represents the religious reasoning system of those subjects. Decision-making constitutes a dialectic process, a selective structuring process, which reveals the regulatory system of religious reasoning.

On this basis, Oser postulated a five-stage sequence of cognitive stages of religious development as qualitatively different forms, to balance these dimensions and relate them to each other in order to render the religious construction of a particular life situation, or, in other words, to produce a religious judgment (cfr. Table 1).

Insert table 1 about here

Religious judgment refers "to the interpretation of experience with respect to a relationship with an Ultimate Reality in a concrete life situation" (Oser & Reich, 1996, pp. 370). It involves processing of particular events and is not restricted to contingency situations, although such situations facilitate its formulation. As previously indicated, to achieve a new equilibrium of meaning-making, the individual balances the various aspects of events in terms of one or more polar dimensions: the particular balance between the two poles of each pair is indicative of a religious stage. A central point of the theory is that the quality of the equilibrium changes from one developmental level to the next.

From the research point of view, Oser interviewed individuals about their meaning-making in actual critical situations, using Kohlberg's method of working with dilemmas. Oser created eight dilemmas in order to elicit religious judgment. The seven polar dimensions characterize the structure of religious judgment to construct these religious dilemmas and the respective probe questions for interview purposes.

Oser's religious judgment measure

Oser proposes a method, called "semi-clinical interview", which leads people to express their religious judgment. According to Piaget's and Kohlberg's methods the interviewee is confronted with certain problems and is required to decide on a course of action. The follow-up on the response with theory-guided and hypothesis-oriented questions aiming at the reasoning behind the decisions made by the interviewee is a special characteristic of Oser's method. Piaget believes that only the semi-clinical

interview method makes it possible to observe peoples' intellectual processes (L.H. Eckensberger et al., 1980).

In the semi-clinical interview, Oser asks subjects what they would do if they were the actors in the dilemma-stories, and why. Responses to these questions and follow-up questions are used to measure subjects' religious judgment. Oser's research followed the Piaget-Kohlberg research paradigm and evaluated religious judgment from hypothetical dilemmas dealing with religiously significant problems. The semi-clinical interview generally consists of standardized and non-standardized questions which depend on the responses of the interviewee and are useful to support the standardized ones. The non-standardized questions are supposed to reinforce the effectiveness of the standardized questions. They are aimed at steering the interview along those lines which are relevant for the investigation of religious judgment and of ensuring a certain level of reflection in interviewees' responses.

The following elements are constitutive of the semi-clinical method: a) confronting interviewees with a certain dilemma task; b) a content-based decision for action; c) reasoning for the action-decision; d) follow-up questions for eliciting further reasoning; e) non-standardized additional questions.

The religious dilemma consists of thrusting respondents into a religiously relevant situation of conflict in which they are faced with the task of having to create a balance between finite claims to meaning and questions about absolute meaning. These dilemmas contain a conflict between the seven polar dimensions (e.g., immanence vs. transcendence; etc.). The interviewees are faced with a dilemma whenever two opposing alternatives suggest themselves. On the specific conflict-situation of the dilemmas, their cognitive disequilibrium continues. Dilemmas resist a satisfactory solution.

Confronting individuals with standardized situations, Oser views the following advantages: a) the probe questions can be structured according to the underlying theory (polar pairs); b) subjects' answers can be compared reliably; c) answers can be used to construct a scoring manual (Oser and Reich, 1996).

The central dilemma of this method is the "Paul dilemma", which from among a number of others, has proved to be the most reliable. Almost everyone reacts to this example, provides answers, and

consciously takes a position. The standardized questions pertaining to this dilemma are in connection with the fundamental dimension of religious judgment.

It is one of the purposes of the present research to investigate the usefulness and validity of Oser's "Paul dilemma" in an Italian setting. In addition, with the help of a cross-sectional study representing different age groups, the project was designed to test religious and moral stages. It was then investigated (a) if religious judgment development is related to age level; (b) if religious development stages parallel moral development stages.

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of 152 subjects ranging in age from 14 to 35 years. The average age of the total sample was 21.20 (SD 6.46). Participants were distributed as follows: 40 subjects aged from 14 to 15 years (mean age: 14.35; SD: .50); 38 from 17 to 18 (mean age: 17.57; SD: .50); 38 from 20 to 25 (mean age: 22.86; SD: 1.76) and 36 from 26 to 35 (mean age: 30.35; SD: 2.99). Males and females in these four age groups were equally distributed. Different categories of characteristics classified: religious attitude ("non-believer" or "still searching"; "non-practising believer"; "practising believer"; "priest"); "belonging to a oriented group" ("social-oriented" and/or "religious-oriented"); "not belonging to any oriented group".

In the whole sample there were 17.4% of "non-believers" and/or "still searching" subjects; 30 % "non-practising believers"; 38 % "practising believers"; and 14.6 % "priests". With regard to socio-economic status, 34 % were low ; 41.4 % medium; and 24.6 % high.

The social-oriented and religious-oriented groups were involved actively in everyday life programs of role-taking opportunity. 26 % of the total sample was involved in "social-oriented groups" and 74 % were not. 46.6 % participated actively in "religious-oriented groups" and 53.4 % did not.

Instruments

The Paul Dilemma (Oser & Gmünder, 1991) - The Religious Interview is based on eight dilemmas (Oser e Gmünder, 1991, pp. 173-175). The Paul dilemma, one of the most widely used, concerns a young doctor who - during a moment of crisis, when he thinks his aeroplane will crash, promises God that he will devote the rest of his life to the poor. He survives and then struggles with whether or not to keep his promise because it means leaving his native land, his fiancé, and an excellent medical practice. This dilemma was chosen out because, more than the others, it evoked strong reactions and because it could be understood by individuals from a variety of cultures and religious traditions.

The Paul dilemma contains the seven contrasting dimensions. According to Oser's theory, their existing structures are revealed because respondents reflect internal operations.

The coding process consists of examining the statements elicited by the dilemma discussion, according to their structural qualities, and ascribing then to one of five stages of religious judgment.

Raters must be trained in this coding procedures. They must learn how to recognize structures of reasoning and how make the fundamental distinction between structure and content. The assessment of all relevant structural statements is calculated into a global score called "Religious Maturity Score" (RMS), similar to Kohlberg's procedures, ranging from 100 to 500.

In validation studies, Oser aimed of validating his developmental model of religious judgment. Both studies of conditions underlying development of religious judgment and cross-cultural studies comparing religious judgment and other domains of development (such as moral judgment) supported Oser's model assumptions (Oser & Reich, 1990; Oser, 1991b; Di Loreto & Oser, 1996; Oser & Reich, 1996).

The Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992) - It is an easy-to-use production measure of moral reasoning that is theoretically and empirically related to Kohlberg's *Moral Judgment Interview*. It contains eleven short answer items addressed to seven sociomoral values: contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, legal justice. The Italian SRM-SF has good levels of reliability and validity (Comunian & Antoni, 1993; Gielen, Comunian & Antoni, 1994). The SRM-SF yields two primary types of overall protocol rating: the *Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score* (SRMS) which is the

mean of the codable item ratings, ranging from 100 to 400; and the *Global Stage*, which represents the overall sociomoral level of the questionnaire. In addition, the SRM-SF provides Moral Type B, which helps to identify more balanced, internal, and universalistic moral reflections (Kohlberg, 1984; Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992).

Procedure

The Paul dilemma and the respective standardized questions were translated into Italian. The back-translation procedure according to Brislin's recommendations (1980) was used. The Italian version was evaluated by three people fluent in both Italian and English. The translated material was then translated back into English. Back-translation from Italian to English was later done by a mother-tongue English teacher. There were no discrepancies between different versions.

The Italian translation of Oser's Paul Dilemma and the Italian adaptation of Gibbs' SRM-SF were administered by the second author as follows: data from the first two age groups were collected from a whole class of no more than 25 middle- and high-school students, and data from the other two groups were collected from volunteer participants outside the work setting. Instructions were given to all participants. The Dilemma and SRM-SF were read aloud for the students, but not for the other age groups. Participants were told that questionnaires were completely anonymous and were asked to answer honestly. This study was conducted during 1997 and 1998.

Scoring

All the protocols of the Paul Dilemma and SRM-SF were scored blindly by two raters. Interrater reliability, based on 20 protocols of Paul Dilemma and SRM-SF randomly selected from the whole sample, was $r(20) = .93$ ($p < .0001$), $r(20) = .97$ ($p < .0001$) respectively. The Exact Global Stage agreement was 85% for the Paul Dilemma and 90% for SRM-SF.

Results

The Italian version of the Paul Dilemma evidenced good levels of internal consistency and reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .83; Test-retest = $r = .82$, $p < .001$). Intercorrelations among the religious judgment fundamental polar dimensions (freedom vs. dependence, transcendence vs. immanence, hope vs. absurdity, transparency vs. opacity, trust vs. fear, eternity vs. ephemerality, holy vs. profane), used by Oser for constructing the religious dilemma and respective standardized questions all had significant high positive correlations ranging from .12 ($p < .05$) to .55 ($p < .0001$).

Significant differences on the RMS was found among "non-believer" or "still searching"; "non-practising believer"; "practising believer"; "priest"; (means: 316, 270, 310 and 346 respectively; $F(1, 151) = 7.05$ $p < .0001$).

In the gender variance analysis, it is noteworthy that the main effect for gender was not significant ($F(1, 151) = .293$ $p < .589$). Only in the 14-15 age groups did males and females show significant differences (242 and 260 respectively; $F(1, 39) = 5.421$ $p < .025$). Also in Oser's study, gender difference in stage development was noted during adolescence, but disappeared in adulthood.

Lastly, in the Italian sample no significant differences regarding socio-economic status emerged ($F(1, 151) = 1.233$ $p < .294$).

Religious judgment and age group trends

Before discussing the results of the Paul Dilemma and Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form analyses on the Italian sample, the median of the Religious Maturity Score (RMS) of the Italian subjects to

the Paul Dilemma and the median of the RMS of Oser's cross-sectional research (Oser & Gmünder, 1991) were put together in a figure (Figure 1). The age group trends, as we can see, looked remarkably similar.

Insert figure 1 about here

The ratings from the Italian Paul Dilemma were first examined by an analysis of variance for the factors: Religious Maturity Score (RMS) and age. In the analysis of the means of the RMS ratings were higher for the 26-35 age group than for the other age groups. Significant differences among all age groups on the whole sample were shown ($F(1,151) = 59.29$). In particular, the 14-15 age group, the RMS was significantly different from the 17-18, 20-25 and 26-35 age groups (means: 251, 315, 326 and 337 respectively) and between the 17-18 and 26-35 age groups ($p < .038$). No differences emerged between the 17-18 and 20-25 ($p < .534$) and 20-26 and 26-35 age groups ($p < .537$).

Spearman's correlation coefficient between RMS and age was $r = .33$ ($p < .0001$).

Religious development stages and moral development stages

The relationship between religious maturity score (as measured by Oser's Paul Dilemma) and moral maturity score (as measured by Gibb's SRM-SF) evidenced positive correlations between RMS and SRMS ($r = .88$, $p < .0001$).

Spearman's correlation coefficients of religious and moral development stages were significant and positively related (Table 2).

Insert table 2 about here

High correlations emerged between stages of religious moral development and parallel stages of moral development. Stage 3 (in both)

appeared as a central core for analyses of religious and moral development domains.

As we can see in Table 1, the correlation of religious development stage 3 with stage 3(4) of moral development was negative, and was not significant with the other stages. The correlation of moral development stage 3 with stages 2(3) and 3(2) of religious development was not significant, but was negative with all the stages of religious development higher than stage 3. Correlation between the parallel stages 3 of moral and religious development was the highest.

Stages of religious maturity and role-taking opportunities

A clear positive correlation was found between RMS and involvement in religious- or social-oriented groups ($r = .49$, $r = .46$ respectively, $p < .0001$). The role-taking experiences in these groups showed high cognitive religious judgment development.

Variance analysis comparisons between subjects belonging to religious oriented groups with role-taking programs and non-belonging subjects revealed significant differences on the RMS (340 vs. 311 respectively, $F(1,151) = 24.56$ $p < .0001$). Variance analysis comparisons on subjects belonging to social-oriented groups with role-taking programs and no-belonging subjects also revealed significant differences on the RMS (347 vs. 317 respectively, $F(1,151) = 21.88$ $p < .0001$). The subjects who participated in everyday life role-taking programs in both religious- and social-oriented groups showed higher RMS (357, $F(1,152) = 10.60$ $p < .0001$) than the other subjects.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Preliminary evidence suggests that the Paul Dilemma, as adapted to Italian culture, is a good measure of religious judgment development. The results of the present research indicate that the Italian version of the Paul Dilemma allows reliable interpretation, being internally and temporally stable. This preliminary validity is encouraging.

The research represents a first empirical attempt to adapt Oser's measure of religious judgment development which is consistent with the Kohlbergian perspective. One of the most interesting findings from these

analyses is the fact that Italian empirical data provide further evidence of the Oser's "dynamic model" (Oser & Reich, 1990). Moreover, as is often the case, considerable research is needed to address questions regarding the relation of moral and religious domains.

Where possible, additional research should examine role-taking, in order to assess the extent to which it contributes to religious and/or moral judgment development. There is emerging evidence to support that role-taking encourages religious judgment maturity in everyday life.

Social role-taking research over the past 20 years (Sprinthall, 1994) indicates that learning higher-order helping skills nurtures humane behavior, ego and conceptual development and moral development. The role-taking program participants have interpersonal autonomy, caring, and a greater understanding of democratic principles (Lind, 1993; Comunian & Gielen, 1997). In the present research, role-taking was found to be an important means of development of religious and moral maturity. An integrated longitudinal cross-sectional research design would probably be most valuable. Interactions between cultural forces and individual conceptions can only be understood if the religious and moral domains are studied simultaneously in individual groups and cultural levels, and on the basis of structural considerations.

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TABLE 1 - *Oser's stages of religious judgment.*

STAGE	STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
1	Orientation of religious heteronomy. There is an Ultimate Being (God) who protects you or sends you everything. God is understood as active, provided with power, intervening in the world directly. The human being is conceived as reactive: the Ultimate Being's will must always be fulfilled; otherwise, the relationship is broken.
2	Orientation of "give so that you may receive". The Ultimate Being is still viewed as an all-powerful being, but may now be influenced by prayers, offerings, promises, etc.. If one cares about the Ultimate Being, he will act like a trusting and loving father, and you will be happy, healthy, successful, etc.. The human being can exert a prophylactic influence.
3	Orientation of ego autonomy and one-sided self-responsibility. The individual is solipstically autonomous, fully responsible for his or her own life, and for matters of the world. The Ultimate Being is apart. He has his own field of action; we have ours. Transcendence and immanence are separated from one another.
4	Mediated autonomy and salvation plan. The individual continues to assume responsibility, but he or she wonders about the conditions for the mere possibility of carrying responsibility. The human being sees his or her commitment as a way to overcome lack of meaning and hope, as well as absurdity. Transcendence is now partly within (immanence): the Ultimate Being becomes the condition for the possibility of human freedom, independence, etc..
5	Orientation to religious intersubjectivity and autonomy, universal and unconditional religiosity. The Ultimate Being appears in every human commitment, yet transcends it at the same time. Transcendence and immanence interact completely. This total integration renders possible universal solidarity with all human beings and the Ultimate.

TABLE 2 - *Intercorrelations among religious judgment development and moral judgment development stages, as measured by Oser's Paul Dilemma and Gibb's Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form.*

RELIGIOUS STAGES	SOCIOMORAL REFLECTION STAGES						
	2	2(3)	3(2)	3	3(4)	4(3)	4
2		.57***	.25***				
2(3)			.42***	.47***			
3(2)				.55***			
3			-.16°	.75***	-		
					.36***		
3(4)				-	.62***	-.23*	
				.37***			
4(3)				-	.32**	.58***	
				.43***			
4				-.27**		.46***	.32**

*** p < .0001 ** p < .001 * p < .01 ° p < .10

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THE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN

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All education is „political“ in the sense that it is about educating citizens who will be effective members of their culture. But what does „effective“ mean? As I was writing this paper, I came across a photograph of a „citizenship class“ in nineteen twenties Chicago. The purpose of the class was to coach the immigrant students in knowledge of US history and constitution. Today, we consider that effectiveness requires more than knowledge - it is also about dealing with social institutions. Indeed, all discourses of citizenship have an underlying narrative. It goes like this; in order to make the world a better place, to counter the dangers or evils we see around us, we need to produce young people of a particular kind. We achieve this by certain educational practices which we know will work, according to our story of human development.

However, citizenship programmes are formulated within a political context. They may take for granted unquestioned assumptions about social systems, social order and social control. Furthermore, there is a major tension behind this narrative. It hangs on the „story“ of human development - and who tells it. Education programmes also reflect assumptions about human development - the „problems“ that have to be circumvented, the mechanisms by which „good“ development is fostered.

In both citizenship and the closely related field of moral education, there is a body of research which has generated theories, explored critiques and considered applications. However, policy-makers are driven frequently

by a need to meet the demands of a „lay consensus“. But lay theory is eclectic, and internally contradictory. „Commonsense“ discourse on good citizenship tends to draw upon a conventional model of the „good person“. This is a portmanteau concept which includes qualities of personhood, skills of judgement and attributes of self.

It is easy to find inherent contradictions in the „good person“ package. Let us examine six, apparently unexceptionable, desirable outcomes of citizenship/moral education, frequently found in lay discourse:

- a) educating young people to conform to social mores and rules
- b) educating moral judgement and reasoning
- c) fostering prosocial behaviour, altruism and taking responsibility
- d) engendering moral autonomy and resistance to conformity pressures
- e) educating moral emotions and caring
- f) preventing anti-social behaviour through internalised guilt

If we compare (a) and (d) it is immediately apparent that they are in conflict - not only as values, but more important, that the educational processes designed to promote conformity are contradictory to those designed to promote autonomy. If we compare (b) and (e), the conflict is more subtle; educating emotions need not be in conflict with educating reasoning, but in practice they require rather different educational regimes, and more important, they reflect very different underlying philosophical theories about the nature of morality. If we compare (c) and (f), we are again facing a tension between conformity tendencies, and the ability to take personal responsibility in the face of social pressures.

So, when we unpack the commonsense package, and identify its components, we find a range of very different models of good citizenship, and of human development. This diversity maps on to different models of human nature, goals of education, and assumptions about what education processes work. Another example is the concept of the school as a microcosm. The implications of this vary according to the assumptions that are being made about how the school works, and what are the desirable outcomes of education. For example, is the child supposed to learn that the community will set constraints on individual behaviour, and that school is the place to learn how to respond to this? Is the school an arena for the practice of responsibility (and power) for and over others? Is the school the place to learn how to effectively put forward one's point of

view - and is this done within the formal, safe, constraints of adversarial debate, or does the school really foster critique of its own internal power structure and hierarchy? Does the school teach „community“ skills through safe school-organised activity, or does it encourage more adventurous involvements?

In this paper I shall explore current and competing models of citizenship education, and with specific reference to three documents. The three documents are the National Curriculum document on Citizenship Education (1990), the Blue Peter Green Book. (1990) and the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority document (1996). I am going to look at the overt and covert agendas of these documents, and unpack the assumptions that they make about the desirable outcomes of citizenship and values education, and the assumptions that they make about psychological and educational processes. I shall do this within the context of current discussions about values development. These discussions have two dimensions; one concerns psychological attributes and therefore, the developmental processes that education has to foster; the other concern value theory, the goals of values education, and the relationship between the individual and society. These two dimensions intersect in provocative ways.

Second part

Models and Contradictions

To explore the first of these dimensions, models of development, let us see what happens when we unpack the messy portmanteau of „commonsense“ views of character. In fact, we can distinguish a virtues model, a model that privileges reasoning and cognition, and an emerging model of communitarianism.

„Virtues“ are qualities of personhood and look, in psychological terms, like enduring traits of personality. Fostering virtues is presumed to require practice in the virtue, in behaviour and in the appropriate management of affect. This requires example and guidance, and the presentation of clear expectations through folklore and moral tales that exemplify the virtue. The current enthusiasm for „Character education“ reflects this; children are urged to aspire to certain personal traits and patterns of behaviour. As a psychological theory, this approach emphasises behaviour, and the shaping of behaviour and values through reward, expectations and negative sanction.

In approaches that emphasise the development of reasoning, values are the product of cognition rather than enduring traits. The desirable goal of development is the capacity for autonomous judgement. This is fostered by stimulating increasingly complex understanding of the social, political and moral issues (reflected in stages of reasoning, along the lines of a Piagetian model of development). This is achieved through contexts which encourage reflection, and awareness of inconsistencies.

This is by far the most extensively and rigorously researched area of moral development, particularly related to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, and there is considerable data on the relationship between moral reasoning and political and social activism. This data suggests that a high stage of moral reasoning is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for certain forms of political engagement and activism, particularly that associated with liberal-left issues. In other words, most liberal-left high stage reasoners have a record of political engagement, but not all persons who are politically (or morally) engaged have high stage of moral reasoning. (Haste, 1986)

The third model I want to consider is communitarianism. Currently, communitarianism is a diverse and somewhat inchoate set of beliefs and values, which have been appropriated by several interest groups. Communitarianism is not unlike environmentalism; both also cut across the traditional left-right dimension, invoking confusion and some strange rhetorical battles. Some writers, such as Amitai Etzioni, discuss communitarianism as a value system, counterbalancing an ethic of individualism which is criticised for failing to foster commitment to the community that sustains a safe moral and social order (Etzioni, 1994, 1995). Others, like Charles Taylor and Daniel Bell, focus on the deeper ontological and psychological assumptions behind communitarianism, in particular on the processes by which values are constructed and sustained. Their argument is that as we are social beings, we must recognise the inevitable social processes in the construction of our values, and in the maintenance of our social and moral worlds (Taylor, 1991; Bell, 1993). In terms of educational mechanisms for fostering values, Etzioni emphasises the social processes by which people are shaped into good citizens - through expectations, reward and punishment, whereas Taylor and Bell focus on linguistic and hermeneutic processes.

This brief exposition demonstrates the interweaving of value perspectives

and preferred theoretical models, but the situation is not simple. A further insight comes from the diverse definitions of „responsibility“ that surface in debates about values and citizenship education. „Responsibility“ is a buzz word in citizenship education, because it explicitly refers to one's connection to something beyond one's own interests - but it serves very different goals.

One meaning of „responsibility“ - which I shall term „Responsibility 1“ - is duty and obligation within an established social order. This implies conformity to rules, recognition of the community's demands and of the validity of those demands. It implies subsuming one's own desires to those of the larger group. A second meaning of „responsibility“ - „Responsibility 2“ - applies to caring for others, recognising that one has ties of affection or affinity to others, whom one should nurture. In terms of one's relationship to others and to the community, this implies recognising and fostering of connections between persons - it is not just a matter of rules or a set of obligations that one cognitively recognises. A third meaning of responsibility - „Responsibility 3“ - arises from a sense of personal efficacy and agency, where the individual „owns“ the value and feels a personal obligation to act upon it. This is about recognising personal commitment to the consequences of a judgement which one has oneself arrived at. A major difference between these conceptions of „responsibility“ is in their implications for action. „Responsibility 3“ carries a personal obligation to take action that may lead one into confrontation with social norms and institutions. A sense of duty, „Responsibility 1“, may lead in precisely the opposite direction, towards conformity and the suppression of one's individual judgements.

Third part

Unpacking the discourses of citizenship

The three documents I want to consider have different agendas. The first, the National Curriculum document on Citizenship, attempted to define citizenship eclectically, finding common ground that would be politically acceptable. It provided a set of guidelines for schools, at each of the four education „key stages“ (National Curriculum Council, 1990). The second document I want to consider is an „alternative“ document, produced by the BBC television team that makes the Blue Peter programme. It was

directed at children and young adolescents, and its guidelines concern individual activity within loose groups or organisations (Bronze, Heathcote & Brown, 1990). The third document I want to consider is the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) document. This is an attempt at a consensus about values, rather than a programme to implement their education (SCAA, 1996).

What are we looking at, in deconstructing these discourses? A prescription for citizenship education or moral education is a rhetorical document. It is designed to persuade policy-makers not only to engage in certain practices, but also to accept the goals and perspective of the writers. There is an assumption that the present situation is inadequate, incomplete, and that change is required. There are assumptions about the validity and effectiveness of the measures prescribed, as well as about the desirability and achievability of the goals. There is an assumption that the goals are already shared, or if not, that the reader can be persuaded that the goals are desirable, through an appeal to a presumed consensus about „the problem“. Any such document can be analysed in terms of what is taken for granted, assumed to be shared, unquestioned, and in terms of what is problematic - what needs to be spelt out, justified, put on the table for debate, or challenged.

The overt goals of the document reveal assumptions about the desirable attributes of persons. From this, we can deduce assumptions about desirable relationships - between persons, and between the individual and the social institutions, the desired social and moral order. Even more interesting, what is implied about obstacles or about failure - what is being educated against? To what is the proposed agenda a reaction? As Michael Billig has trenchantly argued, we can only understand a position if we understand what it is confronting, because any argument accommodates to the assumptions of the perceived listener (Billig, 1996).

The document also reveals assumptions about development. Any educational programme is presumed to intervene in a normal process and enhance it. What agencies are involved in promoting development, what kinds of experiences does the growing individual need in order to acquire the desired attributes? Is there a coherent theory of development underlying these assumptions? Or is it based on little more than conventional wisdom?

The desirable attributes of persons in the NCC document includes personal planning and taking personal responsibility, interpreting an argument critically, the capacity to find out information, helpfulness to others, co-operation, sensitivity to cultural diversity, and the skills of organising. We can conclude from this that „citizenship“ is primarily about effective interpretation of information, the ability to work with others, and the ability to contribute to team efforts of public helpfulness.

The implicit developmental theory is a skills- acquisition model, reasoning in the form of weighing up evidence (but not within a Piagetian or Kohlbergian stage model), and dispositions associated with helpfulness. The skills are exercised by individuals in a group or team situation. The skills do not seem to include individual autonomy, coming to judgments which might lead to confrontation with the group, or with authority. The implied developmental theory is that skills are fostered through practice, so the school - or organised groups in the community - should provide a structure in which this practice can occur. Group membership is explicitly for the effective cooperative use of skills, not for learning how to create a pressure group.

The Blue Peter Green Book contrasts strongly with this on many points. The most obvious is that it is directed to children themselves, not to a school system or to educational policy-makers. The child reader is positioned by this as an agentic individual in a social world, upon which she or he can have an effect. The language is didactic and in many cases polemical. The document is extensively furnished with action advice. The desirable attributes of the reader are, firstly, an environmentalist awareness. The book discusses environmental issues in 28 topics, ranging from acid rain, endangered species, pollution, nuclear power and alternative energy. Each includes information about the issue, and advice about actions.

The clear message is that the aware individual feels a personal responsibility for environmental issues, and has the efficacy to do something concrete about them. The actions involved require reasoning and generating solutions, („Think of ways to make your home use energy more efficiently“) proactive observation and information-gathering, („Look out for pollution on the beaches and report it to the local council.“ „Find out more about nuclear power from involved organisations“) persuasion of others, both by word of mouth and by letter, („Keep a diary of the number of times your family car is used in a week. Suggest that several journeys could be

combined into one trip“ „Write to your member of parliament. Ask „What are you doing to stop the greenhouse effect?““) and involvement with local pressure groups and campaigning organisations („Start a local waste recycling scheme“ „Join an organisation that’s campaigning for cleaner rivers and seas“).

The implied moral theory of this document is limited to issues of responsibility for the environment. However, moral commitment derives from a reasoned appreciation of our responsibility for the planet’s future. It is in many ways a Kantian assumption; one reasons that one has an obligation, and one has no choice but to act upon it.

The third document was published six years later than the others, in 1996, after a period in which there had been much reflection on the problems of prescribing values education. The English School Curriculum and Assessment Authority set up a Forum comprising 150 people from such groups as youth workers, teachers, parents, lawyers, media and the religions. The purpose was not to prescribe a curriculum, but to draw up a consensus on which a curriculum might be founded. The document consists of value statements in four areas - Society, Relationships, the Self and the Environment; I find it noteworthy that by 1996, the environment had become a mainstream theme of morality.

The desired goals are a) caring for other people b) taking responsibility for the self c) recognising that individuals are part of a larger social and physical environment d) treating everyone fairly. The well-educated citizen therefore can make reasoned judgements, take action in accordance with them, recognise the perspectives of others, and act co-operatively. Relationships are based on mutual respect and consideration - whether between persons, groups, or with the environment. The developmental processes include the importance of caring relationships - particularly in families - to lay the groundwork for self-worth and the ability to reflect and develop respect for persons.

The implication is that practice in reflection, and the experience of learning how to operate in a cooperative and caring social environment, is the means of fostering development towards the desired ends. Despite the emphasis on reasoning and individual responsibility and reflection, development appears to be grounded in social processes and interaction, and the explicit outcome is „collective endeavour for the common good“.

and the explicit outcome is „collective endeavour for the common good“.

Fourth part

Counter agendas and antitheses

What of the implied antithesis, the consequence of not implementing a successful programme? I consider that there are two layers of antithesis. One is relatively overt, for example, pleas for „responsibility“ manifestly counter „irresponsibility“. To call for „integrity“ or „honesty“ implies that these are currently lacking. The other layer is of a more covert threat. Improving literacy benefits individuals; poor literacy overtly deprives individuals of the opportunity for development of skills. Covertly, a nation of illiterate, unemployed people is a recipe for alienation, crime and political instability. To understand a political message, we need to look on the dark side.

In the case of the NCC document, the social order is implied partly by the eight areas under which citizenship education is subsumed. These in effect constitute a profile of citizenship itself. These are; community, a pluralist society, being a citizen, the family, democracy in action, the citizen and the law, work, employment and leisure, and public services. To take some examples, „democracy in action“ translates into interpersonal co-operation; „being a citizen“ translates into discussing human rights issues, and also, for the oldest group, helping in the community. These are clearly contexts for learning skills that presumably will translate into adult working together and sharing decision-making, being informed about current affairs (and voting intelligently) and being active in community service.

According to my reading of this text, the ideal social order comprises helpful people who keep themselves informed, who are active in doing things that will keep the system going smoothly and with public consent. The overall impression is of intelligent participant observation, not challenging an existing system. For example, formal debates are suggested as a way of clarifying issues and acquiring the skills of adversarial discussion, but there is no suggestion that this might translate into the skills of social action that challenges institutions. As I have written elsewhere, „equal opportunities are suggested as a useful topic under „work, employment and leisure“, the activities suggested are through

debate and discussion, pupils examine equal opportunities in different types of work and leisure and the impact of equal opportunities legislation. There is no suggestion, for example, that the pupils take their own school as a case study, find out the overt or hidden mechanisms of discrimination, and work out ways to counter it.“ (Haste, 1993, 158)

It is my reading that the „overt“ antithesis is disaffection, lethargy and self-interest, a nation of people whose apathy makes the community sluggish. The covert, „dark“ message in my view is that a disaffected society is alienated - and disobedient. The message seems to be about getting people to subscribe voluntarily to the values of the existing system, to gain the skills to use it. The absence of virtually any „skills“ for confrontation, challenge, or pressure for change is noteworthy. „Democracy“ appears to be a kind of mutual contract which draws all citizens into a shared participation in the system. It is the citizen who is „accountable“, rather than the authorities.

The desirable social order in the Blue Peter Green Book is explicitly a Green world, a saved planet. But it is also a world in which everyone is an active and engaged citizen monitoring the institutions and authorities of society. The environment is the first project, but the style is general. It is interesting that the presumed „political neutrality“ of the environment issue allows it to be a major plank of the highly eclectic SCAA group, as well as permitting the carefully neutral BBC to be engaged. The Blue Peter world is a place of open debate and energetic persuasion and action. What are its antitheses?

The overt antithesis would appear to be indifference, failure to take responsibility in a crisis situation. If people do not feel efficacious and responsible, dire environmental consequences will happen. In that sense, the document is overtly a call to action, a polemic, with a clear agenda. However the fact that it is directed at children indicates an educational intent, to equip the next generation with certain attributes. The covert antithesis seems to be about accountability and monitoring of government and other institutions - implying that we cannot trust the authorities (especially commercial interests) to act in the best interests of the nation/planet and the good citizen needs to be vigilant - even vigilante.

This covert antithesis echoes the peace movement era. The same rhetoric was applied to peace twenty years ago. Research found that a key

dimension of protest about nuclear threat was the intersection of trust in the government, and sense of personal efficacy. Those who were involved in activism had low trust in the government, and high personal efficacy. They were also very attentive to threat and the possible consequences of nuclear war. Further, they expressed anger rather than fear. Those who had high trust and high efficacy showed little fear, and considered that the government had the situation in hand. Those with low efficacy expressed fear, pessimism and helplessness (Marsh, 1977; Haste, 1989; Thearle and Weinreich-Haste, 1986). The Blue Peter Green Book agenda, while never explicitly recognising links to this tradition, appeals for high efficacy, low trust individuals to act as watchdogs in a dangerous and uncertain situation.

Finally, what is the antithesis of the SCAA perspective? Overtly, its message is a buttress against alienation, self interest and the absence of caring, which breed a lack of responsibility. The strong message of valuing persons and developing self-worth clearly implies that these are endangered characteristics. The covert message however seems to be about fragmentation and in particular, factionalism and relativism. If we cannot find a set of common values, and the motivating personal engagement to involve people in making those values work, society will have no means to resist extremist or disaffected groups, nor of resolving conflict between groups with conflicting agendas. The very agenda of „finding a consensus“ is the common strategy for creating a unifying meta-perspective in which all parties feel part of an ingroup and committed to a common cause.

Intervention strategies


My third comparison concerns assumptions about development and therefore about strategies for educational intervention. The NCC document is, not surprisingly, the most specific on this. It is manifestly eclectic in its definition of both morality and citizenship. Its provenance is skills-acquisition, learning through practice (including the practice of reasoning and reflection). The schools task is to provide the practice context, in the real-life of the classroom and the playground, and in the safety of either role play.

The Blue Peter Green Book says little about educational practice, but it

is didactic about individual responsibility - „Responsibility“ - where reasoning generates the obligation for action. It is consistent with the ethos of the television programme itself - that one can engage people's motivation by demonstrating the existence of a problem, presenting them with the means for finding a solution, and demonstrating the steps involved in the skill needed.

The SCAA documents emphasis on the importance of family love in fostering self-worth means that much groundwork is presumed to take place outside the school. The theoretical underpinnings are eclectic. There is a strong strand of ego development and other „self theories“, forefronting caring and affirmation and the development of reflection. There is also a strong strand of reasoning, particularly perspective-taking and understanding one's place in the larger social, and physical environment. Finally, there are interpersonal skills, involving learning to co-operate and to resolve conflict.

In summary, the three documents differ strikingly in their discourses about morality, citizenship, implicit political agendas, human development and educational theory.

 MISSING PAGES FROM HELEN HASTE.....

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The critique of liberalism

A powerful heritage of the Enlightenment is manifested in modern psychology as an emphasis on cognition, judgement and the pursuit of objectivity and individual autonomy. This model is richly reflected in the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, that focuses on stages of reasoning, and on exploring the universality of reasoning processes. It gained support from Rawls' theory of justice, which rests upon objective, impartial reasoning and perspective-taking (Rawls, 1972), and from Habermas' incorporation of a cognitive developmental model of moral reasoning into his 'ideal speech act' theory (Habermas, 1976).

The rationalist model of reasoning and the pursuit of autonomous judgement map on to conceptions of citizenship in which the free individual arrives at his or her own political position and understanding of the social order. This is consistent with liberalism as a political point of view. There are two aspects to this. Firstly emphasising reasoning prioritises judgement; the capacity for reasoned and autonomous judgement is the epitome of this. The second aspect is a concept of 'moral maturity' which comprises not only sophisticated reasoning but also personal responsibility, in the sense of 'Responsibility 3'

How do the three agendas interact with this?

The NCC document includes the *skills* of reasoning, particularly having a critical approach to the media, and an understanding of legal and human rights issues. However, there is no overt encouragement of 'Responsibility 3' that challenges the status quo. The rhetoric is very much in terms of 'Responsibility 1'. The goal is less 'autonomy' than 'skilful understanding and problem-solving'. The rationalist autonomous liberal must be more than skilful; he or she must be *innovative*.

The *Blue Peter Green Book* is explicitly about innovation, 'Responsibility 3' and making independent judgements. In that sense, it is closest to the model of autonomous liberalism and enlightenment reasoning.

The SCAA document is as oriented to ego function and to affect as it is to cognition. Reasoning as the manifestation of individualistic autonomy is however explicit in some goals - for example *be ready to challenge values or actions*, in the appeal to some universals; *respect the dignity of all people* and in relation to some environmental issues; *justify development in terms of sustainable environment* and *understand the place of human beings within the world*. These statements carry at least an implication of 'Responsibility 3'.

The model of liberal autonomy and individualistic reasoning has been under recent attack from two, disparate, critiques. One focuses on the absence of intrapsychic characteristics, such as virtues and 'moral personality' - attributes of 'the good person' traditionally, in the Aristotelian sense (Flanagan, 1991; Lapsley, 1996; Johnson, 1996). An objection is that reasoning alone is simply too narrow. A second objection is that reasoning, despite its relationship with 'Responsibility 3', is not an adequate explanation of moral or social action. Recent studies of people who are deemed 'moral exemplars' and who have made major contributions to social and political life over a long period, show a range of personal qualities such as flexibility and adaptability, open-mindedness, humility, love, and a fusion of the personal and moral aspects of their lives. High-stage moral reasoning was not necessarily associated with being a 'moral exemplar'. (Colby and Damon, 1992; Walker et al., 1995)

However the main critique of liberalism and the 'goal' of individual autonomy comes from communitarianism. 'Communitarianism' addresses many things. At one level, it is a value position (Haste, 1996). As expressed by 'the prophet of communitarianism', Amitai Etzioni, this is about restoring a sense of community, responsibility to others, and the motivations that connect people to the community. The philosopher Charles Taylor expresses a similar *value* position; that we are suffering from the 'three malaises of modernity' - individualism, alienation and instrumentalism. These lead to what he terms 'disenchantment'.

On the surface, the *value* issues are about replacing 'individual' concerns with 'collective' concerns, with 'restoring' a sense of duty and obligation to the community ('Responsibility 1'). This downplays autonomy and the pursuit of individual freedom. Not surprisingly, the liberal-left response has been to charge communitarianism with rightwing values which at very least would promote a conforming society in which people are subject to social pressures. Etzioni's own position includes the view that 'communities gently chastise those who violate shared moral values and express approbation for those who abide by them' (1995). Understandably, liberal rationalists who have fought long and hard for freedom and autonomy are exceedingly sceptical about the adverb 'gently'.

But there is considerably more to the communitarian critique than a challenge to specific values. This is explicit in the writings of Taylor and Bell (Taylor, 1991; Bell, 1993). Their objection is also to the model of human behaviour that is implicit in the rationalist, Enlightenment emphasis on reasoning and individual autonomy. The critique of individualism has a number of strands concerned with epistemology and ontology. The emphasis on individual responsibility and autonomous reasoning is part of a belief in objectivity, in detachment, which is associated strongly with instrumental beliefs about problem-solving - that reason, if appropriately applied, can offer solutions to virtually anything. This entails a premise of control and mastery, and separation of the observer from that which is observed. It leads to objectification and to psychologically unrealistic beliefs about 'rational man' (sic).

This is part of a larger question - how should we conceptualise persons in relation to the social context? Focus on the individual leads to atomism and fragmentation, a failure to see the person as part of a whole, a social context. This is partly a value issue, but it is also a crucial element of the *ontological* critique, the view of human nature implied in the rationalist model is seriously flawed - it is *psychologically* unsound.

We are increasingly seeing an emphasis on language and social interaction in the generation of meaning, based on the thinking of Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, and Vygotsky. Discursive psychologists such as Rom Harré, Michael Billig and John Shotter argue that the primary human reality is face to face conversation, and that we cannot isolate cognition from social and linguistic practice (Harré & Gillett, 1994; Harré, 1998; Billig, 1996; Shotter, 1993). Taylor, in the same vein argues that human life is 'fundamentally dialogic...We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence defining an identity, through our acquisitions of rich human languages of expression' (Taylor, 1991, p 32).

Much follows from this. In particular, it brings into question the assumptions behind 'autonomous' reasoning. A major plank of autonomous reasoning has been Rawls' elegant formulation of the 'original position' in which one ideally reason about a situation from behind the 'veil of ignorance' where the interests of the parties involved (including one's own) are not known. The *psychological* objection is that we can never do this, we can never separate ourselves from the cultural and linguistic context and transcend its assumptions. We must always take account of wider, unspoken assumptions that we bring to the situation. Such 'autonomy' therefore is an unrealistic basis for 'rationality'; far better to recognise the psychological realities and deal with them. A more accurate picture would allow for multiple dimensions and

perspectives, and would recognise that 'knowledge' requires us to take account of the interpretive processes involved in making sense of experience.

The feminist Donna Haraway speaks of this as 'situated knowledge'; we must always have a 'view from somewhere'; 'rational knowledge does not pretend to disengagement: to be from everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from interpretation, from being represented, to be fully self-contained or fully formalizable. Rational knowledge is a process of ongoing critical interpretation among 'fields' of interpreters and decoders.' (Haraway, 1991, p 196)

We have considerable evidence that culture provides us with assumptions and 'lay theories'. In the moral domain, researchers have shown the diversity of 'principles' that we take for granted in different cultures (Killen & Hart, 1996). Shweder and his colleagues have demonstrated that in India, concepts of pollution are vital - concepts that are incomprehensible to Western minds (Shweder et al., 1987; Shweder, 1990). Iwasa shows that Japanese concepts of personhood value the spiritual quality of life over the temporal - so saving life *per se* is not always the highest goal (Iwasa, 1995).

So what are the implications for citizenship education? What is entailed in a 'social being'? There are obvious value dimensions - emphasising community ties, connection, concern for others, along the lines of 'Responsibility 2'. The theoretical premise about development however is that we *derive* our meaning and our frameworks for making sense of the world from the cultural and historical context, and we *generate* meaning through discourse and social interaction. To fully appreciate that we are social beings, we have to experience ourselves as social beings, as bound up with our communities (Bell, 1993). We need to see how our moral and political concepts and values arise out of shared meanings. It is through praxis, not precept, that moral, social and political understanding is formed. By reflecting on social and linguistic practices, the individual understands not only why such practices have value, but how to change them.

The psychological implications of this derive from the assumption that the individual derives personal meaning and worth from being part of a community, being affirmed by others. The goals of education must be to facilitate engagement with the community, enable the individual to see the larger picture, other people's point of view. It means learning how to manage the social group and one's place in it, to manage the linguistic practices by which this is done.

Communitarianism, therefore, is more than a value system; it is an *ontological* critique. It involves a different way of looking at the world and human experience, not just a different set of values. This is not to say, of course, that all those who espouse communitarian values also buy into the discursive or linguistic theory that Taylor, Bell and others would consider the infrastructure. Nor does this infrastructure protect communitarian values from being hijacked by those who want to build a moral system around 'responsibility 1' interpreted as duty and obligation to existing social mores.

To my knowledge, none of the many writers on communitarianism has yet propounded a values curriculum that takes account of the ontological implications. I have elsewhere laid out a set of principles that could guide such a curriculum, based on the model of human development and social processes that are implied in Taylor's and Bell's work (Haste, 1996, p. 53):

- *Learning through language and social practice* means that values must be institutionalised and enacted as part of everyday life, so that they are experienced as taken for granted through action.
- *Fostering social identity* means telling stories and narratives about the community and culture which give meaning to one's self, explanations for why things are as they are, and recognition that these stories and accounts are shared.
- *Feeling engaged with, and connected to, others* means experiencing responsibility and caring, as giver and receiver, and making these explicit and normative.

- Recognising that institutions and communities have multiple covert and overt agendas, and dealing with these, helps community members understand community processes, and fosters pluralist values
- A self-conscious appreciation of the hermeneutic processes which generate meaning, gained by awareness of the community's norms, and reflection upon them, their evolution and their function; this makes social processes explicit, and by making them open, facilitates the conscious generation of new norms.

Such goals and practices would facilitate reflection on social processes, and on understanding how language and social interaction are the crucible of meaning. The radical ontological implications of communitarianism lie in this hermeneutic awareness, not merely in shifting from 'autonomy' to 'responsibility'.

So, how do our three documents mesh with this critique?

The NCC document as we have noted is about eclectic skills training. It is not reflexive about language or the generation of meaning; it is firmly within a model in which individuals skilfully adapt to existing structures and systems. So the hermeneutic dimension of the communitarian critique is absent. However, paradoxically, the appeal to community which pervades the NCC document, the need for affiliation and engagement with the locality, is entirely consistent with the misleading superficial message of communitarianism which can be interpreted as 'Responsibility 1'. The emphasis on skills training relies greatly on praxis - as we have seen. But praxis without reflexivity, praxis without an appreciation of interpretation and discursive processes, serves to consolidate, not question, existing institutions.

The *Blue Peter Green Book* is also not reflexive - except insofar as consolidating one's value position requires reflexivity. It is not hermeneutic. It is, however, oriented to change, but change grounded in individual reasoning rather than social or discursive processes. It is oriented to responsibility for the community in the form of 'Responsibility 3'. The concerns of ecological consciousness are concerns about the larger social group. Paradoxically, in the hands of more sophisticated reasoners than those addressed by the *Blue Peter Green Book*, issues of ecology are very closely tied to reinterpreting how we view the world. 'Deep ecology' in particular, is dedicated to confronting meaning and discourse - and to adopting a hermeneutic stance. But the *Blue Peter Green Book* is firmly based in action (Bowers, 1995; Haste, 1998)

The SCAA document is dedicated to *consensus*. Like all efforts to find enduring truths in a pluralist worlds, it is torn between finding a common thread and recognising the implications of there being many threads. The document's message is about sharing common values, rather than reflecting on interpretive processes. Yet the explicit appreciation of pluralism and diversity generates goals like *accept diversity and respect people's rights to religious and cultural difference*, and *try to discover meaning and purpose in life and how life ought to be lived* (a task that foresees multiple possibilities, not one 'true way') and finally *understand the place of human beings in the world*. One of the more hermeneutic aspects of the document is recognising the need to see just how values are incorporated in school praxis.

In terms of communitarian values, the SCAA document endorses, as we have noted, 'Responsibility 2' as well as 'Responsibility 3'. Though it says relatively little about being part of a community it emphasises being part of a *caring society*, and it also acknowledges the vital part that relationships play in development and in 'the good of the community'.

Conclusions

In this paper I have interwoven a discussion of the different agendas of three documents relating to citizenship education, with discussions and critiques currently surrounding values and the concept of citizenship. I have unpacked the assumptions within these, and shown some surprising conjunctions and disjunctions between agendas and assumptions.

Where might we go from here? We are faced with a number of emergent models for educational practice. We have explored only three - two of which at least have authoritative support amongst educational policy-makers. These are deliberately eclectic, neither rooted in well-founded theory and research nor informed by a sophisticated appreciation of subtle critique and counter-critique. Some might argue that such eclecticism frees one from the lenses of narrow theory. Yet as we have seen, this eclecticism reflects many unspoken and unconsidered assumptions which frame the argument and the desired outcomes - the model of 'the effective citizen' - as well as presupposing what will be 'effective' education.

There is a danger in looking only at the *value* agendas of different citizenship programmes. One may become trapped in traditional distinctions. One needs also to look at ontological assumptions - how development is presumed to take place. For example one could superficially have concluded that the *Blue Peter Green Book* is more 'leftwing' than the anodyne 'conservative' NCC document. Or one could conclude, misleadingly, that both the NCC and the SCAA documents address the public (and pulpit) concerns about 'community values' in the same way. Such value categorisation would miss the point about the very different assumptions about human development, and therefore educational process, that are implied in the three documents.

The *Blue Peter Green Book*, turns out to be based quite firmly in reasoning and the translation of rational argument into action - which has associations with liberal individualism and autonomy. The SCAA document is, at least implicitly, surprisingly more hermeneutic than its professed eclecticism might suggest. Despite the blandness of a consensus model, nevertheless its arguments lead us to address social processes. The NCC document is traditional in its assumptions about psychological processes, and its implicit psychological theory, as well as its values.

I have not proposed an agenda for citizenship education; my concern has been that we look more closely and analytically not only at the rhetoric, but the rhetorical processes, that are necessarily involved in citizenship education.

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CHILDREN'S PEER RELATIONS AND REASONING ABOUT SOCIAL RULES

by
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Children's peer relations and reasoning about social rules

Almost all adults recognize the differences between the 'domains' of rules that regulate social activity. One such domain is that of social conventions, which are socially invented behavioural standards concerning, for example, dressing and eating. They can be changed and can take different forms in different places. In contrast, morals, such as those relating to hurting or stealing from others, cannot be invented or changed and are universal.

During the last 20 years, Turiel and his associates (the 'domain theorists') have accumulated an impressive body of evidence that demonstrates that children, too, can distinguish between morals and social conventions (e.g., Helwig, Tisak & Turiel, 1990; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana 1981; Smetana, Schlagman & Walsh Adams, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1978; 1983). By asking, for example, about the necessity and alterability of rules in different schools and different countries, they have demonstrated that most children make the moral-conventional distinction. The ability to make this distinction occurs remarkably early: Smetana and Braeges (1990), for example, have found it to be present even before 3 years of age. This remarkably sophisticated understanding of the origins and status of social rules gives rise to some challenging questions about how, and from where, it is acquired.

The source of social knowledge

On the face of it, children are given little information from adults about the different domains. Especially during the early years, children are usually given very similar feedback whether they make conventional or moral transgressions. Typically, children will get smacked whether they eat with their fingers (a conventional transgression) or hit a younger sibling (moral). There is some evidence that adults communicate information about the different domains during more subtle interactions: children elicit verbal and non-verbal reactions about rules by playing and joking, as well as by teasing and conflicting with their parents (Dunn, 1988). Teachers, too, transmit knowledge to children by talking about the rules that children transgress (Much & Shweder, 1978).

While accepting that cultural communication plays a part, the domain theorists emphasize the role of the individual child in the construction of knowledge. They argue that children are able to differentiate between rules of different domains because actions that break these rules have different, directly observable, consequences. Moral transgressions have 'intrinsic consequences' – usually the distress of the victim. The consequences of conventional transgressions, on the other hand, are not intrinsic. The transgressor might be admonished or punished, but the action does not directly cause harm to others. Turiel (1989) proposes that, by detecting such regularities in their social environment, children come to appreciate that, in contrast to morals, conventional rules are essentially arbitrary, relative and consensual.

Blair (1995, 1997) has taken this approach a step further. He argues that humans share with other higher animals a 'Violence Inhibition Mechanism' (VIM) that usually prevents them from causing distress or harm to others. The VIM enables us to recognize the distress of others and leads to the inhibition of the behaviour that caused that distress. Blair proposes that this mechanism lies at the heart of the ability to make the moral-conventional distinction since it is triggered by the consequences of moral, but not conventional, transgressions. While cross-species similarities suggest that the VIM is innate, it might also result from early socialization (Blair, 1995: 8).

Piaget (1932) did not recognize young children's ability to distinguish between domains. His younger interviewees appeared to Piaget to talk about game rules as if they were morals: "Rules are regarded as sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and lasting forever. Every suggested alteration strikes the child as a transgression" (: 18). For Piaget, the principal achievement of moral development is the movement from this state of heteronomy, to autonomy, when children recognize that conventional rules are products of consensus. This development, he argued, occurs for two, related, reasons: first, children become less egocentric and so become better able to perspective take and to argue and negotiate with others; and second, they develop relationships with peers with whom they can interact as equals. This latter point marks Piaget's as a *social* developmental theory. It is a theory that focuses on the changing social position of the child, who is initially constrained by all-powerful adults, and subsequently, in later childhood, enters a 'world of co-operation' with whom she can invent and negotiate and change rules.

In various guises and in various fields, Piaget's theory has been taken up by a number of researchers (Damon, 1988; Doise & Mugny, 1984; Light & Glachan, 1985; Sullivan, 1953; Youniss, 1980). All stress the unique features of peer interactions: the lack of inhibition, the familiarity and the understanding that are likely only to occur between individuals who are equal in experience, interests, knowledge and social and physical power. Piaget's contention that peer interaction is the catalyst of moral development has received empirical support. For example, the 'transactive' discussion involved in young peers' joint problem solving, where dyads actively debate, as opposed to passively listen, has been linked to increased moral awareness (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983). Kruger (1988) found groups of 8-year-olds progressed more in their moral reasoning after discussing dilemmas with their peers, than with their mothers. And children showing an increased sense of fairness (another measure of morality) in allocating rewards to peers, are rated more highly by their teachers on generosity, sensitivity, friendliness, and honesty (Damon, 1977). Hartup (1983) argues that without the opportunity to interact with co-equals "children do not learn effective communication skills, do not acquire competencies needed to moderate their aggressive actions ... and are disadvantaged with respect to the formation of moral values" (: 126).

While the discoveries of the domain theorists cast doubt on Piaget's claims concerning *when* understanding of rules is acquired, they do not necessarily threaten the validity of his explanation of *how* this process occurs. Perhaps young children can occupy both the 'world of constraint' when with adults, and the 'world of co-operation' when with peers. It is possible that peer interaction from an early age drives, or at least enhances, the acquisition of the ability to make the moral-conventional distinction. As Piaget argued, it seems very plausible that children's appreciation that some rules can be invented and changed develops through the conflict, co-operation and negotiation that is only possible with peers. And children are likely to notice the consequences of their moral transgressions, and those of others, through interaction with peers.

It is likely that the acquisition of social knowledge is both an individual and a social process, and that it occurs through interaction both with adults and peers. However, it is important to researchers and practitioners to work out how these various influences interact. Clues can be found by investigating individual differences in the ability to make the moral-convention distinction. If, for example, peers play an important role in its acquisition, we would expect individual differences in the ability to be related to certain aspects of children's relationships and interactions.

Failure to distinguish between social domains

This approach has received little attention from researchers, who seem to have assumed that, since the majority of children distinguish between social domains, all are able to do so. Yet Helwig et al's (1990) review shows that this might not be the case. In studies of normal individuals, the proportion of responses that are consistent with making the moral-convention distinction is rarely 100%. The remaining 'failures' to make the distinction might result from all of the people failing some of the time, perhaps owing to misunderstanding of questions. Alternatively, some of the people might fail all of the time. Researchers have not explained whether the inability to distinguish domains represents a characteristic common to a certain group of individuals (Turiel, 1995, personal communication).

Recent investigations of extreme groups, however, have revealed that the ability to distinguish between morals and conventions is by no means universal or uniform. In particular, antisocial individuals appear frequently to fail to make the distinction. For example, Tisak and Jankowski (1996)

investigated adolescent offenders, and Blair (1995; 1997) has tested psychopaths and children with psychopathic tendencies. These researchers report that antisocial adults and children consider moral transgressions to be no more serious than conventional transgressions, and to interpret moral events, such as theft, as conventional. In the absence of rules against moral transgressions, they often claim that such events are legitimate. They appear to focus less on the ensuing harm caused to victims than on the local rules and likely consequences to the transgressor. Blair (1995) argues that psychopaths' apparent inability to make the moral-conventional distinction derives from their having dysfunctional VIMs, so that no aversive arousal is generated by moral transgressions.

While it is possible that only members of groups with extreme problems consistently fail to make the moral-conventional distinction, it is likely that the ability is not all or nothing, but instead is distributed on a continuum within the population. This would explain the failures recorded in the normal samples of most researchers in this field. It is possible, then, that in most ordinary classrooms there are a few children who confuse morals and conventions. The association of antisocial behaviour with impaired ability to make the distinction suggests that it would be important to identify these children in case they, too, are at risk for behavioural disorders. Blair (1997) asks whether the level of VIM functioning is normally distributed and adds: "At the present time, not even a tentative answer can be given to this question".

Peer relationships

If a group of individuals who fail to distinguish domains does exist in the general population, it is likely that they are characterized by poor peer relationships. This prediction arises for three possible reasons: first, domain-distinction failure results *from* poor peer relationships - if peer interaction plays a significant role in moral development, then those children who lack good quality interaction with peers are liable to be hindered in their learning about social rules. This is consistent with Piaget's (1932) account, and the finding that the skills gained in peer interaction are associated with children's level of moral reasoning (e.g., Kruger, 1988; Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983). Second, domain-distinction failure results *in* poor peer relationships - inability to recognize the implications of moral transgressions might lead to poor social reasoning and skills, and hence poor relationships with peers. Third, both poor peer relations and the failure

to distinguish between domains might result from lack of empathy (perhaps related to dysfunctional VIM) and aggressive behaviour.

Children who have less access to the positive aspects of peer relations, may have less opportunity to learn about rules since they lack the opportunities to resolve conflict and co-operate in intersubjective problem solving that are conducive to development of a more sophisticated understanding. The skills and traits characteristic of children who are popular with their peers, are themselves fostered by peer interaction. This suggests a pattern of circular causality: since less popular children lack sustained interaction with their peers, they have reduced opportunities to develop the very skills which would lead to their greater acceptance.

Peer popularity has been linked to social competence and psychological adjustment. Those who are excluded or rejected by their peer group appear to have less sophisticated social skills (Parker & Asher, 1993), and often show maladaptive or aggressive behaviour (Coie & Dodge, 1983; Rubin, 1989). Ladd et al (1990) suggest that aggressive children not only fail to realise they are disliked by their peers, but that they tend to make friends with other aggressive children, which may exacerbate their deficiencies. Rejection by normal peers and acceptance by deviant peer groups are key elements in the developmental sequence that leads to delinquency and crime (Patterson et al, 1989; Dishion et al, 1994).

While there are, then, a number of reasons to suspect that the quality of peer relationships is related to the ability to distinguish between domains, little directly relevant research has been conducted. An exception is the study by Sanderson and Siegal (1988), who compared pre-schoolers' conceptions of moral and social rules. One of the very few differences that were found was that, whereas the 91 non-rejected children considered the conventional transgressions as less deserving of punishment than moral transgressions, the eleven 'rejected' children viewed them as equally deserving. Peer status, however, was not associated with children's tendency to rate conventional issues more rule contingent or relative.

It is possible that the apparent lack of difference in domain understanding between children of different peer status shown in the Sanderson and Siegal (1988) study reflects the young age of their interviewees (4 and 5 years). Children of this age tend to have relatively unstable peer relationships with little emphasis on the reciprocity and empathy that characterizes friendships

between older children (Damon, 1988; Hartup, 1983; 1992). Young children are also supervised more closely by their parents, and spend less time with their peers, than do their elders. For these reasons, younger children are less likely than older children to have opportunities to engage with their peers in interactions (e.g., negotiation, co-operation, resolution of conflict) that enhance their understanding of social rules.

In addition, Sanderson and Siegal's analysis of peer relations in terms of five peer status groups (controversial, popular, average, neglected and rejected) results in small numbers within each group, and hence, possible type II errors. There is also a possibility with this classification that unpopularity and lack of friendship are confounded. Rejected peers are, usually, by no means friendless (Dishion et al, 1994). While they are unpopular with most peers, they might have stable and reciprocal friendships with other rejected peers, during interaction with whom they are able to develop social skills and understanding of social rules. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that rejected children distinguish between domains in much the same ways as other children.

Testing the theories

The possible sources of understanding of social rules are unlikely to be mutually exclusive. It is possible that parents *and* peers play important roles. Indeed, Smetana (1989) reports that conflicts with peers primarily concern moral issues, whereas conflicts with mothers are mainly about conventional issues. These findings suggest that children learn about rules of different domains from different sources. Similarly, social influences are compatible with the domain theorists' view that children actively construct their understanding of rules since this process occurs through social interaction. Furthermore, it is possible that a biological, 'hard-wired' approach such as Blair's is also compatible both with the social and individual accounts since a mechanism such as the VIM is likely to enable children to construct their knowledge from their social experiences and observations.

However, some different predictions arise from the different theories. Failure to distinguish morals from conventions might occur either because individuals consider conventions to be like morals (all rules are unalterable, necessary and universal), or because they believe morals to be like conventions (all rules are alterable, arbitrary and relative).

Piaget's (1932) view was that young children fail to distinguish morals from conventions because they consider even game rules to be like morals. If Piaget was correct to explain domain differentiation in terms of peer interaction leading to recognition that some rules (conventions) can be invented and changed, then it would be predicted that poor peer relationships result in individuals considering conventions to be like morals.

In contrast, according to both the domain theory and Blair's VIM account, failure to distinguish the domains occurs because individuals fail to recognize the intrinsic consequences of moral transgressions. They consider morals, therefore, to be like conventions. This might arise from neurological dysfunction or from problems with socialization. If children are denied the opportunities to experience the consequences of their actions by, for example, being excluded by peers, they are unlikely to develop an understanding of the separate domains. Alternatively, if children are punished severely by parents for both conventional and moral transgressions, it is possible that the salience of the punishment overwhelms that of the intrinsic consequences of their actions to the extent that children fail to notice the results of their actions of others.

These different predictions suggest that the various accounts can be tested. It is possible that one, or more than one, is correct. Perhaps some individuals, for example, consider morals to be conventional because they fail to notice the harmful effects of their moral transgressions, while other individuals consider conventions to be moral because they lack sufficient interaction with peers.

The study to be presented was conducted to investigate further the relation between children's peer relationships and the ability to distinguish between rules of different social domains. Drawing particularly on Piaget's (1932) social developmental theory, and subsequent work (e.g., Sullivan, 1953; Youniss, 1983), it is proposed that peer relationships aid children's understanding of rules because they offer unique opportunities to discover that conventions are consensual, relative and alterable. For this reason, it is expected that less popular children will tend to treat conventions as if they were moral.

Peer interaction also allows children to observe and experience the consequences of their own moral transgressions, and those of others. In addition, it is likely that understanding of social rules (perhaps reflecting

effective communication from parents, or empathy, or functioning of VIM), results in children being able to develop good quality relationships with peers. However, according to the present account, these factors are considered to be of secondary importance in explaining any association between peer relationships and understanding of social rules.

In addition to the moral and conventional domains, children's understanding of the personal domain (Nucci, 1981) is included in this study. Issues which are within the realms of personal choice are characterized by greater rule alterability, rule contingency and less or no punishment. Individuals who clearly distinguish this domain from others are able to separate those actions which affect others (in terms of personal welfare or co-ordinating sanctions) from those that are directly relevant only to the self. They show appreciation of self-governing principles and responsibility for their own actions.

A study of nine-year-old children's evaluations of three types of societal rules (moral, conventional and personal) relating to importance, sanctions, authority, and alterability will be presented. Participants provided justifications to support their evaluations. Peer status was also assessed from classmates' ratings of popularity and friendship.

It was predicted that:

- most children would rate morals less alterable and relative than conventional or personal rules, and moral transgressions more serious, more worthy of punishment and less rule-contingent than transgressions of conventional or personal rules.
- relatively unpopular children would distinguish between social domains less clearly than their classmates.
- these unpopular children would tend to treat conventional and personal issues as if they were moral, rather than vice versa.

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ADOLESCENTS' PERCEPTION OF THE MORAL ATMOSPHERE, THEIR LEVEL OF MORAL COMPETENCE, PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT AND MORAL BEHAVIOR

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The relationship between adolescents' perception of the contextual moral atmosphere, their moral competence, practical judgement and moral behavior was investigated. Earlier research showed that secondary school students of the same educational level differed in their perception of the school moral atmosphere, even when controlled for students' level of moral competence. A high quality school moral atmosphere as perceived by the students was related to their moral behavior around school. This paper focuses upon (a) the validity of the constructs involved and (b) the moral atmosphere in social contexts different from the school. Convergent and discriminant validity of moral atmosphere, practical judgement and moral competence were investigated in a multitrait - multimethod study using oral and written instruments. A 120 students, half male half female, from 16 secondary schools completed the questionnaires and interviews. The validity was assessed qualitatively by using Campbell and Fiske's criteria and quantitatively by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Convergent and discriminant validity correlations were acceptable for moral competence, and for practical judgement and moral atmosphere concerning the predicted action in school-related dilemmas. Results from studies with residential youth, homeless youth, and delinquent youth confirmed the importance of the perception of the moral atmosphere for moral behavior and the low moral atmosphere level in which these adolescents find themselves. Also the possibility to influence this perception seems available. Finally the first step in an educational policy of a forensic center is

described to develop the moral atmosphere in order to stimulate the moral competence and behavior of juvenile delinquents. The center contains a secondary school.

Introduction

An educational policy aimed at improving the institutional moral atmosphere as it is perceived by its participants has to answer the following questions: a) How do we define and measure the institutional moral atmosphere? b) Why should we try to improve this atmosphere? c) How are we going to try to improve the moral atmosphere? The first section of this paper summarizes the definitions of the constructs involved and some results of earlier studies on students' perception of the school moral atmosphere, in particular its relationship with moral behavior. The moral atmosphere as individuals perceive it may fulfil an important function in their moral behavior and development. In the second section attention is given to the measurement of the constructs: moral competence, moral atmosphere and practical judgement. In the third section findings are summarized and presented concerning the perception of the moral atmosphere and its relationship with moral behavior in homeless youth, residential youth and delinquent youth. The research carried out so far gives an empirical foundation for an educational policy of a forensic center for juvenile delinquents to try to stimulate the perception of the moral atmosphere. In the fourth section the first step in the policy to achieve the desired goal is described.

Adolescents' perception of the school moral atmosphere, their level of moral competence, practical judgement and moral behavior

Nearly 30 years ago Kohlberg (1970) started speculating about the moral atmosphere in school and its impact on adolescents' moral development (for overviews see Higgins, 1991; Oser, 1996). Moral atmosphere or 'hidden curriculum' as it was called at the time refers to the informal norms and values that regulate social relationships within an institution and the degree in which these norms and values are shared by the participants (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989). Kohlberg's research consisted in educational experiments with volunteers trying to develop Just Communities. A Just Community is characterized by a highly developed collective understanding of justice as the cornerstone of the institutional ethos, i.e. a high quality moral atmosphere

The first attempt to improve the institutional moral atmosphere was carried out in a female prison. It seemed that improvement of the moral atmosphere led to less recidivism (Kohlberg, Scharf & Hickey, 1972, Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf & Hickey, 1975). Later, the approach was applied to secondary schools. Power et al. (1989) distinguished moral climate from the perceived moral atmosphere or moral culture and used six constructs to describe this moral atmosphere¹. These constructs were divided into a series of categories, phases or 'soft' stages, to describe the developmental process that students with their teachers passed through when they were developing their school into a Just Community. The studies have demonstrated that the moral atmosphere in secondary school can be improved, resulting in student effects that are broader than those of the traditional moral discussion programmes. Long-term consequences were observed for students' career planning, moral competence, and prosocial behavior (Power et al., 1989; cf. Battistich, Solomon, Kim, Watson, & Schaps, 1995). In particular the effects on students' behavior are important. The concept of moral atmosphere was introduced as a missing link between moral competence and moral performance. The moral atmosphere contains an allocation of responsibilities (Oser, 1995). Thus one might assume that Just Community schools achieved an impact on the behavioral level by the way they allocate responsibility to the students.

While the moral atmosphere judgements reflect the perspective of the majority of the participants as it is perceived by the individual, practical judgements reflect the perspective of the individuals themselves. Both types of judgements are evoked by real-life institutional dilemmas, in contrast to the abstract hypothetical dilemmas that are used in research on moral competence, the highest stage of moral reasoning individuals are capable of at that point in their development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). The concepts of moral competence and moral performance or practical moral judgement refer to the distinction between ability and the use of it (Levine, 1979). The distinction is in agreement with the general conviction that concrete human behavior for some reason depends on persistent, and deeper aspects of human beings. Hypothetical moral reasoning (the best means to reflect the moral competence) is prescriptive only and refers to what subjects think why the protagonist in the situation should do or ought to do a specific action. Practical judgement is not only prescriptive, it is also concrete and descriptive. Practical judgement refers to what subjects think what specific action in the situation they themselves are going to do and should do or ought to do and why. The real-life

problem occurs in a context which is much more complex and uncertain in comparison with hypothetical dilemmas (Higgins, Power & Kohlberg, 1984).

Proponents of the Just Community approach have claimed that the institutional moral atmosphere as it is perceived by its participants (delinquents in penitentiary institutions or students in secondary schools) is of a lower level than their practical (moral) judgement in these institutions (Higgins et al., 1984; Kohlberg, Scharf, & Hickey, 1973; Power 1988; Power et al., 1989). A related claim is that individuals more or less adapt their practical judgement to the perceived lower level institutional moral atmosphere. Individuals' practical judgement is of a lower level than their moral competence. In addition, the perceived moral atmosphere has more impact on moral behavior than moral competence. The evidence for these claims is based upon the observations in Just Community schools and their controls.

Our research that we will summarize in this paper looks like working backwards. We started with using the moral atmosphere constructs for the construction of an instrument to assess the moral atmosphere in normal secondary schools (Brugman, Høst, Van Roosmalen, & Tavecchio, 1994; Høst, Brugman, Beem, & Tavecchio, 1998) and our tentative final object is to evaluate and give feedback to a forensic center that tries to develop a high quality moral atmosphere. The naturalistic oriented research has broadened the empirical evidence for a Just Community perspective. The expected relationship between school moral atmosphere and undesirable behavior was confirmed by Høst et al. (1998). The question was answered about how much one could expect undesirable behaviour to decrease if a school would improve from the lowest to the highest moral atmosphere score observed in the sample of 32 secondary schools. A lowest decrease was predicted with teasing at school, which would drop by 12%, and a highest decrease with victimization (stealing), dropping by 34%. An even stronger decrease in undesirable behavior can be expected when a higher school moral atmosphere is achieved than observed in our sample. At present a longitudinal research study is carried out to measure the effects of school moral atmosphere on students' moral behavior and development of moral competence. Preliminary results confirm the importance of students' perception of the school moral atmosphere for their moral behavior. This study will also answer the question concerning the direction of the effects, i.e. whether the perception of the moral atmosphere influences the behavior or vice versa.

However, the naturalistic research also has led or --we think-- should led

to some qualification of opinion.

Firstly, Power et al. (1989) portray the cultures of normal secondary schools and Just Community schools as non-overlapping². The focus on differences between cultures whether on large or small scale brings with it the idea of uniformity and homogeneity within cultures (Wainryb & Turiel, 1995). Empirically, however, the idea of uniformity and homogeneity within cultures between schools can not be maintained. In a generalizability study Beem, Brugman, Høst, & Tavecchio (1998) found that huge differences exist between students in their perception of the moral atmosphere in school. About 10% of the variance could be explained by the school level, 6% by the level of type of school, 3% by grade and class level each, and 2% by the interaction grade and school, leaving 77% for student and error. We do not know whether these differences in perception between students are due to differences in experience at school, differences in the interpretation of the same experience or differences in the weighing of the (interpretations of) experiences or any combination of these.

Secondly, in contrast to the opinion that secondary "(...) schools share common characteristics that press on students and teachers and create the same hidden curriculum of authoritarian, individualistic and self-protectionistic, and instrumental norms and institutional valuing" (Higgins, 1991, pp. 131, 132), Høst et al. (1998) reported that among secondary schools students differ in their perception of the moral atmosphere even when controlled for the educational level of the school and students' level of moral competence. However, these differences between schools were rather small when compared with the differences between normal secondary schools and Just Community schools.

A multitrait - multimethod analysis on moral competence, moral atmosphere and practical judgement in secondary school students

The validity of measurements on the constructs involved is a necessary precondition for testing a theory on the relation between these constructs. Until now, only validity studies have been reported on moral judgement competence. No studies have been reported on the distinction between moral competence, practical judgement and moral atmosphere. Therefore, part of our research was designed to explicitly establish the convergent and discriminant validity of these constructs (multitrait - multimethod, Brugman, Tavecchio, Van Os, Høst, Meier & Van Roosmalen, 1995). This question is addressed here.

The main idea of a multitrait - multimethod study is to measure all constructs using more than one method. In this particular example we measured the constructs moral competence, practical judgement and school moral atmosphere using both a structured interview and a written questionnaire³. Then, convergent validity can be established by verifying that measurements of the same construct, although measured by two different methods, are similar. Discriminant validity can be established by verifying that two different constructs measured by the same method are distinct. In total 6 scales/instruments were used together with a verbal intelligence and a social desirability scale. Here, only the results are presented with regards to the qualitative criteria. Results using also quantitative criteria are presented in Brugman et al. (1995).

Sample

A hundred and twenty normal public secondary school students, half male half female, participated in the study. All students were from the same grade level and varied in age from 13,8 year to 17,3 year. The students came from 16 secondary schools reflecting the educational levels that are distinguished in the Netherlands: (a) Junior Vocational Secondary Education, (b) Intermediate Secondary Education, (c) Preparatory Higher Education and Preparatory College Education. A distinction was made between schools who offered one educational level and schools who offered mixed educational levels. Two classes were aselect chosen for each educational level. From each class 3 students were randomly selected (see Brugman et al., 1995 for more details).

Instruments.

Standardized interviews and written questionnaires for moral atmosphere, practical judgement and moral reasoning, and moral competence were used.

The School Standardized Moral Atmosphere Interview (SMAI) is a standardized interview constructed analogously to the 'Practical School Dilemmas Interview' of Power et al. (1989). The interview contains two school-related dilemmas (helping and stealing) and open-ended questions and probes in order to stimulate students to communicate their own perceptions and the perceptions of the majority of students in their class or school. There are questions about predictive behavior: 'What are you going to do?', 'What do you expect your classmates to do?', and prescriptive behavior: 'What should your classmates do?' These questions about the kind of behavior are referred to as 'Content of the Norm'.⁴ The

interview also contains questions enabling students to justify the behaviors from two perspectives: practical judgement when it addresses their individual perspective and moral atmosphere judgement when it addresses the perspective of most other students.

The instrument was used in an earlier stage of research as a follow-up to the ethnographic interview. In this study, we report only the results concerning the Helping dilemma because of practical limitations (currently the Stealing dilemma is processed). Interviews were typed out in full. Statements by the students were scored on Content of the Norm and Stage of the Norm. Stage of the Collective Norm could not be reliably distinguished from Stage of Community during the scoring process and was therefore dismissed. Inter-rater reliabilities (Cohen's kappa) for coding the interviews on Content of the Norm varied between .75 and .92, with a mean of .83. The reasoning statements were scored separately (Cohen's kappa .90).

The Secondary School Moral Atmosphere Questionnaire (SMAQ, Høst et al., 1998; cf. Lind, 1986 for a similar instrument) is a multiple-choice instrument. It covers the dilemmas mentioned above, one about helping and one about stealing. After each dilemma subjects are requested to give their opinion about what happened, what they think they themselves would do and what their classmates would do. Next, sets of four questions are asked, for instance concerning the reasons for helping. Practical judgements as well as moral atmosphere judgements are asked for. For example, after presenting a reasoning "If you do not help John, the teacher might get angry", students are asked "Is this a reason that you would give?" and "Is this a reason that most of your classmates would give?". Then, subjects are asked to choose the reasoning closest to the one they themselves would probably give in this situation, and the reason closest to the one the majority of the students would probably give in this situation. Such sets of questions are also asked for the reverse situation, for instance not helping. As in the SROM-SF (see below), reasonings are keyed to specific stages. Other questions concern what the subject and their classmates will do when the situation changes, for instance: you will be bullied by your classmates, you miss your favorite tv programme, or the teacher is asking you to help.

In this study only the scores on Stage of the Norm (Cronbach's $\alpha=.67$), Content of the Norm ($\alpha=.68$) and Stage of Community (Personal gains, stage 1 and 2: $\alpha=.61$; Social Relations, stage 3 and 4: $\alpha=.78$) were used. The Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form (SRM-SF, Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992, transl. Zwart-Woudstra, Meijer, Fintelman &

Van IJzendoorn, 1993) is a simplified and shortened oral version of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982), which in turn is a simplified and shortened version of Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview. It measures production statements, i.e. students are asked to produce moral reasonings. The instrument is administered individually. The interview was transcribed and the written text was scored. In this study, the inter-rater reliability between both coders was good compared with the criteria given by Gibbs et al. (1992) with a SRMS correlation of .94 (norm .80), a mean absolute SRMS discrepancy of .09 (norm .20), a global stage agreement of 100% (norm 80%) and an exact stage agreement of 80% (norm 50%).

The Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure - Short Form (SROM-SF, Basinger & Gibbs, 1987; cf. also Gibbs, Arnold, Morgan, Schwartz, Gavaghan & Tappan, 1984) is a written instrument to measure the moral competence. The instrument contains two hypothetical dilemmas, one of them being the Heinz dilemma. After the dilemma has been presented a subject is asked what Heinz should do and why (open question). Next, some aspects of the stories are changed: its no longer Heinz' wife but Heinz' best friend who suffers from the illness. Subjects are asked which reasons they would use if it was their own best friend. For each reason subjects are asked to indicate whether it is close to the reason they themselves would give or not. Subjects are supposed to recognize the reasons they themselves use or would use. Each of these responses gives a close score. Finally, subjects are asked which of the four reasonings given most closely reflects their own. This series of questions is repeated with a stranger replacing the best friend. The SROM-sf score combines the close and closest score. Two respondents were dismissed because they met one of the exclusion rules set by Gibbs. Cronbach's α was .71.

The Verbal Intelligence Test - Short Form (Kooreman & Luteijn, 1987) contains 20 multiple-choice items asking the subject to find a logical connection between pairs of words. The items gradually increase in difficulty. Guttman's Split-half coefficient was .67.

The Social Desirability Scale contains 11 items, for instance "I am honest ... sometimes/always". Cronbach's α was .54 ($n=116$), which was well below the .73 in the try-out ($n=198$).

Results

As a first step, the discriminant validity of the constructs of moral atmosphere and practical judgement was investigated. This was regarded as necessary, because of the large number of (sub)constructs based on this

distinction and the small number of methods. Correlations between both perspectives proved too high to maintain the distinction in separate constructs; especially the perspectives in Stage of Community correlated highly (Pearson $r=.81$ for Stage 1 and 2, and $.80$ for Stage 3 and 4). Moreover, neither did the convergent validity coefficients in the practical judgement of Stage of the Norm (.29) and the moral atmosphere judgement of Stage of the Norm (.26) exceed the discriminant validity coefficients between the perspectives on the verbal method (.43) and the written method (.61). Thus, these measures did not meet Campbell and Fiske's criterion of discriminant validity. The exception was the Content of the Norm with a convergent validity coefficient for practical judgement of .54 and for moral atmosphere of .42, while the discriminant validity coefficient for the verbal method was .51, and for the written method .45 (Table 1).

In the complementary CFA (Bentler, 1989) the discriminant validity was also tested. Two kinds of models were compared. The first kind contained a single latent variable for both constructs -- Stage of the Norm and Content of the Norm -- explaining both the practical judgement and atmosphere measurements. The second kind, nested within the first, contained separate latent variables, one explaining the practical judgement and one explaining the atmosphere measurements. According to this methodology, discriminant validity between the perspectives requires a significantly higher fit of the second kind of models over the first kind. This requirement was only met for the measurement of Content of the Norm. Because of these results, the practical judgement and moral atmosphere variables for Stage of Community were compressed into one score, while for Stage of the Norm only the Atmosphere measurement was used, and for Content of the Norm the differentiation was maintained. As a second step, both convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs were investigated using the moral atmosphere variables mentioned above, moral competence, and the control variables. The MTMM-matrix is given in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

According to the first criterion of Campbell and Fiske (1959), all convergent validity coefficients should be statistically significant and sufficiently high (a correlation higher than .50 is preferred). The coefficients for Moral Competence, Content of the Norm of practical judgement, and the moral atmosphere judgements concerning Content of

the Norm and Stage of the Norm were .43, .54, .40, and .24 respectively. All these coefficients were significant ($p<.01$). The coefficients for Moral Competence and Content of the Norm were moderate, that for Stage of the Norm weak. We conclude that the criterion of convergent validity was at best moderately met.

As regards Moral Competence (SROM-SF), the convergent validity coefficient is comparable to those reported by Basinger and Gibbs (1987) and Gibbs et al. (1984) for homogeneous age groups. Basinger and Gibbs (1987) reported studies about the psychometric qualities of the SROM-SF using 3 samples: grade 6 students aged 12, delinquent youths aged 16-17, and grade 11 students aged 16-17. Convergent validity coefficients with the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM) ranged from .21 for the 12 year-olds to .48 for the 16-17 year-olds. In a validity study using the SRM and SROM, Gibbs et al. (1984, Table 3, p. 533) reported convergent validities ranging from .21 to .61 for homogeneous age groups and .58 for the whole group. By dismissing the youngest age group (mean age 12.5 years) which showed the exceptionally low correlation of .21, the correlation rose to .70 for the whole group, varying in age from 14 to 18.5 years.

In this study, Moral Competence met the criterion of discriminant validity: the convergent validity coefficient was higher than all correlations between Moral Competence and other constructs, independent of whether the same or a different method was used. Moral Competence showed a weak positive relationship with the moral atmosphere judgement of Content of the Norm measured by the verbal method, and practical judgement and atmosphere judgement of Content of the Norm using the written method. Discriminant validity of the SROM-SF and SRM-SF with control scales falls within the same range as reported by Gibbs et al. (1992) for the SRM-SF. Discriminant validity was shown by a weak correlation (lower than the convergent correlation coefficient) of especially the written version with Verbal Intelligence (VI), and by the absence of any correlation with Social Desirability.

Content of the Norm also satisfies this criterion of discriminant validity, although the practical judgement and moral atmosphere measures were rather strongly correlated. The practical judgement of Content of the Norm correlated positively with Social Desirability, but this correlation was lower than the convergent validity coefficient. Interestingly, the moral atmosphere judgement of Content of the Norm lacked a relationship with Social Desirability. This confirms the discriminant validity of both constructs.

The moral atmosphere measure of Stage of the Norm, however, did not meet the criterion of discriminant validity. The correlation between this construct and the moral atmosphere measure of Content of the Norm (.41), practical judgement of Content of the Norm (.28), and Social Relations of the construct Stage of Community (.30) was higher than the convergent validity coefficient. In addition a relatively high correlation with Social Desirability was found (.26). The correlation between the moral atmosphere measures for Content of the Norm and Stage of the Norm was probably partly due to the fact that higher-stage reasonings for a decision not to help were difficult to construct, for the subjects themselves as well as for the designers of the instrument.

Finally, we notice rather high correlations between the variables of Stage of Community and Social Desirability. As there was no coefficient for convergent validity, it is impossible to test Stage of Community against these criteria. Because of the high correlation between practical judgement and moral atmosphere measures, and the weak correlation with other atmosphere constructs we expect some discriminant validity in future research.

For the moral atmosphere and practical judgement constructs no comparable studies have been carried out. However, the lack of discriminant validity suggests that research in this domain should not only code statements reflecting practical judgements independently from statements reflecting the moral atmosphere, but should also sample these types of statements separately. To enhance differentiation, questions may be asked about differences between actions and reasonings of oneself and those of others. The gap between moral atmosphere and practical judgement can be at least partly explained by social desirability effects on practical judgements. However, a relatively substantial positive relationship between Social Desirability and Stage of Community was found. These findings raise questions about the interpretation of the effect of moral atmosphere on practical judgement, and about the educational success of the Just Community approach on Stage of Community.

Summary of results and discussion

The results of a MTMM study on moral atmosphere, practical judgement, and moral competence, using verbal as well as written instruments, show that convergent and discriminant validity correlations were acceptable for moral competence and behavioral choice in schooldilemmas (Content of the Norm). Method effects were strong for practical judgement and the moral atmosphere perspective on Stage of the Norm.

A problem was noticed with the sampling of statements on the practical judgement and statements reflecting the moral atmosphere perspective. Because of their conceptual similarity the operationalization of moral atmosphere and practical judgement is rather confusing. For measuring practical judgement and moral atmosphere the same dilemmas were used, the difference being that in the first case the perspective from the individual him or herself is asked for, while in the latter the perspective from the majority of the institutional members is being investigated. Until now, these statements have been gathered in a too close connection with each other; instead they should be sampled separately.

Adolescents' perception of the moral atmosphere, their level of moral competence, practical judgement and moral behavior in homeless, residential and delinquent youth

One major interest in the study of moral atmosphere was its presupposed influence on moral behavior. While, according to Gregg and Gibbs (1994), the relationship between moral competence level and delinquency "has become an established finding", the relationship found is rather weak (about .30). Several empirical studies (Chandler & Moran, 1990; De Mey, 1994; Gavaghan, Arnold & Gibbs, 1983; Gregg, Gibbs & Basinger, 1994) and meta-analyses (Nelson, Smith & Dodd, 1990; Smetana, 1990) have confirmed this finding. Typically, most persons committing serious delinquent acts have been found to function at stage 2. The majority of matched controls functions at stage 3, which is indicative of a way of judgement characterized by acceptance and upholding of interpersonal expectations. The stage 3 ideal reciprocity ('do unto others what you would like to have them do unto you') is supposed to function as a kind of barrier against committing unjust, i.e. criminal acts. Some studies have also found a substantial number of delinquents who function at stage 3 (Smetana, 1990). When this finding was reported for the first time, it was suggested that especially addicts would function at stage 3. Smetana's study makes clear, however, that other factors than moral competence are of importance too. One other moral factor is the moral atmosphere of the group within which the adolescent participates.

In their study on moral judgement development in homeless youth, using the SROM-SF Tavecchio, Stams, Brugman and Thomeer-Bouwens (1998) found that homeless youth reported much more delinquent behaviour than residential youth on all behavioural

scales: petty crime, vandalism, violence, and rebellious behaviour to police-authorities. While in the residential group the expected result was found that conventional subjects showed much less delinquent behaviour than pre-conventional subjects, in the homeless youth group this difference was absent. Because this difference between the residential group and the homeless youth group could be observed in all four kinds of delinquent behavior, it seemed unlikely that it can be attributed to the economic life condition and economic survival needs of the homeless youth group. Instead, it was argued that this difference probably should be attributed to the lack of stable social relationships and social support that characterizes homeless youth. Thus the contextual moral atmosphere in which adolescents find themselves overrules their level of moral competence in its effect on delinquent behavior.

Boer, Van Lagen and Brugman (1996) report differences in delinquents' perception of the moral atmosphere in a jail dependent on detentional condition. A moral atmosphere questionnaire containing a subset of Power et al.'s constructs was administered to 38 young adult male delinquents (mean age 20.4 years) who stayed during their detention either in an unit that offered thematic group work or in a custody unit. The thematic group work programme was based upon Cohn's theory about identity development, and lasted for eight weeks (Cohn, 1975). The programme resembles a Just Community programme in two regards. First, both programmes have the purpose to create an atmosphere of mutual trust. Second, residents are confronted with a diversity of social problems which stimulate role-taking and problem-solving abilities. A difference between the programmes was the lack of democracy in the thematic group work programme. The custody unit programme focused on physical and leisure activities. Persons in this unit either did not want to take part in the thematic group work programme or could not take part in it because of their insufficient command of the Dutch language.

No difference was found between both units in individuals' moral judgement level as measured with the Dutch translation of the Sociomoral Reflection Measure - Short Form. The average level of moral judgement was somewhat higher than expected with an average Moral Maturity Score of 260 (range 179-336, $sd=36$), global stage 3(2). This score is equal to the average score of 15 year olds from all educational levels in the Netherlands.

A more positive perception of moral atmosphere was found in individuals participating in the thematic group work. The delinquents in the group-work programme perceived a less authoritarian community

atmosphere, a less individualistic oriented sharing of norms, a stronger sense of acceptance of authority and a less counter-culture oriented sharing of norms. Also, norms of community and procedural justice were more strongly perceived. Norms of order and of individually oriented substantive justice, however, were less strongly perceived.

In this study we did not measure the moral atmosphere constructs 'stage of the norm' and 'stage of community'. With an average moral competence stage 3(2) of delinquents, a stimulating moral atmosphere in a penitentiary institution has to reach at least the same level on 'stage of the norm' and 'stage of community', and preferably stage 3. Currently, such a level can not be expected to exist as a standard in regular penitentiary institutions.

In a study with a group of 40 students with behavioral problems (Brugman & Boom, 1996), having the same mean moral judgement competence level as the delinquent group mentioned above, total scores were computed for 'Community feeling' and 'Sharing norms' based upon the mean score for each stage or level multiplied by its stage value. The higher the score, the better it reflects the standards of a community as defined by Power et al. (1989). Total scores on the dimensions of 'Stage' and 'Sharing' correlate moderately positive with their counterparts in the other contexts (about .30 or .40).

The perception of moral atmosphere differs between the three social contexts: institutional group, friends, and family. Paired t-tests showed that community feelings are more positively valued in friends than in institutional group or family. No difference was found between institutional group and family. A closer look at the pattern of community stage specific scores showed that community stage 1 reached its highest score in institutional group, community stage 2 in friends, and community stage 3 in family.

Concerning the sharing of norms, paired t-test showed differences between friends and institutional group, and between family and institutional group. Again friends showed the highest score. Concerning the sharing of norms, friends scores highest on all levels.

Thus for these students, institutional moral atmosphere cannot not only be characterized negatively with reference to moral reasoning competence, but also with reference to the social contexts of friends and family.

The educational policy at the forensic center "Teylingereind" to stimulate the moral atmosphere as perceived by juvenile delinquents

A high quality moral atmosphere in a penitentiary institution is an important goal in itself, and can be helpful for an effective treatment of juvenile delinquents (Jennings & Kohlberg, 1983). The first goal of the policy of the forensic center "Teylingereind" is to realize a high quality moral atmosphere among the professional workers themselves who supervise the adolescents. The workers have recently been elected for this job. They applied to a position that was announced in national or regional journals. They are qualified at the level of Intermediate Vocational Education. A criterion for their election was a positive attitude toward the philosophy on which the policy of the center is based, which implies treating the juveniles as a moral subject, i.e. as a person who is responsible for his own opinions and behaviors, and who is able to reflect upon them. As an introduction to the center's policy the elected professionals subsequently received a communication and social skills training and a short introduction into Rest's four component model. At the center 72 boys (aged 12-18 years) arranged in six groups of 12 persons each are detained, most of them for three months. One group consists of juveniles which are locked in for a longer period. Several cohorts will take part in the study. The study focuses on those who have committed hostile aggressive acts; about 50% of the male juvenile delinquent population belongs to this group. The center contains a secondary school.

Our first question was whether the moral judgement level of the elected applicants with a positive stance differed from those that were rejected. One can be interested in this question for several reasons. Our main interest concerned the hypothesized relationship between level of moral competence of the group-workers and their pedagogical style, which may contribute to a positive moral atmosphere as perceived by the boys. All applicants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT Rest, 1979, Dutch transl. Hoeks, Dudink & Wouters, 1984) and other instruments. The DIT contains six hypothetical moral dilemmas. Subjects have to evaluate 12 moral reasonings statements, which are rated according to the amount of importance on a 5-point Likert scale, and to rank four statements they regard as most important to their decision about what action to take in the dilemma. The P-score indicates the percentage a person prefers principled reasonings as decisive in the dilemmas. The DIT is widely used for assessing adults' moral competence because it is easy to administer and to

score. Research, mostly carried out in the USA, gives acceptable to good psychometric properties. Our results were more modest but still acceptable for research purposes. Subjects' P-score did not play any role in the election procedure.

A total 87 persons applied as group-worker, of which 69 completed the instrument: 34 male (mean age 34 years), 27 female (mean age 30 years) and 8 missing; 25 male applicants were accepted and 19 women. The applicants had a normal mean score for adults with this educational level according to Dutch standards for the DIT (Mean P-score=38.3, sd=13.6, range 6.8 to 68)⁸. Applicants with Intermediate Vocational Education scored higher on principled moral reasoning than applicants with a Lower Vocational Education (Mean P-score 29.9) that applied to security or other jobs ($F=4.9$, $df=1,82$, $p<.05$). The P-score correlated negatively with conformism ($-.35$, $p<.01$), positively with word fluency ($.33$, $p<.05$), and empathy ($.39$, $p<.01$). All these results are in the expected direction. However, no difference in moral judgement level (P-score) was found between accepted and rejected applicants. No difference was either found between males and females, although males scored somewhat lower on principled moral reasoning than females: 36 versus 40.8.

The second step in the policy of the staff is to create a moral atmosphere at the center as perceived by the group-workers in which pedagogical values that are conceived as important for stimulating the juvenile's moral development are sufficiently shared. Although all group-workers had shown a positive stance toward the goal of the center when they applied for the job, once in the work-setting big differences of opinion between the group-workers appeared in how to deal with questions of discipline in the companionship with the juveniles. This resulted in a clash, apparently between those who opted for a liberal rule and those who opted for a strict rule. The resulted in the resignation of the head of a unit who had chosen for a more liberal approach. The clash was subsequently won by those who argued that a rather strict regime should be settled first in which rules were clearly spelled out to the boys. The idea is that when all interactions run smoothly, a more liberal approach can be afforded if desirable. Several comments can be made on the clash during this introductory phase. Whether liberal or strict, in both instances the group-workers made their own decision based upon their own reasons. They are in charge of the group and because of the differences among them about how to interpret the rules everyone got confused. Two different goals, keeping order and trying to understand an individual juvenile, seemed to have interacted. In their discussion, the basic idea of the center, to treat the

adolescents as moral subjects, was lost out of sight. Now that the group-workers have learned to become more consistent as a team in keeping the rule, the goal of order is achieved. This gives them the opportunity to learn to understand the reasons of the boys individually. Until now any group-discussions about the rules and the reasons for keeping them or accepting an exception, are scarce in most units. In one interview a boy compares the atmosphere in Teylingereind with the atmosphere in elementary school and the atmosphere in the streets: "In the streets everyone is lying to you. You cannot trust anyone. Here inside, you behave yourself better. It's like elementary school. You reflect more about yourself. We have discussions like students, it's mature. Sometimes it goes wrong, and everyone is yelling. But now it all goes reasonably well in the group. We discuss quite often about how things are going, for example about our household chores (...)"

The question is whether the group-workers will make a start with a further training in social skills to lead moral discussions with the juveniles. Stimulating the moral discourse with the juveniles is planned by the staff as the next step to be taken. An adapted version of the EQUIP Programme will be used for this purpose (Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995). After leaving the center, the juveniles can choose to step into a developmental path that helps them to find their place in normal everyday life in the society.

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Table 1: MTMM matrix of Moral Competence (MC), practical judgment (Content - P), moral atmosphere (Content - A, Stage Norm - A, Stage of Community-A) and concurrent constructs (Verbal Intelligence, Social Desirability) (n=113). The correlations in the upper triangle refer to scores that have been normalized. P=practical judgement, A=atmosphere judgement, Com or C=Community, Soc=Social, VI=Verbal Intelligence, SD=Social Desirability.

		Verbal				Written							
		MC	Content		Stage	MC	Content		Stage	C.1/2	C.3/4	VI	SD
			P	A	A		P	A	A	P/A	P/A		
V e r b a l	Moral competence					42							7
	Content P	11				2							31
	A	24	51			19							10
	Stage Norm A	13	28	41		4							25
W r i t t e n	Moral competence	43	1	18	14		19	17	8	-14	15	29	5
	Content P	22	54	35	16	20							34
	A	13	23	40	10	20	46						14
	Stage Norm P/A	11	12	22	24	11	9	10					10
	Com.Stage 1/2 P/A	-19	-26	-29	-16	-15	-36	-24	-2				-30
	Com.Stage 3/4 P/A	8	33	25	30	17	35	9	34	-28			38
	Verbal IQ	10	-6	6	8	28	-14	-8	-15	-9	-10		-11
	Soc.Desirability	6	30	10	26	4	31	12	10	-29	38	-11	
Significance r one tailed: $r > .29 \Rightarrow p \leq .001$, $r > .22 \Rightarrow p \leq .01$, $r > .16 \Rightarrow p \leq .05$													
two tailed: $r > .30 \Rightarrow p \leq .001$, $r > .24 \Rightarrow p \leq .01$, $r > .18 \Rightarrow p \leq .05$													

1. Five of these constructs are used in this study. (1) Valuing of the School as an Institution, which refers to the extent to which students value the school intrinsically. (2) Stage of Community, which refers to the shared understanding of the community as a terminal value. (3) Degree of Collectiveness, which refers to the degree in which a norm is shared by the students. (4) Stage of the Norm, which refers to the way the meaning of the norm is shared. (5) Content of the Norm of a Community, e.g. justice and care. We did not use the construct of Phase of the Norm.

2. The moral atmosphere in large, normal secondary schools is characterized as follows: The school is instrumentally, extrinsically valued as an institution that helps individuals to meet their own needs. The stage of community is concrete reciprocal, meaning that the community denotes a collection of individuals who exchange favors and rely on each other for protection. The degree of collectiveness of norms is individualistic, authoritarian (i.e. in these cases norms are not shared), or counter-culture. No collective ideal or norm exist or has to be expected. The stage of the norm is concrete reciprocal and lower on school-related, real-life moral dilemmas than on hypothetical moral dilemmas.

The moral atmosphere of a Just Community school is characterized as follows: The students identify with the school and the school is intrinsically valued. The stage of community has developed into a commitment and loyalty to the community. Collective norms have been established. Students feel responsible in maintaining and defending the collective norms. The stage of the norm is congruent with or even higher on school-related, real-life moral dilemmas than on hypothetical moral dilemmas.

3. One might object that in case of moral competence an interview and a questionnaire do not measure the same construct. As Chapman and Chandler (1992, p. 262) aptly have observed: "The problem as we see it is that investigators choosing to use different response criteria in assessing a given competence often commit themselves unaware to different conceptual criteria at the same time. Instead of measuring the same competence with different assessment procedures, they often end up measuring competencies which are conceptual distinct." We should realize, however, that the differences noted between a questionnaire and an interview on moral competence only refer to a difference in level, not a difference in strength of the relationship, which forms the basis of a

MTMM study.

4. Because the prescriptive statement was not included in the practical judgement of Stage of the Norm it was not included in the score for the moral atmosphere judgement of Stage of the Norm either.

5. We have by now used the DIT in 3 studies: with auditors, with a group of teachers from primary and secondary schools, and with group workers. All 3 groups scored somewhat below the normal level for adults with college experience according to the norms of Rest in the seventies.

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THE USES AND ABUSES OF LITERATURE FOR MORAL EDUCATION (MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION AS MORAL EDUCATION)

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As you can see from the program, the title of the present session is "The Uses and Abuses of Literature for Moral Education," which was actually the original title of my own paper until the conference organizers decided to make it the umbrella for all our papers and assign my paper the title it now bears. At the time, this change seemed easy to make, since I had originally envisioned my paper as a comparison between the sort of development that takes place under the heading of multicultural education and that which takes place when people, especially children, read books. My thesis, unremarkably enough, was to have been that both sorts of experience have a moral dimension, such that it would not be inappropriate to consider them as two related sorts of moral education.

I will get to this thesis at the end of my presentation, but I would like to spend most of my time today on some other concepts which, as I discovered in the course of revising the paper, not only are important preliminaries to the discussion of how multiculturalism, reading, and moral education are related to each other, but are also fascinating and extremely important in themselves. With these concepts out on the table, we can then go on in the discussion period to relate them to multicultural education per se.

So let me begin with the general contrast between the so-called uses and abuses of literature, paying special attention to *moral* uses and abuses, especially those found in children's literature. I'll start at a very theoretical level, by asking whether such talk of uses and abuses necessarily implies that there are essential features of literature that determine a priori how literary works should be understood and, in educational contexts, how they should be presented. In what follows, I

will refer only to a specific subset of literature, that of children's fiction, and within that subset, to novels. I think my remarks have wider application, but this is not the place to follow them out.

DEFINING LITERATURE

Defining "literature" or, what amounts to the same thing, specifying its essential features, is a notoriously difficult task. But the definition of children's literature is especially difficult because the very concept of children, or childhood, is so problematic. As Peter Hunt (1995) has pointed out in the introduction to his wonderful historical study of children's literature, this concept has different meanings from period to period, place to place, culture to culture, and even, he suspects from child to child. As a result, the literature fashioned for children will reflect serious differences in the way this audience is understood. As Hunt observes, "It takes a considerable mental leap to remember that the innocent schoolgirl intrigues of Angela Brazil or Enid Blyton in the 1940s were designed for the same age group as the sexually active and angst-ridden teenagers of Judy Blum in the 1970s" (p. ix). Going beyond the historian's concern with diachronic differences, I would add the synchronic point that there are also many competing conceptions of childhood among the people who write or influence the children's literature of any given generation -- especially our own. Hunt would apparently agree, since he goes on to say: "Just to add to our problems, children are notorious literary omnivores, and have always (initially perforce) read books not designed for them, while adult uncertainty about appropriateness has led to many books which were originally written for adults" (p. ix). True enough, though I would add that not only do many children *not* read adult books, but many adults are blithely unaware of those who do.

But there are still more problems with the definition of children's literature. Unlike adult literature, where writers and readers are usually or at least ideally working with the same general ideas about what books are supposed to be like, children's books are written and managed by adults who are usually working with a radically different agenda than that of their young readers, one that involves not only nostalgia but also *edification* in some more or less didactic sense of that term. To be sure, there are exceptions. It often seems that Roald Dahl is just writing for, well, the hell of it, in the same way that his readers are just reading for, if

not the hell than at least the impishness and anarchy of it all. (Indeed, Dahl has been criticized for using his children's books to ventilate his own resentments and biases, such that he is, as it were, a bad-tempered kid talking to other kids.) Here again Hunt puts the matter very nicely, noting that authors of these books (themselves adults) are often motivated by "the need to react to, to sublimate, to repair their own childhoods." And a bit later: "For the adult there is a potent mixture of nostalgia (often in the form of a rural or suburban arcadia); there are the learning of codes and initiation, group identification, and, strangely enough, retreat. For the child, the wish-fulfilment is forward-looking; it breaks the bounds, it is anarchic in that it has not learned taste and restraint, or has retained the spirit of rebellion, and of hope." Here Hunt is echoing an idea put forward by F. J. Harvey Darton, who in 1932 declared that children's literature is "produced ostensibly to give children spontaneous pleasure, and not primarily to teach them, nor solely to make them good, nor to keep them *profitably quiet*."

AESTHETIC ABUSE

At this point you may begin to wonder whether I am still talking about the *uses* of children's literature, or have moved on to their *abuses*. This would be a valid question, embodying as it does the old conflict between aesthetic and moralistic conceptions of art. This conflict, reminiscent of Plato's *Republic*, in which artists were depicted as dangerous to the moral well-being of the individual and the state, has recently been recapitulated in the so-called law and literature debate, represented by Richard Posner on the aesthetic side and Martha Nussbaum on the moralistic side. Posner, citing Oscar Wilde's famous quip that there is no such thing as a moral or immoral book, but only books that are well or badly written, accuses Nussbaum and others of what might be called moralistic abuse, or as he puts it, undermining great literature by "trading off" its aesthetic values for moral ones. In other words, she and by extension all those who would use literature to develop moral or multicultural sensibilities are literally killjoys, since joy is the natural correlate of aesthetic worth. Posner's own view is that "there is nothing *morally improving in literature itself*, any more than there is in music or painting or architecture" (p. 15, italics his). His point presumably applies to children's literature as well as to adult classics, along the lines suggested by Darton's above-cited comment that children's literature is primarily source of "spontaneous pleasure" rather than an instrument for moral or any other sort of education, or a way of

keeping children "profitably quiet." Note that in both of these quotations, that from Posner and that from Darton, we are asked to think of something called "literature itself," as though this were not a socially-constructed and richly open-textured concept.

My own view is that Posner, an enormously well-read man, a prominent law professor, and a federal judge, has taken an unbelievably simplistic approach, a point I have tried to make elsewhere. A far more sensible approach to the function of literature, which leaves room for Nussbaum's use of literature as a way of expanding our moral sensibilities (more on this in a moment), is that taken in various reader-response views of literature. Of these views, the one that seems most relevant here is Louise Rosenblatt's (1995) conception of literary works as "transactions" between the reader, on one hand, and on the other, the text or its implied author. These transactions have no "essential structure": they vary from time to time, text to text, reader to reader, contingently and with no a priori scheme or algorithm whereby certain kinds of transactions are "right" or "wrong" in themselves. Some of these transactions are "aesthetic" in that the reader's attention is only to the reading experience itself, and others are "efferent" -- Rosenblatt's term for readings that are motivated or at least enhanced by the desire to carry something away. Moral readings are a subset of the latter, i.e., they are one type of efferent transaction. But as she, and following her, Wayne Booth (p. 14), point out, it often happens that the most substantial efferent freight is carried away when the reader is least conscious of anything other than the aesthetic transaction. This is surely what happens in the most engaging children's literature.

Or at least that is what happens in the most engaging of *today's* literature for children. It may well be that in any literary genre the balance between aesthetic and efferent transactions is itself an artifact of the image society has of itself. When I look back at books I found very pleasing as a child, I now find them unbearably goody-goody, but this does not mean they were wrong for their times and cultural context. It is probably the case, at least in modern times, that every generation of children's authors regards its immediate predecessors as too didactic. In 1906 Eveline Godley declared that:

Time was when the story was merely a cloak, at best a thin one, for the moral: its engaging qualities served as a means to an end, not as the reason for its existence.

[Now, however,] the standard, principle, or ideal must be moulded to suit the child. Everything has to give way before the infallible instincts of childhood; it is the unfortunate outside [i.e., moralizing] influence which is looked on with suspicion. (Godley, 1906)

Commenting on this rather wry declaration, Hunt notes children's books can never be completely free of "adult ideological freight."

Although earlier writers of children's books were more conscious of their moral responsibilities or stewardship ("children's books were part of God's work"), adults of every generation including our own know that they are writing for an inexperienced readership, as well as that society is looking over their shoulders as they write. For this reason, the author-reader relationship is qualitatively, even "essentially," different when it is mapped onto the adult-child relationship than when it is between consenting adults. On the other hand, within these fairly elastic constraints there is a good deal of anarchy in children's literature, and, as Hunt's historical study shows, always has been: adult authors often seem to abandon the moral pulpit in order to conspire with their young readers (consider Shel Silverstein's poems), with glee on all sides.

MORAL ABUSE

This last remark, about authors as conspirators, is a transition to the opposite sort of "abuse" of literature, that of books which are aesthetically successful in the literal sense of giving delight, but which seem to be morally pernicious. I have already alluded to Roald Dahl's work in this connection, but let me slip into the narrative mode for a moment. As my children were growing up, they read and relished his stories, most of which were introduced to them by their teachers at school. My wife and I enjoyed the stories too, and so we all had many happy moments reading and rereading them with the children, making textual references, bad puns, and so on, to the extent that for a while we had a kind of lingua franca à la Dahl. The gentle scatology of *The BFG*, the magical realism of *James and the Giant Peach*, the utopian thrust of *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*, the uncanny outrageousness of *The Witches* -- these were all themes for conversation that, though not exactly moral education, seemed to me to be wholesome and formative in some general but very important way.

Imagine my surprise, then, when I later discovered that these and other Dahl stories were viewed with considerable suspicion by a number of educators who seemed to be otherwise quite sensible people. In the pages of journals such as *Children's Literature* and *The Horn Book Magazine* I read that his books were all the more sinister for having been so well-written, that in them children were taught to fear, mock, or at least not respect the old, the ugly, the fat, women (especially bald ones), and so on, that rules were presented as things to be broken, and so on. Here are just a few quotes:

Dahl plays too much to the gallery where the children sit: hence his popularity. He has considerable skills and talents, but they are frequently misused. And there must be quite a number of us -- teachers, librarians, parents, critics--who wish that some of the books had never been written. (Rees, 1998, p. 154)

I find it regrettable...that Willy Wonka...can triumphantly convince Charlie that life lived forever inside the [chocolate] factory, enclosed as in a prison, is the height of all possible bliss, with ...nothing expressed that would question this idea. (Cameron, 1973)

The trouble with Dahl's world is that it is black and white -- two-dimensional and unreal -- and that he has a habit of elevating personal prejudices, ordinary likes and dislikes, into matters of morality. (Rees, 1998, p. 144).

It was of course too late to undo the damage, but I did try one thing: I suggested to my son, then a high school senior, that he critique some of these journal articles for an English assignment. He did, and wrote a rather bland paper to the effect that he didn't see what all the fuss was about. As a result, I was left wondering: is this evidence that the articles were needlessly alarmist, or that he had been so corrupted that he didn't see the problem?

That's the end of my story. To my knowledge neither of my children has yet been arrested, though my son did go on to kick a soccer ball through the window of the dean of students office, and my daughter has become a journalist, so perhaps their moral fiber was damaged by Roald Dahl after all. But I don't want to bore you with any more discussion of them or even of Dahl, since I come to you as a philosopher,

rather than as a fellow parent or a literary critic. You see, the articles I referred to just now were not unreasonable "chicken-lickin" sorts of alarms. They condemned Dahl, yes, but often regretfully, and were always careful to acknowledge his ability to tell an interesting story with many delightful touches. In fact, when I re-read those articles, I came to see that some children probably really were damaged by Dahl's stories, and it is this insight that is the point of departure for the second part of my talk today.

CENSORSHIP

If moral educators really believe that books can influence children for the better, they cannot escape the converse proposition that books can also influence them for the worse. So put, this seems a self-evident truth, but it is often overlooked by my fellow liberals when narrow-minded censors are calling for the removal of books from libraries, the curriculum, and even from the sober shelves of Barnes and Noble. Somewhat more sophisticated is the argument mounted by the partisans of free speech to the effect that a book is a complex whole, and that what might seem offensive when taken out of context, such as Huck Finn's use of the word "nigger" or Holden Caulfield's use of "Fuck," is not offensive when its role in the larger movement of the book is appreciated. Here one thinks of the gargoyles in a cathedral or the dissonant notes in a classical symphony. The problem with this argument, though, is that if a reader fails, for one reason or another, to see how the seemingly offensive part fits into the total scheme, the "seemingly" offensive will -- de facto -- be *actually* offensive. Adult readers who are too lazy to make the effort to discover the part-whole relationship may not deserve much sympathy, but such high-handedness does not seem appropriate for children.

For instance, I think that a child might very well be confused by the fact that in Dahl's *Danny, the Champion of the World*, Danny's very nurturing father was a poacher. A reader unequal to Twain's old-fashioned sentence structure and dialect transcriptions might miss the point that Huck loves Jim as a person even though he does not know how to reconcile that love with the stereotypes he has learned. And a careless reader or someone not familiar with New York brashness might somehow miss the point that, when Holden Caulfield says he wants to wipe the word "Fuck" off all the bathroom walls, it is not the word itself that he is distressed by (if he were, why would he say it?) but rather the insensitivity that it connotes. In short, in any literary transaction things can go wrong,

regardless of the author's intent and that of the reader.

What then is the safety net that can save a reader who, because of inexperience or some other reason (including laziness or prejudice), misreads a book in some morally dangerous way? If there are no nets that always work for everyone, should protection from moral harm take the form of prevention, i.e., censorship? At this point, the choice seems to be between freedom and security, always an unpalatable situation.

But I would submit that this way of setting up the issue is profoundly mistaken, especially for children but to some extent for all readerships. As literary criticism of the last twenty years has emphasized, we read texts in relationship with other texts. Deconstructionists have managed to make this simple truth very complicated, but the basic idea here is just that we don't read books in a vacuum. We compare them (consciously or unconsciously) to other books, and even more importantly, we compare our reactions with the reactions of other people whom we respect. I revise my opinion of a movie after I hear you talk about it, I approach a novel enthusiastically because of what someone has told me, etc. This ongoing interpersonal experience is what Wayne Booth has called "co-duction." In his aptly named *The Company We Keep* (the company are books and their authors, who function as our "friends"), he shows that the act of reading a book and the consequent (or concomitant) evaluation of that book involves both immersion in the text at hand and critical conversation with other authors and readers. Even the "immersion" is social, in that one compares what one has read both with one's own unfolding experience and with the responses and arguments of other readers. There are of course individual differences here, in that some people talk about their reading experiences more often than others do, and some books lend themselves more to such talk than others do. Sometimes there will be no interpersonal conversation at all, just as we can have thoughts that are never uttered aloud. But these are special cases of the more general rule that literary appreciation, like thought itself, is inherently social. (As John Dewey said, all thought is incipient dialogue.)

Where am I going with this idea? Directly into the classroom or living room, and with some rather strident prescriptions to boot. Parents and teachers should assume responsibility for the way their children read. It is not enough to see that they have only the right books on their shelves or in their backpacks. If as Booth says, reading is conditioned by the

conversations one has about the texts and issues one has read about, then it is unreasonable to expect a book to speak directly to children who have virtually no context from which to assess it. I think that the reason my children were not harmed by what might be called the dark side of Roald Dahl is that there was conversation about his books, both at school and at home. His wildness was not negated, but it was incorporated into our family parlance and thereby gentled. Similarly, books about "sensitive" themes were discussed in ways that somehow made them fit into the world our children were themselves still growing into. Lastly, books like *Huck Finn* or Mukerjee's *Jasmine*, which deal with the otherness of other cultures, and which could have been as threatening as Dahl's surrealism or Judy Blum's discussions of menstruation, were topics of conversation at school and at home, and so on. Please don't think I am saying a family must spend the supper hour doing literary criticism. Most of our family conversations about books were pretty pathetic, but the important thing is that some public discussions took place, either at home or at school, and the children had opportunities to find out what other, more experienced readers thought about books that might have otherwise seemed more wild, more hateful or spiteful or self-destructive, than they really were.

WHAT BOOKS CAN AND CAN'T DO FOR MORAL EDUCATION
 By way of conclusion, let me list a few things, most of them quite obvious, that books can or can't do for moral education.

- A. Books can teach lessons by presenting models (social learning theory).
- B. Books can stimulate moral reasoning by introducing cognitive disequilibrium (Kohlbergian theory).
- C. Books can expand horizons, either by developing empathy and perspective-taking skills (Selman, Hoffman, Kohlberg, Mead), or teaching how to appreciate different ways of human flourishing here and abroad (Nusbaum).
- D. Books can refine sensibilities, affectively (education of the emotions) and cognitively (readiness to process situation in moral terms; recognition of salience).
- E. Books can expose the injustice of social structures that might otherwise be taken for granted (especially by allowing us to see that people from other cultures or classes do not have access to the same opportunities for flourishing that we do).

But books can't do everything.

- A. Books can't substitute for reality. Moral atmosphere in a home or

school must be established by the actual people in the family or classroom.

- B. Books, like friends, are imperfect. A book we like (as with a good friend) is not automatically good for us, at least not without qualification and co-duction. Discrimination is not disloyalty (I like Dahl, but am wary of him).
- C. Books need to be embodied (they don't discuss themselves).
- D. Books are only part of growing up: reading is only one of several key activities whose exercise constitutes what Aristotle called "living well" (flourishing).

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ON THE UNIVERSALISTIC AND CULTURE-SPECIFIC NATURE OF SOME 'UNIVERSAL' VALUES

by

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Abstract

The paper presented at the MOSAIC'98 is to focus on the question in which respects some main value concepts can be regarded as universal values and in which respects they show up their culture dependent forms and contents.

On the basis of recent scientific knowledge (and everyday experience), including cognitive social psychology, the former radical and rigid controversion of 'universalistic' and 'culture-specific' values seems to be a bias in understanding the emergence, structuration and nature of values.

Following some theoretical introduction the paper will examine the above question on the basis of a cross-cultural study on legal socialization with regard to such 'universal values' as responsibility, freedom, equality, security.

I. Introduction: what is my problem with the imaginations and models of value learning?

Beside the current growing problems in Central-East European countries in transition, this presentation was especially inspired by the Helen Haste's editorial (urging us to consider some new challenges in thinking about morality) and by some results of a cross-cultural study on legal socialization in which I have been taking part since 1993.⁽¹⁾ The former selected out for reconsideration some really universal problems of humanity which have the highest importance for morality and human responsibility, while the latter gave me some insights into what is wrong with value transmission, with the 'model' of learning universal values and how children can acquire values in their daily life.

What is my problem with the considerations and models of universal values? The problem is that in the so called high culture and educational practice of every society universal values are formulated, ordered and presented to the upgrowing generations in the ways of facing them with highly abstract terms/concepts which either seem to be very far from their point of view (e.g. salvation or inner spiritual peace) or which cannot be proved in the reality (e.g. peace, human humility) because of the everyday contradicting experience. These abstract value systems have been derived either from some religious or other non-religious authority and this authority itself has been regarded as natural, taken for granted prestigious source of the strength and effectivity of the given value system. Both the abstract feature and 'naturalness' are the very characteristics of the presentation or teaching of universal values.

There are some other scientific models to demonstrate universal values, most dominant among them is the variations of the method of using abstract value concepts and requesting people of different countries to choose among them or to rank or to categorize them on different scales (a lot of authors could be cited from Rokeach to Triandis, Schwartz, etc.). At the end of data elaborations in this kind of research one can always get a large sum of values which could be regarded as universal (featuring in the value-map in each country under investigation) and there a possibility of further scientific game to factor analyze, to group these values and to make more or less 'well-based' conclusions on the possible motivational basis of such kind of value preferences. Just the middle of the evaluational process (evaluations by the examined subjects) has been taken into the brackets. For me this middle part is the very core of the value acquisitional process and the manifestation procedure of value preferences: it contains the understanding and the real

meaning of these abstract value categories which might be and probably it is very different in subjects of different countries, different strata and gender.

So on the one side we have **abstract theoretical models of the very abstract value concepts and value systems**, on the other side we have **the very mess of routines, rituals** in daily practice of education within and beside family and school in the multicultural societies. Children of the latter are confronted from day to day with a tremendous variations of different cultural and subcultural customs, fashions, rituals, not knowing how and which are worth learning, accepting, which should they tolerate, imitate, negotiate and deny and why. These mixed populations and situations in a lot of times are frustrating even for those who are liberal thinking and really would like to develop tolerance among children or people with different ethnic and religious background.

I think not I am the only one who is dissatisfied with the ways how we can approach the growing difficulties of adolescents in enjoining, elaborating the hard-core of their own identity with their own chosen values (especially in not-religious, secularized families).

Some years ago in The Guardian Suzanne Moore (a liberal democrat journalist) published an interesting and painfully right article on the newly widespread and deepening problems of values and morality, titled 'A lesson in mish-mash morality'. The actuality of the article was that the English government wanted to introduce the monoculture of Christianity into the schools but the writer enlightened the problems of what does it mean to grow up in a multicultural society in a large scale, not denying the misunderstandings of the leftists as well. (The Guardian, 22. Sept 1994)

The core of the problems really is that which values can or have to be treated and learned as universal in order to save and to continue the life in the world with growing number of such societies. To learn the answers presupposes first to know more about children's mind, how they see and understand these surroundings and their different classmates and how they can cope with their dilemmas.

II. Lessons of a cross-cultural studies on legal socialization

Just this is why I would like to refer to the results of a cross-cultural study on legal socialization. The aim of the research group was to carry out comparative studies on legal socialization in different countries. Specifically, it was looking for similarities and differences in variations of opinion and of attitudes towards

legal concepts and institutions among French, Polish, Russian and Hungarian adolescents (aged 11-17). This aim seemed to be both intellectually challenging and productive, considering the lack of this kind of research on East Europe. Different fields of socialization, especially political and moral fields are obviously overlapping with each other and with legal socialization as well. This can be frustrating only if someone would like to obscure the special tasks of legal socialization within the normative ordering of people's behaviour either by means of overpoliticizing them or by regarding them predominantly as moral issues. Fortunately none of these applied to the above research group. My intention to join this particular research derived from some important questions that emerged from my former studies on values. These questions were as follows:

- what will happen if the people's only reaction to the growing insecurity (especially with respect to social security and welfare) will be the general neglect of all the legal rules?
- will the responsibility for private and common affairs be reconstructed on a new base or it will disappear within the circumstances of the privatization and capitalism?
- whether the system change has generated a real citizen's mentality (on rights and duties) among the Hungarian youth?
- whether there is or is not a particular age when the processes of the appropriation of the normative order reach a higher level and the whole issue begins to attract more attention on the part of the adolescents than before?

Here I am presenting only partial results: the findings on adolescents' understanding of two value-loaded key-concepts (taken out from the large set of concepts), namely of 'responsibility' and of 'citizen' which have high informative value on adolescents reasoning on legal issues and clearly show some cultural values.

One of the dimensions of the normative order and attitudes is undoubtedly related to **responsibility**. This issue is particularly exciting in Hungary because according to all my former empirical researches carried out among adolescents and young professionals, people have adapted an ambiguous relation to responsibility which has to be changed in an environment which is not very favourable for such changes.

As a theoretical framework, I could easily adapt the view presented by Bruner and Haste in their book titled 'Making Sense' and as it was in agreement with this also the viewpoint of Kourilsky-Augeven on legal socialization. We have basically a similar view on **socialization** in general. It

is based on the assumption of the **active agent, of the mutuality and contextuality of the processes of socialization**. My approach to values also reflects this interactive conception of socialization. Mutuality within the processes of value acquisition means, that it is not only the **knowledge of values**, that counts but the child's own **experience (e.g. on realization of values) and comparative mental and emotional processes** as well. The child is learning not only values, but through the acquired cultural and cognitive models the capability of evaluation as well.

More recently social psychology began to overcome the biases of a rather formal, too rational psychological treatment of the child's cognitive development. The new research is stressing the emotional connotations/commitments in the course of child's development. Its value-loaded, symbolically and ritually mediated nature, inherent in the given culture has been also recognized. (6) Researches on social representations were helpful in this respect. **Moscovici (1983)** defined **social representations** as systems of values, ideas and practices with a two-fold function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in and master their social world, and second to facilitate communication among members of a community by providing them with a code for naming and classifying various aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (7) Abstract terms like law, court, judge, order etc. can also be regarded as **social representations**. They serve as symbols of rules and as a means of social construction of the world for orientating the individual's action. The question is when the child begins to use them more actively in both of their functions.

Let us see an account of the variations of meaning and attitude of the Hungarian youth (aged 11-16) on the concepts of **RESPONSIBILITY** and **CITIZEN** as a demonstration how these general terms differ in the responses across the age-groups and also in different countries with particular cultural and historical background.

II. ADOLESCENTS REASONING ON RESPONSIBILITY

1. Meaning of 'Responsibility' in spontaneous associations

What is the first or basic meaning of responsibility?

One can learn about this by looking at the proportion, the character and the content of the spontaneous associations elaborated across the age-groups (aged 11-12, 13-14 and 15-16). This analysis highlighted the place of 'Responsibility' in the rank-order of the missing answers to the key-words, then

in the rank-order of the answers with legal connotations, and finally its place in the range of the positive and negative evaluative aspects of the responses.

The results of the content-analysis of the spontaneous associations show first of all the **meaning** attributed to '**Responsibility**', on the basis of their cultural and social background, under the influence of some cultural models. From this analysis the following characteristics of adolescents' **understanding of responsibility** surface:

- Responsibility means for both the primary and secondary school pupils predominantly certain **activity and a feeling** of wanting to get involved. In this meaning-content Hungarians stood near to the French pupils, they were a bit higher, while Russians identifying responsibility somehow with obligation or duty, externally attributed to the person, lacked this positive feelings.

- Whether this complex mental and behavioral readiness is externally or internally determined, the 6th and 8th grade pupils (11 and 13 years old) differed significantly in this respect. The youngest mentioned more examples of responsibility externally determined, while the 13-15-16-year-old pupils referred more frequently to internal commitments and/or positively accepted responsibility. Responsibility was relatively frequently connected with the self (I feel it), with the self-esteem, self-realization and self-interest.

- The insight that responsibility is the basis of human relation has also appeared among the associations. This concept can by no means be equated with 'Obligation or Duty', while this latter may overlap with 'Responsibility' (associations to Duty indicated more externally prescribed tasks. However, Duty could mean inner obligations too).

- Responsibility has positive connotations in the adolescents' view (a 'good', a 'great thing', it is 'inspiring'). Even those high school students who mentioned difficulties did not deny this.

- Some critical or ironic remarks were made by high school students on the way how responsibility is presented nowadays in the mass communication (e.g. on fashion of blaming for everything the 'damned 40 years').

A certain frequency-change could be obtained between the 6th and 8th grade pupils' responses, while interesting qualitative change showed up between the two subsamples: the high school students gave significantly more answers connected with some group- and job-commitment or responsibility. This is worth for special attention as signs of maturing of their identity (See Table 5).

2. Meaning of Responsibility in selective associations

The results of selective associations probably show the weight or importance attributed by the pupils to responsibility in the different fields of social life (including the legal culture as well). On the basis of logical and empirical considerations two largest fields can be distinguished: the private and public spheres of responsibility. The first could be detected by following the responses to such key-concepts as 'To be of age', 'Family', 'Property'. 'Tax' was viewed first as belonging also to the private responsibility, later on it turned out that it could be better classed as representing public responsibility..

a) Private responsibility.

The **Profiles of Responsibility** made for the whole sample and along the grades show clearly that the greatest weight of Responsibility has been attributed by both the 6th and 8th grade pupils to the concept 'To be of age'. In this respect they did not differ. 'To be of age' was followed by Obligation, Family, Mayor, Fault, Judge, Contract, etc. almost in the same order in the whole sample. They did not differ significantly in their view on private responsibility.

b) Public responsibility.

Looking at the findings with regard to this large field represented by the key-words of 'Citizen', 'Citizen2', 'State', 'Judge', 'Mayor', 'Law/Right', 'Policeman', the following phenomena are worth mentioning:

- Attributions of **Responsibility to the 'Citizen'** - as they were reflected in the mean-scores of Responsibility related to the given concepts - tended to **grow with age**. Table 2 shows clearly this trend in case of the Citizen (decrease of the rank-place is inversely proportional to the intensity of the attributed responsibility). The above mentioned growing emphasis can be observed in case of 'Citizen2', 'Mayor', 'Judge' and 'State' as well.

- The relatively high rank of the 'Mayor' in the rank-order of the key-words from the point of the Responsibility is surprising and due to the special attention gained by this role in the period of transition. However, 'Responsibility' was associated with 'Offense', 'Law/Right', 'Social security' and 'Family allowance' to a much lesser degree or was not associated at all. This finding is also meaningful, it says something about the legal culture of the youth.

We were looking for some **age-specific differences** and used t-tests to uncover them. With regard to private life - with one exception - no significant differences could be found, but with respect to all the fields of **public responsibility** presented in the questionnaire, significant differences were

found (Table 8) mostly between the 6th and 8th grades, and in some issues between the 6th or 8th grades and the high school students.

Summing up the above findings, they show some **broadening of the adolescents' view on the public spheres of life** and intensification of their interest in these directions. The findings are in agreement with the presumption - which is not quite new as it could be found at some developmental psychologists as well - that there is a qualitative change in political and legal culture at the age of 13-14, although the validity of these descriptive results can be generalized with caution only.

Now let us see, what was the meaning of the 'Citizen' and 'Citizen2' for adolescents?

3. The meaning of the CITIZEN

The meaning of the **Citizen**(polgár) and **Citizen2**(állampolgár) could be revealed also in the ways already shown above. Perception of the Citizen revealed from the results of the content-analysis of spontaneous associations showed that the two terms for 'Citizen' seem to begin to loose their formerly more noticable distinction. This process takes place not in science but in the everyday's usage of the language. In case of both words the leading association was connected with 'citizenship' in both subsamples, followed by the content of 'living in one country' or 'to belong to a country'. The pupils emphasized the **liberties** in different ways, among them always freedom and equality stood in the first places. These were rarely accompanied by referring to the citizen's duty. This latter was more frequently observable at the high school students, together with mentioning the republican tradition and the patriotic aspect of the term.

Let us see now the meaning of freedom and equality.

There was also a considerable cross-cultural difference in the dominant meaning of **Freedom**: while Hungarians and French pupils were willing to give such answers to the key-word 'freedom' that it is when one can make everything which is not harmful or not dangerous for the others, Russian pupils emphasized only the freedom of action (of making everything one wishes).

It is worth mentioning that '**Equality**' meant most frequently 'equality before the law' and 'equal member of the state'. (This was especially highly emphasized by the Russian together with the wish or claim of equality in the family!). In spite of the rapid growth of the value of money more recently - the pupils rarely expressed the wish of 'economic equality'. Some results of the elaboration of the selective associations, and the comparison between the 6th

and 8th grade-pupils with respect to Responsibility and other values attributed to it, can be seen on Table 10). These seem to confirm first the above characteristics of the Citizen, and second, these show again, what was said about the particularly important age (of being 13-14 years old). Here we are faced not only with the broadening view but also with certain appropriation of the social recognition of the citizen's growing responsibility. Table 10 shows the significant differences between the 6th grade and 8th grade pupils' opinion of the Citizen (obtained by t-tests, marked by stars). The 8th graders attributed greater responsibility to Citizen which is a good sign or positive change. The negative feature of the Hungarian pupils' answers that the rank-places of security, discipline and solidarity are rather low if the order is made from the point of the characteristics of the Citizen.

Instead of a summary

To the questions raised at the beginning, these particular data on responsibility and some other concepts can give only some insights indirectly related to them. They show cultural-dependent nature of the contents and also some general or universal need behind them. Now we can only roughly summarize in which respects the value-loaded terms, concepts (and related activities) manifest probably their cultural-dependent and universal nature? First of all, let me claim, that we do not find so called universal values without being at the same time culture-specific as well. Cultural-specificity could be manifested and revealed

- in the meaning or meaning-set of the universal value concept (like human responsibility, security, care for others, etc),
- in the enacted meaning of it (which behavioral patterns are recognized, commonly shared as social representations are attached to this or that value concept, eg. to be acknowledged, greeted, etc.) and also
- in the place within the system of other values,
- and finally in the availability and familiarity of values in such forms which cannot be overviewed as a significant moment of the possible and very needed discourse on values.

Nowadays the main representatives of religious and non-religious ideological authorities try to cure the abstractness of their talk on values by exemplifying. I think that it would be more effective to cure the perspective and start with the basic needs of everybody and of human kind in order to cope with the dangers

of the future. I cannot forget mentioning this the truth of that characterization what Ichbeiser gave on exemplification:

"Whether we perceive certain social facts or are blinded to them depends on: The biopsychological organization of our sensorium. Of particular importance here is the role of 'visibility'; ..on **Individual sensitivities** (idiosyncrasies), whatever origin...on **Our cultural background, that is, on our Kulturbrille**, which sensitizes us to certain facts or aspects of facts, and blinds us to others. Whether the respective social facts, particularly social evils, affect us and those with whom we are identified, or affect only indifferent or even antagonistic 'others'. The concrete social situation in which we ourselves are located, which defines (to use the language of sociology of knowledge) our social perspective. The information and misinformation which is transmitted to us, or withheld from us, by other people, particularly by those who control the media of communications.

... The next logical step now would consist in exemplifying concretely some effects of social blindness upon our moral judgements. However, we are confronted here by the following peculiar dilemma: exemplification is, admittedly, itself a function of selective social perception. ...without taking into account this problem, we would expose ourselves to a valid criticism that we are not actually exemplifying, but rather revealing, as a kind of symptom, the mechanisms which control our own selective social perception.....any exemplification of the selective social perception is bound to operate within the framework of my own selective social perception, and is, therefore, involved in all its dilemmas and paradoxes. This applies, of course, to the examples presented by myself as well and to the examples presented by anybody else.

We are not fully aware but are insisting that as far as social facts and issues are concerned, not our generalizations 'in principle' but our concrete exemplifications 'in fact' are the real thing...This means also that our agreements and disagreements 'in principle' are mostly meaningless and empty. For the really relevant and meaningful agreements and disagreements are those which refer to the concrete facts and issues. Hence, again, not the generalizations but the exemplifications are 'the real thing'. Even, for instance, all people were to agree with each other that they are 'against prejudices', they might, and probably would, find out that they refer in their minds to entirely different kinds of prejudices, and would therefore soon start again denouncing each other as being prejudiced: the one would denounce the prejudices of the South against the Negroes, the other prejudices of the North against the South.

Hence, 'being against prejudices' **in general** does not mean actually anything **in fact**. And the same would apply perhaps even more so to the **ambiguous concept of tolerance** (emphasis from me): tolerant about **what** is here the really significant issue." (Ichheiser, 1971:162-164)

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MOSAIC '98

University of Konstanz, Germany, July 20 - 23, 1998

Konstanz is a beautiful historic town on the famous lake, on the borders of Germany and Switzerland. The conference will follow the usual format of the discussion of papers that have been circulated in advance. There will be time also to enjoy the delights of the local region, and eat wonderful food. We particularly would like to encourage graduate students to participate.

The theme of the conference will provide a focus for papers, but we also welcome papers on other topics that are of interest to MOSAIC. Posters are also welcome.

This year's theme is 'Moral Unification?' It includes sub-themes;

- ~ cultural issues
- ~ societies in transition
- ~ common values ?
- ~ the educational implications of the above

Accommodation - in hotels, or possibly for a small number of people, in an academic institute (preference for this will be given to students and persons paying concessionary rates). The accommodation will be handled by a travel service so payment will be separate; we give the range of costs here.

Deadlines ~

For Abstracts	April 20
For final papers	June 15
For deposit	June 15

Costs:

Accommodation (three nights) ~ £80 - £160 [range]

Conference costs (including deposit)

full rate £90/\$150

concessionary rate* £40/\$65

Includes costs of papers, administrative costs, tea and coffee, and the Conference dinner.

Meals apart from the Conference Dinner, are not included.

* students, unwaged and retired persons. Some concessions may be available, on application, for persons from countries with currency restrictions or problems.

Deposit (non-refundable) £20/\$30

Papers will be circulated on payment of Deposit. People who want the papers, but do not wish to attend, pay the Deposit only.



MOSAIC'98 - 20.-23. Juli 1998 in Konstanz

Nr	Name, Vorname	Adresse	papers requested	Attend	Paper presentation	Hotel-Dinner	Full concess. Rate	Deposit	Paper	Fee paid
1.	Brugman, Daan	Department of Developmental Psychology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglassn 2, NL-3584 Utrecht, NL		1	1	1				1
2.	Buxarrais, Maria-Rosa <i>Abgesagt</i>	University of Barcelona, Divisió de Ciències de l'Educació Passeig de la Vall d'Hebron, 171, E-08035 Barcelona, Spanien (thmbe22d@d5.ub.es)		1		1				
3.	Clarke, Monica	79 Rodborough, Yate, Bristol. BS37 8SG, England		1		1	1	1		
4.	Comunian, Anna-Laura ABGESAGT	Dept of General Psychology, University of Padua, I-35100 Padua, Italy		1	1	1				
5.	Davies, Richard	Dept of Educational Studies, 15 Norham Gardens, Oxford. OX2 5PY, UK (richard.davies2@1mh.ox.ac.uk)		1	1	1				
6.	Eedels, Michal	The University of British Columbia, Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, 2125 Main Mall, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4	1			1				
7.	Fitton, Elizabeth	Department of Experimental Psychology, South Parks Rd., Oxford, England (elizabeth.fitton@wolfson.ox.ac.uk)		2						
8.	Gater, E.C.	42 Tangier Lane, Eton, Berks, SL4 6bb, UK				1				
9.	Gatherer, Bill <i>+ Nini</i>	44 Liberton Drive, Edinburgh, EH16 6NN, Scotland UK		1		2				
10.	Halfton, Amos	61 Brande St., Petach Tikva 49600, Israel				1				
11.	Haste, Helen	Dept of Psychology, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK (h.e.haste@bath.ac.uk)		1		1				
12.	Haynes, Lorna ABGESAGT	Apardo 570, Merida, Merida 5101, Venezuela				1				

Nr	Name, Vorname	Adresse	papers requested	Attend	Paper presentation	Hotel <i>Palace</i>	Full / concess. Rate	Deposit	Paper <i>Palace</i>	Fee paid
13.	Juraneck, Natalie	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin (Juraneck@medea.wz-berlin.de)		1		1				
14.	Kiehl, Esther	Department of Psychology, room 3.710 C, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ		1		1				
15.	Lee, Seung-Mi	Seoul National University, Korea								
16.	Lind, Georg	U of Konstanz, Germany	1		1	1				
	Linn, Ruth	School of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa Israel, 31905				1			10750	
18.	Marschall, John	58 Beaumonds Ave, Weymouth, Dorset, DT4 7RG, England	1	1		1		1		
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23.	Priece, Gail-McCracken	Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge CB3 0BU, England		1		1				
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Nr	Name, Vorname	Adresse	papers requested	Attend	Paper presentation	Hotel <i>Dinner</i>	Full / concess. Rate	Deposit	Paper <i>Poster</i>	Fee paid
25.	Schrader, Dawn E. <i>obesapt</i>	Program of Educational Psychology, Cornell University, 407 Kennedy Hall, Ithaca NY, 14843-4203		1	1	1				
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28.	Tiesler, Johannes	Neue Landstr. 45a, A-6841 Mader, Österreich	1			1				
29.	Vajda, Zsuzsanna <i>vajda.zs@psy.u-szeged.hu</i>	Univ. Attila Jozef, Szeged, Petöfi S. sgt. 30-34, H-6722 Szeged, Ungarn <i>tel: 36-62-455-382 home: 36-1-5128-02</i>		1	1	1				
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33.	Zutavern, Michael	Forschung Päd. Hochschule, Notkerstr. 27, CH-9004 St. Gallen, Schweiz				1				
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MOSAIC'98

July 20 - 23, 1998, University of Konstanz, Germany

MORALITY AS CONCEIVED AND MORALITY AS REVEALED IN BEHAVIOR

by

Mordecai Nisan

Jerusalem, Israel

Philosophers differ as to the definition of morality. Some prefer a very narrow definition, limited to the rules which delineate boundaries for the behavior of people in relation to one another; others define it more broadly, including in it positive duties with regard to other individuals and to society, like consideration toward and help for others; some give yet a more inclusive definition, including in it duties of man toward himself, and even his notions of what constitutes the good life. The lines which divide these differing concepts of morality are not always clear, but the distinctions between the two extremes that I mentioned – morality as referring only to the obligations of man toward his fellows, which comes closest to the meaning of justice, and the more comprehensive view, which, following Bernard Williams I shall call “ethics” – appear to be quite sharp and clear. Indeed, it is shared not only by the philosopher but also by the average person in western culture.

Thus, for example, in one of my studies, I presented to Israeli respondents the following dilemma: A scientist is trying to decide whether to accept an offer – which might not be repeated – to spend a year conducting research in the United States, in a laboratory where he could test his new theory. Acceptance of the proposal would mean that the scientist, an only child, would be deserting his sick and elderly parents for a year, and that his parents would clearly suffer thereby. One question the respondents were asked was, “From a moral standpoint, what behavior

would be required in this situation?” The subjects were given two alternative responses: (1) to go and take advantage of the opportunity to conduct the desired research; or (2) to stay in Israel so that the parents would not be alone. Approximately 70% of the subjects thought that morally right behavior would be to stay with the parents, and forego the attractive opportunity. As expected, they explained this in terms of a son’s duty toward his parents, and went to great length to explain the source of this obligation. After this, the respondents were presented with an additional question, “Before, you were asked what would be the correct behavior from a moral point of view. Now, what would you personally do in this situation?” Of those who answered that, from a moral point of view, they should stay in Israel in order not to leave their parents alone, approximately 30% said they would elect to go abroad and conduct the research.

For our purposes, the important point of this study is that the decision to take advantage of the opportunity to go abroad was viewed as ethically justified. The respondents perceived the dilemma to represent a conflict between the demands of morality understood in the narrow sense of the word, and the demands placed upon them by ethics, insofar as these are concerned in the growth and fulfillment of the individual, and not as something limited to obligations imposed by one’s interaction with others. From the point of view of conventional morality, the surprising result was that the demand connected with self-fulfillment was perceived by many respondents to override – indeed, that it should override – what they perceived as a moral obligation.

These findings serve as a starting point for a distinction that I suggest between what I shall call “conventional morality” and “practical morality”. By the “conventional morality”, I mean the way people generally understand morality – the meaning of the term, its content, and its attributes. The notion of morality is used quite broadly in our culture. We speak of a moral person, a moral act, moral judgment, a moral point of view, etc., and generally speaking, people understand what these terms mean. There is sufficient agreement among people as to the meaning of morality for communication to take place. If we ask a person, “What is morality?”, he may hesitate in formulating his answer, but ultimately he will come up with an answer not too different from the answer given to the same question by other people in the same culture. It is this common core of people’s formulation of what morality is, that I call

"conventional morality". In general, the conventional perception of morality involves a system of rules which dictate behavior within the sphere of interaction between people. A moral person is one who behaves according to these rules.

My claim is that, besides morality as perceived, one may also speak of a "practical morality", a conception of morality which is manifested in people's actual behavior and is different from "conventional morality". It is perhaps important to make it quite clear that I do not mean by this the disparity between moral judgment and moral behavior; this is not the phenomenon I am referring to. This disparity may indicate a weak will, ignorance, rejection of morality, or evil, but it does not reflect a particular conception of morality. What I mean by "practical morality" is the conception embodied in moral behavior in the normative sense of the term morality, behavior which derives from moral judgment, from an acceptance of morality and an intention to be a good person. Such a conception is manifested in a person's consideration, by the weight she gives to each of these, the choices she makes, the emotions she experiences while making the choices, and by the course she follows after making a decision. The claim is that the principles which guide moral behavior do not correspond to "conventional morality"; indeed, they even may run contrary to it. And since I do not want to claim that a person is subject to a perpetual conflict between the two conceptions of morality, and since "conventional morality" is the one that people are aware of (even though their notion of conventional morality cannot always be easily formulated), I come to the conclusion that people tend to be unaware of their "practical morality". And this is not a repressed Freudian unconsciousness; rather, it is a kind of unawareness typical of common patterns of behavior which have not been formulated.

"Practical morality" represents knowledge of the sort which Polanyi called tacit knowledge, or what Schon called knowledge in action. The source of this knowledge is the totality of man's experience. This knowledge includes a series of issues which are supposed to be relevant to moral decision-making, and a procedure for making this decision. This knowledge guides a person's moral behavior, and thus we may say that therein lies a person's conception of morality. And in the same way that Nisbet and Wilson's subjects, when asked about the principle which guided their non-moral choice, sought answers in conventional perceptions of behavior, so too the average person persists in clinging to

the conventional conception of morality. The above description does not explain how the gap between conventional and practical morality is sustained. Why does a person not achieve an awareness of practical morality? I shall return to this question toward the end of my talk; but before I do so, let me draw the main lines in the distinction between the two kinds of morality that I have mentioned – conventional and practical.

The proposed distinction is not original. It is based on philosophical discussions and had its sharpest expression in an influential article by Anscomb forty years ago. Anscomb claimed that modern philosophy of morality, under the influence of the judeo-christian tradition, seeks a legalistic foundation for an obligatory morality. But this is a pursuit which has no chance of succeeding in the secular world. Anscomb points out two principal features of this system: it refers to behaviors which are well-defined, and it establishes an obligation in a strong sense of the term. Anscomb proposed that this understanding of morality, as one which represents binding obligations, is not suitable for the modern era, and she called upon philosophers to reexamine their conception of morality. She also suggested that the theory of virtue, as set forth by Aristotle, could serve as a more appropriate starting point for a modern-day approach to morality. Anscomb's call reverberated throughout philosophical thinking, and virtue theory is enjoying a philosophical reawakening today.

Both the claim that the conventional understanding of morality does not correspond to practical morality, and the characterization of practical morality, can be approached from different points of departure – philosophical, historical, sociological, and perhaps even literary – may rely upon different sources. My own point of departure is psychological, that is to say, an examination of the behavior and thoughts of individuals. My sources are studies I have conducted regarding moral judgment and moral choice. These studies, like the one I presented at the beginning of my talk, were not designed to verify the current claim, and they cannot serve as proof thereof. They are useful as illustrations of the claim raised above, the test of which is its heuristic and explanatory value. Let me give you a few of the key findings relevant to our subject.

Firstly, moral demand is not understood as imposing an absolute obligation. Respondents allow themselves to diverge from morality, in order to achieve a personal objective, believing that in doing so they are not removing themselves from the moral community. They view

themselves as moral, and at the same time allow themselves to be imperfect. They seek to be "reasonably moral". This degree of moderation is not determined on the basis of one act alone, but rather is determined by the generality of an individual's behavior over a given period of time. In other words, a person's behavior is guided by will and intention to achieve a level of perfection over time.

Secondly, however, this perfection is determined not only by one's moral behavior, in the narrow meaning of the term, but also by other considerations. These include social values like loyalty to one's group, values which appear to be universal, like the acquisition of knowledge and the development of personal autonomy, as well as personal values like the fulfillment of personal goals. Indeed – and this is the third point – a person's ethical choice is viewed as leaving room for the influence of subjective factors unique to the individual; so an important consideration in man's ethical choices, that is, choices which he perceives as desirable and correct, is the consideration of loyalty to one's identity, loyalty which requires that a person give expression to values which she perceives as central to her.

These findings lead me to delineate three important and interconnected distinctions, between what I have termed the "conventional" conception of morality, and "practical morality". These basic differences are rich in content, and carry with them a number of secondary distinctions, some of which I shall touch upon briefly.

1. At the risk of over-generalizing, I shall say that the picture of conventional morality -- and the predominant view among psychologists -- is constructed along the lines of the legal model: a system of injunctions, mostly prohibitions, which are backed by sanctions. The laws of this system are understood to have external validity – divine, social or even logical. These laws are perceived as providing objective standards for evaluating every behavior option which may be open to the individual. The other side of this coin is that morality is understood as focusing upon behavior. This conception of morality means that moral judgment must relate only to the behavior to be judged, and not to characteristics of the person or of the broader context of the act being judged. These are the qualities of impartiality and objectivity required of a judge. A person's characteristics, and the specific circumstances, may have an influence on punishment, but not on judgment. "Practical morality", as it is illustrated

by the research findings I described earlier, presents a fundamentally different picture. In this picture, the starting point for morality is not the evaluation of specific behavior, but rather an evaluation of the person. The principle which directs ethical behavior is not whether specific behavior is permitted or forbidden, but rather what is one's standing as a good person, and what this particular conduct does to this standing. Moral rules serve as a tool for evaluating behavior, but this evaluation is only one factor within a broad system of facts and considerations. Such ethical decision does not aim to be impartial and objective but leaves room for considerations unique to the person being judged.

2. Under the conventional conception, morality is viewed as a command, a duty to be obeyed absolutely. This is a key feature of morality as understood by traditional philosophy, but also in the common-sense conception of the word. Morality does more than merely suggest the correct behavior, or advise one how to behave; it commands one to behave correctly, and one must submit to the authority of morality. This feature of morality is also salient in psychological theories of morality, Freudian and cognitive, which follow from Kant's conception of the categorical imperative.

"Practical morality" reveals quite a different face. Certainly, the morality which is reflected in behavior has a normative character. It tells us what behavior is proper, the type of conduct expected of a good person. But, as the results of our research indicate, and perhaps our experience as well, it lacks a conception of inherent obligation. An outstanding example of this is what I have termed "limited morality", which aims at an "acceptable level or moral perfection.

3. According to the conventional conception, morality rests upon a system of motivation which is unique, and which is based on the principle of avoidance of guilt and shame. We are speaking of having pangs of conscience. And if there is a positive parallel to guilt, it is a weak one. The approach which views morality as an obligatory system of rules, needs to suppose a kind of strong motivation which backs up morality. Otherwise, the obligation is meaningless. However, the idea that morality has unique motivation is also guided by the central fact of morality: that people repress personal desires and personal plans because of moral considerations. This fact was the starting point for Freud's thinking about morality in terms of the capacity of the superego to punish (and to a lesser extent, to reward) in the form of guilt feelings.

individual expects himself to satisfy this demand. And not answering to this demand requires a justification, usually in terms of another important consideration. Moreover, though the force of the demand is more "moderate" in practical morality, its scope is more broad. A person is expected to be faithful to every element of his identity, and to give expression to all of these elements, and not only to avoid moral transgressions. And beyond all these things, he is expected to be true to himself, to take a comprehensive position of sincerity and loyalty to oneself. The practical morality which merges from our description does not involve a break-down, but rather is aimed at a full life in a very broad spectrum of man's daily life.

We haven't come to the conclusion of this lecture, but not before returning to the question hinted above – how, or in what way, is it possible that the conception entailed by practical morality does not enjoy a developed awareness in the consciousness of the person? How is it that this does not alter the conventional conception of morality? It is very tempting to invoke the words of Nietzsche that the religious conception of morality has such a strong hold on us that hundreds of years will be necessary to change it. This strong hold may derive from emotional, cognitive and social factors. It is difficult to deny that morality has a deep emotional foundation. This foundation, which is related both to religious beliefs and to moral socialization, was apparently deeper in Freud's time, but we must not assume that it has disappeared in our own era. From a cognitive point of view, the difficulty in changing the conventional conception may actually be inherent, in that the framework which this conception presents does not allow for analysis and understanding in terms of the conception of the good and the notion of human perfection, which are hardly part of everyday language. But it may be that the most important factor in maintaining the conventional conception of morality is social. Society, and the individuals within it, still need the conventional conception of morality as an anchor which ensures that practical morality will not be carried away by the storm of the new times.